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The international marketing of South Africa's fresh fruits appears to have been given scant 
coverage in its educational institutions. This is unusual considering that the fruit exporting 
industry is 120 years old in this country. It could be symptomatic of several things. Firstly, 
the industry had its marketing arm regulated for many decades by government. Secondly, 
the industry has preferred to prioritize production matters ahead of marketing matters. 
Thirdly, it is a silent commentary on the entrepreneurial - rather than the academic - profile 
of the typical South African fruit-marketing agent today. 
A privileged industry position carries with it the responsibility of recording events, even if it 
is just for posterity's sake. If this work opens a Pandora's box of research in the marketing 
aspect of the fruit export business, the effort will have been worthwhile. It is really hoped 
that this discourse will contribute towards educational material that furthers the 
understanding of those carrying the torch for our industry - especially for emerging farmers 
wanting to market their table grapes abroad successfully one day. 
To the legion of industry executives that have given generously of their time and 
knowledge, I am deeply indebted. Some of them were particularly outspoken, and the trust 
that they have put in me to safeguard their recorded candidness has been most gratifying. 
This dissertation has been written during a period in which financial returns in the table 
grape export industry have been lacklustre to say the least. The world in which grape 
producers and exporters operate has morphed beyond all recognition in the last 10 years -
such has been the pace of our globalizing world. 
To my father who fought his terminal illness with unprecedented bravery, I salute you with 
this effort. And to my wife, Gail, who has patiently watched this unfold - you were the wind 











This discourse uses three of Porter's competitiveness determinants to offer a number of 
interventions to the leadership of the South African table grape export industry. The first 
intervention considers how exporters can improve their relationships with the major UK 
supermarkets. It proposes that suppliers should increase their product penetration, deliver 
more carefully targeted product more evenly across the season and divert surplus product 
into alternative markets to the UK. It further proposes that suppliers should address UK 
supermarket power by opening formal dialogue with the UK's Office of Fair Trading. 
Amongst other things, this buy-supply forum could ensure that a regulator was appointed to 
manage the buy-supply relationship, that buyers gave timeous prices to suppliers, that 
sales account formats were standardized and that supermarkets were disallowed from 
selling at below cost price. 
The second intervention examines how supporting industries and service providers can 
increase their rate of post-harvest research and innovation. This could be achieved by 
addressing container technology, integrated packaging solutions, alternative treatments for 
diseases and pest control, non-destructive techniques for assessing fruit quality, new 
cultivar development and the establishment of an industry information hub. The drivers of 
innovation could, amongst others, be further bolstered by the synergistic use of resources, 
the effective transfer of new technology and a revision of the current research model. 
The third intervention analyzes the strategy, structure and rivalry of the table grape export 
sector. Product quality could be enhanced by eliminating unwanted varieties, raising 
minimum export standards and revising handling protocols. Service quality could be 
improved by substantially revising what services should be offered by the PPECB, by 
ensuring that all exporters are accredited in line with the exporter association's code of 
conduct and by training programmes that would raise the standards across the whole value 
chain. Finally, entrepreneurial leadership was required to move the industry mindset from 












The South African Fruit Industry is renowned for being an industry of acronyms. The 
































Agricultural Business Chamber 
Bunker Adjustment Factor 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Black Economic Empowerment 
Berg River Table Grape Association (producer organization) 
Currency Adjustment Factor 
Competition Commission 
Current Competitive Index 
Centre for International Agricultural Marketing and Development 
Cost Insurance Freight 
Cape Town Container Terminal 
Deciduous Fruit Board 
Deciduous Fruit Producers' Trust 
Delivered in Port 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Science & Technology 
Department of Trade & Industry 
Efficient Consumer Response 
Electronic Data Interchange 
Every Day Low Prices 
European Union 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Forty Foot Equivalent Unit 
Free on Board (Incoterm used in shipping) 
Fresh Produce Exporters' Forum 
Fresh Produce Journal (UK Publication) 
Fresh Produce Terminals 
Fruit South Africa 
Great Britain Pound 
Growth Competitive Index 














































Hazard Access Control Points 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Hex River Table Grape Association (producer organization) 
Institute of Management Development 
Intellectual Property 
International Standards Organization (e.g. ISO 9000) 
Minimum Guaranteed Price 
Multinational Company 
Maximum Residue Level 
National Agricultural Marketing Council 
Non-Governmental Organization 
National Department of Agriculture 
National Productivity and Competitiveness Council (Mauritius) 
Northern Province Table Grape Producers' Association 
Office of Fair Trading (UK) 
Orange River Producers' Association 
Perishable Products Export Control Board 
Relative Comparative Advantage 
Radio Frequency Identification 
South Africa 
South African European Conference Service 
South African Plant Improvement Organization 
South African Revenue Services 
South African Table Grape Producers' Association 
South African Table Grape Industry (producer and exporter body) 
Southern Hemisphere Association of Fresh Fruit Exporters 
Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit 
Transnational Company 
Transnet National Port Authorities (previously National Port Authorities, NPA) 
Taylor Nelson Sofres (research house, UK) 
Transnet Port Terminals (previously SA Port Operators, SAPO) 
United Stats of America 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 
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Chapter 1: Setting the Competitiveness Stage 
1.1 Purpose, Methodology and Structure of the Dissertation 
The primary objective of this thesis is to offer the table grape export industry a few 
interventions for improving its competitiveness to the United Kingdom market. However the 
intricacies of exporting a perishable product over considerable distances - in the face of 
fierce competition and dominant buyers - need to be understood before such 
recommendations can be made. Information on exporting fruit in a relatively new free-
market system in South Africa is not readily available in industry or university libraries. 
Therefore, putting this thesis together involved interviewing many local executives and 
referring to international journals written by those familiar with the demand-end of the chain 
in particular. 
The secondary objective of this dissertation is to provide - on behalf of the fruit export 
sector - an up-to-date account of how the table grape export business to the UK actually 
works. The deregulation of the South African agricultural sector yielded a few unintended 
consequences, one of which was the fragmentation of - and in some cases a complete loss 
of - information on certain aspects of the business. In today's knowledge economy, it is 
incumbent on the leadership of the export fraternity to return this information to the industry 
table. Otherwise, without business intelligence and the systems that provide it, the industry 
stands little chance of becoming globally competitive and a leader in its field. There is no 
role-player better positioned in the export value chain than the exporter himself to provide 
this information, as he is responsible for the procurement, sale and successful movement 
of the goods from the farm gate right through to the supermarket shelf overseas. 
The fast-changing nature of the business has meant that some of the material compiled 
over the last three years for this work is already out of date. Despite this, it is hoped that the 
material is still sufficiently accurate to make the recommendations relevant (even if some of 
the recommendations have already been implemented). The dissertation is structured in 
such a way that it deals first with the procurement of product to fill UK supermarket 
programmes secured by the exporter. It then deals with how the products and services are 
managed at the South African end of the logistics chain to meet the ever-changing market 
demands. A major thrust of this thesis is to unequivocally instil a market-led culture 










can reach new heights. The five chapters making up this dissertation unfold in the following 
manner. 
Chapter 1 sets the stage for the discourse by describing the eventful history of the 
industry's evolving competitiveness since its inception in the late 19th Century. Rather than 
trying to capture an elusive definition of competitiveness, the writer examines the 
development of competitiveness via historical economic thought, global composite indices 
and contemporary themes underpinning the topic. The measured competitiveness trend of 
the South African agribusiness sector is assessed over a 50-year period right up until 2007, 
and three of Porter's determinants on which this dissertation is built are identified. The 
bicephalic structures of the South African table grape industry are described, along with the 
remaining fruit industry structures. The chapter concludes with the South African table 
grape production and export statistics being put in a global context. 
Chapter 2 describes the brittle nature of the grape product, including its varieties, 
production regions and intake weeks across the 26-week season. The various ways in 
which the product can be differentiated in the UK market are highlighted. The de-
concentration of the export sector is examined over the deregulated period, and the key 
drivers of the various models of the export companies - especially the marketing agents 
and the producer-exporters - are evaluated in detail. The procurement strategies that the 
larger marketing agents have exploited to keep the encroachment of smaller export 
companies out of the mainstream of the table grape export business are explained. Finally, 
the financial procurement tools used by marketing agents in the form of loans, 
disbursements and minimum guaranteed prices are analyzed, including the risk-
management strategies that the agents need to take in order to protect and stabilize their 
export businesses. 
Chapter 3 looks at the logistics chain, and investigates the major changes in the 
international transport sector, especially the conventional and containerized shipping 
sectors. The major drivers of change in the trade chain are noted, including the effect that 
they are having on the flow of table grapes through the South African end of the chain to 
the UK market. Five critical areas affecting the congestion of product in the port of Cape 
Town are evaluated, namely underinvestment in port infrastructure, disorganized exporters, 
parastatal impotence, overly powerful shipping lines and the volume pressures in the peak 
exporting weeks. Finally, post-harvest innovation in the value chain is investigated in terms 









disease management of the product, and the provision of accurate, real time information for 
all stakeholders. 
Chapter 4 looks at the rise to prominence of the retail grocery sector in the UK over the last 
30 years, and the metamorphosis of the UK wholesale markets as a result of the growth of 
the retail sector. Internal and external competitive forces are examined in the pre- and post-
Christmas sales windows of the falling price market of the UK. The use of category 
management to sustain retailer power upstream and downstream in the buy-supply 
relationship is analyzed along with the first-tier supplier insecurity that it breeds. The 
mechanics of a UK supermarket programme are assessed in terms of how retailer 
behaviour gives rise to late price indication, product over-procurement and limited 
alternative outlets for suppliers. The buy-supply relationship is considered using examples 
that support the organizational theories of distributive, procedural and interactive justice. 
The cost chain to the UK is studied to ascertain the levels of profitability available under 
certain conditions of supply; and then game theory follows to demonstrate price and 
volume dilemmas encountered by competing suppliers. Finally, the major retailer trends 
covered indicate the current market power enjoyed by the major UK supermarkets over 
their suppliers. 
Chapter 5 draws some conclusions and makes recommendations to industry around the 
three Porter determinants identified early in the dissertation. These three determinants 
cover the market power exercised by UK supermarkets on their South African table grape 
suppliers; the value-adding role of service providers in the logistics chain and their need to 
innovate - and address innovation inhibitors - in order to stay competitive; and finally the 
transformation of the table grape export sector in terms of its structure, leadership and 
quality of products and services. 
The Appendix gives readers an insight into what South Africa's major competitor, Chile, 
has done to earn its current global reputation as the leading Southern Hemisphere supplier 
of table grapes to the EU market. It is worth mentioning that South African table grape 
producers and exporters have revered many of Chile's business practices during the 
deregulated era; and she is often cited in industry meetings as the leading example to 










1.2 Evolution of the SA Table Grape Export Industry 
Precious few books detail the history of the deciduous fruit industry.! However, these books 
uncannily reveal the same issues that have continued to compromise the industry's 
competitiveness from one decade to the next over the last 120 years. Whilst the issues of 
today are likely to be on a grander scale and of a more sophisticated nature compared to 
yesteryear, it is probably fair to say that the more things have changed, the more they have 
stayed the same. Explosive production volumes, oversupply, uncoordinated sales, inability 
to organize, logistical inefficiencies, wars, port congestions, natural catastrophes, product 
quality challenges and governments suffering from inertia have been some of the recurring 
challenges through the decades. With the number of people currently employed by and 
dependent on the table grape industry,2 there remains an enormous social responsibility 
facing those in industry leadership positions to help companies sustain and improve their 
competitive positions. And it is the leadership's task in the free-market system operating 
today to find innovative and enduring solutions that are palatable to the majority. 
This section is a synopsis of two books: The Tree of Life (Stander, 1986) and 160 Years of 
Export (De Beer et ai, 2003), and it serves three purposes. Firstly, the colourful history of 
this industry provides a valuable backdrop to the competitive complexities so characteristic 
of this industry. Secondly, the gargantuan challenges that cropped up in successive 
decades demonstrate the ongoing hurdles that the industry has had to jump in order to 
survive and thrive. Thirdly, it demonstrates the enormous distance the industry has come 
since its inception. It is also entertaining to read the somewhat antiquated opinions that 
observers of those times used to express - with lofty phraseology - their disdain for certain 
industry practices. 
1.2.1 1882 to the Start of World War II 
In the late 19th century, the virginal Cape Colony had been similarly compared to the vast 
fruit growing State of California in terms of climate and soils. And so it was that the grape' 
export industry that lay in waiting was fertile ground for entrepreneurs such as Cecil 
I The deciduous fruit sector in South Africa is made up of three industries: the table grape industry, the apple and pear 
(pome) industry and the stone fruit industry (which comprises apricots, plums, peaches and nectarines). 
2 In 2006, there were 36 949 full-time employees and 147 796 dependents in the table grape production industry alone 
(OABS, 2006). 
3 The grape industry in this dissertation refers to the export orientated industry of fresh table grapes. It does not pertain to 










Rhodes (financier), Percy Molteno (shipping guru), Harry Pickstone (professional 
nurseryman) and Leicester Dicey (exporter). These pioneering godfathers of the industry 
were demonstrative then of the human capital so necessary in birthing, and maintaining, a 
successful industry. Export trials began, and the first grapes 'exported' were Hanepoot 
grapes, wrapped in newspaper, and mollycoddled by their accompanying entrepreneur 
aboard a mail ship destined for England. Miraculously, the grapes survived the 19-day 
journey . .J Commercial volumes were later loaded into a crudely constructed 'cool chamber' 
on a similar mail ship to the first. But disaster followed as this commercial consignment 
arrived in inedible condition - most likely because the grapes had been packed with 'fowls, 
carcasses of beef, hams, livers, all looking and feeling as if they were ice'. 
Apart from the technical challenge of shipping table grapes to England at the end of the 
19th century, there was the added challenge that English consumers were not big eaters of 
grapes in their winter. 5 An additional marketing observation at the time was that the thin-
skinned muscatel grape being shipped was not what the market wanted, and that such a 
skin was easily abraded by the wood wool that was used as cushion packaging. In order to 
compete with the Portuguese and Tasmanians who were successfully shipping their fruits 
to England at that time, Percy Molteno observed simply, but profoundly, that unsuccessful 
South African shipments had failed 'for the want of the necessary knowledge as to the kind 
of fruit to send, the mode of packaging, and the temperature to be observed; and that it was 
necessary to substitute accurate observations and experiment for haphazard chance' 
(Stander, 1986:10). Molteno made an additional observation of the mistakes that the 
Tasmanians had been making in the marketing of their fruits in England (which would 
compromise the competitiveness of the South African grape exporters if they were unwilling 
to learn from others' mistakes). The Tasmanians handed their fruit to a great number of 
brokers for disposal. If shippers consign their parcels to various brokers indiscriminately, 
these brokers must necessarily sell all their fruit at the same time, thus dividing the buyers 
and lowering prices by reducing the competition. In this way the monopoly value attaching 
to Cape fruits is almost wholly lost' (Stander, 1986: 11). 
In terms of the packaging of grapes at the time, it was observed that 'sawdust gave a 
flavour to the fruit, bran caused heating, paper strips were not a success and cork was too 
expensive. Finally packers discovered the use of wood wool and an open-sided crate which 
allowed for proper ventilation' (Stander, 1986: 14). 
4 Today this same journey takes about 12 days. 
5 South African grapes are harvested in the South African summer and immediately shipped to the counter-seasonal UK 










A visiting Professor Wallace also noted 'that the use of seedlings - instead of grafted vines -
was producing bastard refuse without a name and without a single quality to recommend it' 
(Stander, 1986: 14). A certain Mr Butters, a visiting Tramway entrepreneur from California, 
claimed at the turn of the 19th century, that in reference to the successful California Fruit 
Union, 'specialization was one means to success: but the great and indispensable means 
was organization' (Stander, 1986: 14). 
The Western Province Exporters' Association was formed in 1899 as a co-operative 
marketing body to: (1) standardize box sizes; (2) employ a single overseas marketing 
agent; (3) ensure the provision of crop estimates to the shipping companies; and (4) press 
for the building of cold storage facilities at the docks. This last point produced the world's 
first pre-cooling chamber which ensured that fruit was cooled before being loaded onto the 
ship. A Horticultural Board was formed in which scientists researched issues surrounding 
pest management and fruit inspections. The latter was controversial, simply because there 
were those who believed that they selected and packed with care and therefore needed no 
supervision; yet fruit of varying quality continued to arrive in the market place (suggesting 
fruit inspections were indeed a necessity). It was the government of the day at the 
formation of the Union in 1910 that insisted that fruit inspections became compulsory. 'The 
buyer likes to buy according to a guaranteed standard and apart from the confidence 
established under a strict system of inspection and grading, it undoubtedly facilitates 
business and improves prices' (Stander, 1986: 18). And it was the South African Fruit 
Export Act of 1914 that provided another world first in this regard. It laid down the 
regulations governing fruit quality, namely packaging methods, fruit sizes and quality 
standards. 
World War I had the effect of cutting off the UK and European markets from South African 
table grape supplies. This spurred the South African industry leadership on to nurturing the 
local market, investigating the possibility of a local fruit-canning industry and finding new 
export markets in Africa, Asia and South America. Interestingly, the producer ranks were 
swelled at the end of the war by soldiers who sought refuge in quieter places with an easier 
lifestyle, such as the farmsteads amongst the South African vineyards. In 1922 the poor 
performance of the industry during the peak weeks of exporting grapes through the Cape 
Town port led to an investigation committee being formed. It determined that the port 
facilities were inadequate and that congestion was consequently unavoidable. Members of 
that committee might have been alarmed to find the same issues still confronting the Cape 










In the early 1920s, attempts to organize the industry to avoid unnecessary government 
interference were achieved through the amalgamation of citrus producers (from the north) 
and deciduous producers (from the south) through the Fruit Growers' Co-operative 
Exchange of South Africa. In 1924 a commission of enquiry had been established to 
determine what could be done about the volume-based growth pains being experienced by 
the industry. Some of the issues tabled were temperature control at the quayside, duty on 
boxwood, packing and transport methods. Dissent over control of the Exchange led to its 
demise when the Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) - a supposedly 
neutral state institution - was established via an Act to wrestle shipping control and other 
matters away from the Exchange's disagreeable members. 6 
During the period just prior to World War II, some valuable technological innovations were 
made. 'Circulating air' in storage was introduced into mail ships which improved the 
condition of the fruit. The 'skid' was invented where wooden platforms on cast-iron wheels 
made moving a consignment of grape boxes easier from one point to the next. This 
avoided each box from having to be handled in break-bulk fashion from the cold store (on 
the quayside) and onto the ship. And the fewer times a box was handled, the less abrasive 
the wood wool and wooden boxes were on bruising the fruit. 4-tonne cranes were used to 
maximum capacity by lifting fully laden skids of boxes simultaneously on to a ship. This 
logistical efficiency seems a simple innovation now, but at the time was a significant 
breakthrough on quality and costs. 
The depression of 1929 caused concern amongst growers, and the decision was made to 
manage the marketing of grapes offshore from a central marketing office. The first 
manager, Mr Dykes, had observed coal merchants and librarians selling South Africa's 
fruits in the UK. In 1932 he complained that 'fruit of indifferent quality is becoming 
increasingly hard to sell and is tending to damage the whole industry'; and that 'the fruit 
was being harvested at the minimum of maturity and quality sufficient to pass the all-too-
tolerant requirements of the Government Grading Regulations' (Stander, 1986: 22). 
6 Bickering politicians and conniving capitalists in the Exchange were blamed for speculating with the shipping space for 
personal financial gain at the expense of the industry. Therefore, one of the functions of the PPECB, as a government-based, 










1.2.2 Legislative Changes Around World War II 7 
With the decline in profitability of the industry, and the onset of World War II, the re-
organization of the fruit industry was perceived as being essential at the time. In 1939 the 
SA government required the citrus and deciduous industries to consider control measures 
under two Acts of Parliament: the Marketing Act and the War Measures Act, which would 
allow the industry to qualify for state subsidies in the face of war and discontinued exports. 
Producers would need large loans from the government to replace credit formerly obtained 
from the marketing agents for production and packaging costs. However, a precondition of 
a state loan required a representative organization under the Marketing Act (no 26 of 1937) 
through which these state funds could be channelled to the producers. The Deciduous Fruit 
Board (DFB) was therefore constituted, under proclamation 250 of 1939 known as the 
Deciduous Fruit Regulatory Scheme. Both export and local fruit matters were to be 
managed under this Scheme. 
By the late 1940s, the powers of the DFB were strengthened after the findings of the Raats 
and MacDonald Commissions of enquiry, and the following functions were incorporated 
within the DFB's portfolio: centralized packing, the pooling of proceeds8 (including transport 
and other costs), the complete revision of the local market grading and packing regulations, 
the standardization of packaging, the discontinuation of innumerable individual brands and 
the rationalization of sales channels. The original Scheme (of 1939) was again reviewed 
and replaced by an amended Scheme in 1951 that eventually gave the DFB full plenary 
powers that determined its total control over every aspect of the deciduous fruit business 
for three full decades thereafter. 
The menacing U-boats of World War II eventually put paid to South African grapes 
reaching England - but not before the DFB had been promulgated in law, and the British-
issued, permit-based restrictions had allowed some fruit through the net in the early years 
of the war. The underlying objective of the DFB was to ensure that the industry could 
somehow survive the war without foreign income. Financial rescue packages included 
generous loans from the Land Bank to producers, and subsidies to export growers. Drying 
. The legislative changes described here are drawn from "The Controlled Marketing of South African Deciduous Fruit 1951 to 
1980" (Bestbier, 1985). 
8 Producers' fruit was pooled in a sense that an average price was paid to every farmer for his grape consignment, 
irrespective of when and where the fruit had been sold. The disadvantage of the pooling system was that it did not reward 
quality-orientated producers. In fact it encouraged producers to pack to the lowest possible standard because if they could get 
'pool participation' for marginal fruit, they would receive the 'pool price'. Another disadvantage of pooling fruit was that it hid 
information from the growers regarding the actual prices received for the fruit from each specific market. The major 
advantages of the pooling system were that it spread the growers' risks across a number of markets and facilitated the 










yards were built for raisin supplies to the British War Ministry, even though these ran at a 
loss. The potential of the local market was revisited, and wineries and distilleries were built 
to soak up the product, which was otherwise destined for dumping - something that was 
socially unacceptable considering the plight of the hungry. Optimum use was made of the 
idle cold stores in the ports as temporary depots for inland markets. A number of DFB 
policies also helped manage the efficient and effective supply of fruit to consumers: the 
maintenance of quality, the avoidance of oversupply and the substitution of hundreds of 
growers' labels with the single "DFB" label. 9 And it was only years after the war that, once 
the commandeered ships had finished repatriating allied troops back home, did refrigerated 
space once more become available for fresh produce shipments to begin. The war cloud 
had a silver lining, for it encouraged access for South African grapes to other, smaller 
markets like Sweden, parts of the European Continent and the United States. 
1.2.3 The Roaring Fifties 
The war had produced a lackadaisical attitude towards quality, and the quest for zero 
defects began in earnest. This was particularly necessary in the light of exploding 
production volumes. The wartime emergencies that included the formation of the DFB were 
suspended and the industry was left to manage itself ... within the confines of the law and 
the newly promulgated Marketing Act. The Deciduous Fruit Scheme drawn up in 1951 also 
ensured that the Board of the DFB did not exceed its powers in terms of appointing agents, 
controlling prices and restricting people's freedom - though the Scheme was not without its 
inadequacies. 
In this decade the government signed a 10-year contract with the SA Conference Lines 
guaranteeing shipping space for export products for that whole period. The closing of the 
Suez Canal meant congestion at Cape Point and the DFB had to pay shipping lines extra 
fuel costs to make up for lost time. 1o In January 1959 the entire pre-cooling facilities at the 
Table Bay docks were gutted by fire. However there were two interesting spin-offs from the 
fire: the already approved expansion programme of the pre-cooling facilities was 
implemented immediately with a greater sense of urgency than had existed before the fire; 
and the concept of introducing a quota system - as a result of a hiatus in supply - caught 
the attention of the authorities and was used effectively at a later stage. A good example of 
9 This was a different marque to the "Cape" label, which came later in the 1960s. 
10 The ships to Mediterranean Europe would have to go via the west coast of Africa and through the straits of Gibraltar. This 
was a longer journey than going via the Suez Canal. So the DFB had to pay the shipping lines for the extra fuel used so that 










industry ingenuity resulted from this fire. 4000 tonnes of grapes that had not been pre-
cooled - because of the incinerated facilities - were loaded onto a ship. The ship was then 
ordered to sail immediately into the very cold Benguela current (up the west coast of Africa) 
for as long as possible, essentially to cool the consignment of grapes. The shipment arrived 
in Southampton in mint condition, and was hailed as a triumph of an industry suffering 
adverse circumstances. 
1.2.4 The Challenging Sixties 
With burgeoning volumes came port congestion and shipping space crises. The 
appointment of a planning committee for such challenges pioneered the way for 
groundbreaking recommendations such as palletization, the inspection and pre-cooling of 
fruits inland (away from the ports), and improved handling protocols. All these 
recommendations were in search of more economical ways of achieving increased product 
flow through the chain. They culminated in a 7 -day loading week in the ports, something 
which had never before been achieved. The inland inspection undoubtedly served to 
increase the flow of fruit through the ports and onto the vessels. The "Cape" product brand 
was launched that was eventually to be placed alongside the Krugerrand and Appletizer 
brands in global market ratings. It became synonymous with 'high quality standards and 
dependability of service'. At the close of the decade, accounting ledgers in the DFB -
reportedly a metre wide to accommodate the entries - necessitated the introduction of 
computer systems to handle the volume of accounting traffic. 
1.2.5 The Progressive Seventies 
Corrugated, cardboard cartons started to gradually replace the wooden boxes. By the mid-
seventies, huge strides had been made in the metrication, design (the ventilation holes 
undoubtedly improved the quality of the product in the market) and on-site assembly in the 
pack houses of these boxes. This innovation was regarded as another 'world first', and 
additional benefits of the cardboard carton were: (1) the gentleness of it on the packers' 
hands (wood had been rough to handle); and (2) the production of standardized cardboard 
box sizes that made palletization much easier. 
In 1974, the South African Plant Improvement Organization (SAPia) was formed to 










through optimum production practices, could maximize yields per hectare and the quality of 
their fruit. But 'genetically superior clones, free of viruses and other diseases, were needed 
to improve the bloodstock of fruit-producing plants in the country. Such plant material has 
been shown, both experimentally and under commercial conditions, to be capable of yield 
increases (per hectare) of as much as 20%' (Stander, 1986: 49). In the case of grapes, 
such yield increases were around 50%. SAPIO, the development department of the DFB, 
immersed itself into propagation programmes for new cultivars, and crossbreeding took 
anything from 15 to 30 years to complete - a significant investment in time for the 
development of new cultivars. 
Pre-harvest and post-harvest treatments of fruit were understood to impact deeply on fruit 
quality. Containerization was introduced in the late 1970s, and constituted a major 
breakthrough in the minimization of fruit handling. Any logistical improvement made on the 
streamlining of fruit from the farm to the supermarket shelf in which multiple handlings of 
the fruit could be minimized, was prioritized. It was simple economics due to the fact that 
fruit handled fewer times had better quality results and fetched better prices in the market. 
By the end of this decade the 'orchard value' i.e. the gross income of producers minus the 
packing, storing and transport costs, was at 82% of gross income. This made exporting 
table grapes very profitable indeed. 
At the close of this decade, the marketing personnel in Europe were making interesting 
observations. 'The single label, with fruit graded and packed to uniform standards, gave an 
opportunity to measure demand, to plot price trends and to determine the influence of 
various outside factors - all the techniques so essential to modern business' (Stander, 
1986: 44). They further added that 'our purpose must not be to maximize price, but to 
maximize returns for our produce - not just for one year, but consistently over a period of 
years' (Stander, 1986: 44). By developing the pooling system, the DFB wanted producers 
to concentrate on the economical production of fruit. The DFB had through the years 
established a significant rapport with certain agents (panelists) and the consolidation of 
support for the identified few meant that, by the end of the 1970s, most of the other 
overseas agents had fallen by the wayside in favour of the privileged panelists. II At this 
stage three types of selling system were in use in South Africa's overseas markets: (1) 
consignment sales to England; (2) auction systems in Europe with additional movement of 
II These panellists were Albert Jacobs in the Benelux countries, Gerd Schubak in Germany, Josef Soderquist in Switzerland 
and Scandanavia, Rune Rydberg in Denmark and Finland, Gaby Corchia in France, Peng Boon in Hong Kong and Art Fisher 










product through the wholesale and retail trades; and (3) Free on Board (F.O.B.) sales to the 
Middle East buyers who took possession of fruit on the ship in the South African ports. 
1.2.6 The Costly Eighties & Topsy-Turvy Early Nineties 
Louis Kriel (snr), the Chief Executive of the DFB spoke of the 'ruinous costs' of the 1980s. 
As South Africa's political polecat status unfolded, so did her economy continue to suffer its 
truncation from the global economy. Boycotts were rife. Double-digit inflation continued 
relentlessly. Input costs for producers rose steeply. A depreciating rand against the dollar 
put rand-denominated shipping costs at unseen levels. With increasing competition in 
overseas markets, prices flattened, profit margins shrank and growth was severely curbed. 
Interest rates marched upwards. Economic recession hit hard. Producers started seeking 
investments away from their farms. Research, an area where innovation can take an 
industry a quantum leap forward in challenging times, was under-staffed and under-
financed. It was noted that 'South Africa allocated only 0.5% of its gross agricultural income 
to research, compared with 2.5% for most Western countries' (Stander, 1986: 51). All the 
industry could do was to declare war on costs, though two areas were difficult to contain in 
this regard: the reliance on government related monopolies in the chain, and the costs of 
imported goods arising out of a fluctuating and steadily declining rand. 
Unifruco was founded in 1987 which gave export producers direct shareholding in the 
deciduous fruit industry. In 1988, late harvest grapes were exported for the first time, and 
several new local grape varieties were also commercially exported. In 1989 the Orange 
River gained importance as a grape production area, exporting more than a million cartons 
for the season. 12 Lauritzen Cool developed a 40-foot integral container 13 which would 
change the economics of the grape exporting environment yet again. And in this period, a 
new grape carton dimension was introduced that had a suitable 'footprint' for the two most 
commonly used pallet sizes. 
Throughout the eighties and early nineties, the liberalization and globalization of world 
trade had pre-empted the dismantling of regulated industries worldwide. Coupled with the 
first democratic elections in South Africa and the introduction of a new government in 1994, 
macro-changes were in the air. Before the actual deregulation of the South African fruit 
12 The Orange River region exported close on 12 million 4.5kg equivalent cartons in 2007. 
13 Up to this point, only 20-foot porthole containers had been in operation. Using a 40-foot integral container achieved the 










industry, entrepreneurs had already sniffed the winds of change. As early as 1995, 
exporting companies were positioning themselves by shipping grapes in a clandestine 
fashion out of South Africa i.e. without the approval of the former authorities of the 
regulated channels. These conditions all set the scene for a totally new export dispensation 
to unfold. This dissertation deals with the onset of deregulation that took hold of the South 










1.3 What Constitutes Competitiveness? 
Many innovative measures were taken by the industry in its first 100 years to remain a 
viable supplier of fruit to its northern hemisphere customers. An attempt is made in this 
section to find a framework in which these competitive measures can be identified so that 
they can be addressed by industry and company leadership. Since competitiveness is a 
vast subject that can be scoped at many different levels, this section starts by taking a 
historical look at the evolving definitions of competitiveness. Various composite indices on 
competitiveness are also examined, and the section concludes by honing in on the 
underlying themes that permeate most definitions on the subject. 
There is a rich history of economic thought on competitiveness dating back to Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776. (A summary of these economic theories on 
competitiveness, including the personalities involved, their concepts and the mechanisms 
used to motivate their theories, can be found in table 1.1). Adam Smith postulated that the 
four input factors (land, capital, natural resources and labour) determined the absolute 
advantage of nations in international trade (Walter, 2005). Ricardo followed on from this in 
1817 to develop the concept of comparative advantage - one that stipulated that a nation 
should trade only those goods for which it had the greatest relative advantage to another 
trading nation (Zereyesus, 2003). In 1848, John Stuart Mill added a rider to this classical 
philosophy on competitiveness by suggesting that infant industries should be initially 
protected in order that they could later participate in comparative advantage trading 
opportunities. 
These classical economists believed principally that 'countries could reach their highest 
levels of income by maintaining open (unrestricted) international trade; that domestic 
production and consumption should be based on what prices foreigners were willing to 
trade at; and that governments should focus on ensuring competitive national markets by 
investing in public goods like research and education' (Van Rooyen et ai, 2000: 3). A 
subsequent school of economists that continued the debate on competitiveness issues was 
spawned in the first half of the 20th century. Their neoclassical models expanded on the 
concept of comparative advantage but challenged their predecessors' thinking. Their 
theories collectively postulated that there were five attributes contributing to an industry's 
comparative advantage: technological efficiency, factor intensity of different industries, 










By the start of the second half of the 20th century, economists were confronted by a fast-
changing world. Global production volumes and trade volumes had picked up substantially. 
Government interventions, through the likes of export subsidies and import restrictions, had 
rendered the 'unrestricted trade' idea a theoretical concept. As a result, measuring 
comparative advantage had become a real challenge. However in 1977, Balassa 
developed his analytical technique - called revealed comparative advantage (RCA) - in 
which a country's share of the world market in one commodity was measured against its 
share of all traded goods (Van Rooyen et ai, 2000). Porter (1990) introduced a more 
holistic view on competitiveness. He tabled six determinants of competitive advantage in 
his diamond model that incorporated real trading conditions. The six determinants were: (1) 
factor conditions; (2) demand conditions; (3) related and supporting industries; (4) firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry; (5) the role of government; and (6) the role of chance. 
Table 1.1 Foundations of Competitive Analysis 
Theories Key Concepts Mechanism(s) 
Classical Political Economy 
Adam Smith (1776) Market size, productivity Specialization, competition 
David Ricardo (1817) Comparative Advantage International Trade 
JS Mill (1848) Infant Industries Learning-by-doing 
JS Mill (1873) Politics of Protection Income Distribution 
Neoclassical Models 
Ricardo (1817) Technical Efficiency Single Key Resource 
Heckscher & Ohlin (1919,1933) Factor Intensity More Than One Resource 
Ricardo & Viner (1937) Special Factors Industry-Specific inputs 
Heckscher, Ohlin & Samuelson (1962) Consumer Demand Product Preference 
Salter & Swan (1959, 1960) Exchange Rates Non-Traded Goods, Inflation 
Challenges to Comparative Advantage 
Prebisch & Singer (1950) Import-Substitution External Terms of Trade 
AO Hirschman (1958) Development Strategy Inter-Industry Linkage 
New Trade Theory Strategic Policy Rent-Shifting, Externalities 
Porter (1990), Balassa (1977) Competitive Advantage Factor Creation, Demand 
Signalling 










In a world where old rules of trade no longer apply, many previously protected economies 
in developing countries are still relying on comparative advantages (like cheap labour) to 
engage in international trade. Fairbanks & Lindsay (1997) insist that this strategy will simply 
keep them poor. This, added to the rise of protectionism in major trading regions like the 
EU and the USA, threatens to further weaken the export performance of these emerging 
economies (Palmer, 2006). Whilst South African farmers can compete with the best 
farmers in the world, they cannot compete with foreign governments (da Luz, 2005). This is 
nowhere better illustrated than in the currently stalled Doha Round in which the biggest 
role-players, namely the USA and the EU, have been unable to resolve their differences 
over farm subsidies 14 and tariffs.15 This has led to a proliferation of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements. These agreements have serious repercussions on the competitiveness 
of developing countries that must accept unwelcome trading conditions with much more 
powerful trading partners than themselves (Lamy, 2006). 
From an industry's perspective, there is something vaguely useful about knowing how 
competitive South Africa is across a basket of economic factors compared to other 
countries that sell similar products into similar markets. The International Institute of 
Management Development (IMD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) compile the best-
known composite indices on competitiveness. The IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) is regarded as the world's most comprehensive report analyzing the 
competitiveness of nations, in which 83 criteria are used to measure economic 
performance, 77 government efficiency, 69 business efficiency and 94 the quality of 
infrastructure (Walter, 2005). The WEF sports two such indices: (1) the Current 
Competitiveness Index (CCI) that uses micro-economic indicators to measure the pattern of 
institutions, market structures and economic policies yielding immediate levels of 
prosperity; and (2) the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) that concentrates on 
competitiveness as a set of institutions and economic policies that afford high growth in the 
medium-term, and forecasts growth five years in advance (Walter, 2005). In 2006, the GCI 
rankings proposed the following positions of competing grape-supplying countries to the UK 
market: USA (6th), Chile (2th), India (43rd), South Africa (45th), Mexico (58th), Brazil (66th), 
Argentina (69th), Peru (74th) and Namibia (84th). 
I~ In 2005, the USA government subsidized its farmers about US$20 billion while the EU governments subsidized their 
farmers in the same time period about US$80 billion. 










Zereyesus (2003) notes that such indices can be criticized for their heterogeneity, lack of 
focus and difficulty of interpretation. Walter (2005) also states that composite indices are 
often based on weak theoretical assumptions and sometimes unreliable statistical methods; 
and that their authors change the components that make up the indices from time to time 
on a fairly subjective basis. Despite such criticisms, these indices serve merely as a 
comparative benchmark of South Africa's international competitive standing with its 
competitors. After all, Porter (1998), Krugman (1998), as quoted by the National 
Competitive Council of Ireland (NCC, 2005), and Khemani (2003) all categorically maintain 
that it is not countries - but companies - that compete with one another. 16 Boehlje (1999) 
has taken this idea a little further, suggesting that it is supply chains - rather than individual 
firms - that are competing with one another in international markets. 
In the last 20 years there has been a raft of literature alluding to the fact that 'no single 
definition or measurement of competitiveness has gained universal approval by either 
economists or management theorists' (Zereyesus, 2003). To try and devise an all-
encompassing definition for competitiveness would be to fall into the same trap that many 
organizations - especially NGOs - find themselves. It is an elusive exercise, because (1) 
the topic is too multifaceted to encapsulate in one definitive statement; and (2) two 
countries may, by way of example, have political and social agendas that are vastly 
different from one another. To then measure both of these countries by the same 
competitiveness yardstick would make for a meaningless comparison (NCC, 2005). 
Furthermore, the various definitions often refer to different organizational and spatial 
entities, namely countries, sectors, industries and firms (NPCC, 2005). 
What is possibly more valuable to give here than a single definition of competitiveness is a 
number of underlying themes that permeate many of the definitions, what Ortmann (2005) 
refers to as 'sources' and 'indicators' of competitiveness. They are as follows: 
(1) Competitiveness should be considered as a means to an end, and not an end in 
itself. Esterhuizen et al (2006) put it another way by saying that competitiveness 
is a dynamic process, not an absolute state of affairs. 
16 The Nee believes that countries do compete with one another, but only for foreign direct investment (FOI). This is 
understandable considering that only governments are in a position to provide incentives (like tax concessions and grants) to 
attract FOI. And FOI brings along with it additional growth, employment, exposure to new technologies and the corresponding 










(2) Competitiveness incorporates efficiency, which means reaching goals at the 
lowest possible cost; and effectiveness, which implies having the right goals. 
According to Buckley (1988) it is the choice of these goals that is the most 
crucial. 
(3) Competitiveness often implies an increase in wealth 17 as a result of a 
corresponding increase in the productivity of its inputs (capital, labour, energy, 
etc). Fairbanks and Lindsay (1997) maintain that competitiveness is achieved 
where high operational productivity and good strategy intersect (i.e. turning 
informed choices into timely actions). 
(4) Institutional 18 frameworks are assumed to be in place so that policies 19 relating to 
competitiveness can be managed and coordinated between the public and 
private sectors. 
(5) Competitiveness demands growth - but without equity, growth becomes politically 
and socially unsustainable if it is only the business elite that captures the 
benefits (NPCC, 2005). 
(6) In order to sustain competitiveness, Esterhuizen et al (2006) believe it is 
important to predict change correctly, to act upon such predictions in an 
innovative manner, and to mobilize and attract resources from other economic 
endeavours to act on these predictions. 
(7) A rather hackneyed understanding of competitiveness implies an increase in 
'market share'. However, in the world of commodity trading, it tends to be a 
zero-sum game where each country's gain comes at the expense of another 
(assuming little or no growth in volume in the market itself) (NPCC, 2003).20 
17 Walter (2005) notes that if competitiveness is a precondition to 'prosperity and wealth', then the different interpretations of 
'wealth and prosperity' further exacerbate defining competitiveness. For example, 'wealth' means GOP per capita in the WEF; 
prosperity in the IMO; living standards for the US Council on Competitiveness; and living standards and social welfare for the 
European Commission. 
18 North (1990) defines institutions as "arrangements" among economic agents that attempt to decrease uncertainty and 
costs during exchange and ownership i.e. they comprise rules, laws and conventions that govern economic behaviour. 
19 Competitiveness is often viewed as a key indicator of the success or failure of policy (UN, 2001). As an example, Ireland 
has been leading the GOP growth tables in the EU. Its stellar performance, according to the NCC (2005), has been heavily 
influenced by policy decisions made in the past in the areas of taxation and regulation, infrastructure, education and training, 
entrepreneurship and innovation. 
::'0 Where a developing country in particular fails to innovate, introduce new technology or value-add to its products in some 
way, often it relies on the devaluation or depreciation of its currency to remain competitive. The NPCC (2003) points out that, 
in doing so, a nation simply takes a collective pay cut by discounting its products and services in world markets and paying 










In the writer's opinion, too many reports, conferences and workshops concentrate their 
efforts on addressing competitiveness challenges at a generic level, and they therefore 
tend to conclude with generalities. According to Walter (2005), national reports on 
competitiveness tend to carry fairly stereotypical recommendations such as strengthening 
the competition policy, deregulating and lowering the administrative barriers to business, 
improving the infrastructure, supporting SMMEs, promoting strong research, innovating and 
developing a strong and diversified financial system. Such recommendations tend to be 
produced by those who overlook the 'specifics' affecting a particular industry. What is more, 
these recommendations end up being endorsed by those who simply herd industries or 
sectors together for administrative convenience or political expediency. 
This dissertation attempts to dredge for the detail that affects the competitiveness of the 
table grape industry in the areas identified, and to find solutions to improving its 











1.4 Sectoral Competitiveness 
In order to create sustainable competitive advantage for table grape producers and their 
marketing agents, it is important to understand the competitive milieu of the SA 
agribusiness sector in which these role-players have had to operate. For example, in 
addition to dealing with globalization and deregulation issues, South African table grape 
farmers - unlike their global counterparts - have had to try and stay competitive by adjusting 
to a myriad of socio-political issues in their sector like land reform, black economic 
empowerment (BEE), revised labour legislation (that includes minimum wage levels), 
taxation on farm properties, compulsory levies for skills training and an extension service 
that has been re-routed from commercial (white) farmers to emerging (black) farmers 
(Ortmann, 2006). The deregulated road for the SA table grape exporters has not been easy 
either. Marketing agents have had to cope with a volatile rand, significant service provider 
monopolies in the trade chain and increasingly powerful supermarket buyers - all of which 
are essentially beyond their control as individual firms. 
In order to contextualize the competitiveness of the era covered by this discourse, two 
approaches are taken. Firstly, the measured competitiveness trend of the South African 
agribusiness sector is assessed over a 50-year period until 2007. Secondly, the sectoral 
trends for identified sub-factors making up Porters' determinants are scrutinized from 2000 
to 2006. 
1.4.1 Historical Competitiveness Trends (1961 - 2007) 
Diagram 1.2 depicts the trends in the competitiveness of the South African agribusiness 
sector over the last 50 years using Volrath's Relative Trade Advantage (RTA) method. 21 It 
would be useful to consider Diagram 1.2 in conjunction with the competitive evolution of the 
SA table grape industry described in section 1.2 - particularly the competitive issues 
coupled with the macro-economic, political and climatological events that unfolded during 
the decades from the 1960s onwards. They provide an informative backdrop and 
supporting evidence for the trends being disclosed here. 
c I Balassa's Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) model referred to earlier was extended by Volrath in 1991 to the 
Relative Trade Advantage (RTA) method (ABC Biennial Report, 2006). An RTA > 0 denotes a trade advantage; RTA < 0 
signifies a trade disadvantage, and RTA close to 0 has a marginal competitiveness status. Esterhuizen et al (2006) state that 
the RTA method allows for the measurement of competitiveness under real world conditions with its uneven playing fields, 










Diagram 1 2 can be broken up into SIX phases (periods) during which the directional trend 
changed from the previous period 's competitive trend. In the first plwse from the 1960s to 
the early 1970s, a positive trend ensued where the sector was relatively competitive This 
was due to low Interest rates. low inflation and grlVernment support via subsidies and 
import protection measures In the second phase. from the mid-1970s to the mid 1980s, a 
strong downward trend prevai led indicating the decreasing competitive status of the 
agribusiness sector This was a dJrect result of the in troduction of sanctions , high and 
volat,le Interest rates and several droughts The third phase In the late 1980s saw a mild 
Increase in the relative competitiveness that can be attributed to the first phase of 
deregulation The rourth phase trended downward in the early nineties due to political 
uncertainty around the first democratic elections, and another drought 
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The last two phases are the periods covered by this dissertation In the firth pllase from the 
mld-1990s to 2003, the competitive trend was again positive According to Kirsten & V,nk 
(1999), this couid be attributed to (1) the sharp and sustained decrease in the value of the 
rand against the US dollar: (2) the improved business know-how of South African 
agrlbusinesses; (3) the second phase of deregulation of the various agricultural Industries 
that resulted in the movement from cooperatives to companies: (4) the elimination of 
uncompetitive businesses: (5) the improved quality of products being delivered, and (6) an 










the current year 2007, is not completely covered in diagram 1.3. However, according to the 
ABC Biennial Report (2006), the decline in the sector's competitiveness during this period 
has been mostly attributed to the strengthening of the rand. 
1.4.2 Current Trends in Identified Factors of Porter's Determinants 
Porter's six determinants, referred to in the introductory chapter, are applied to the SA 
agribusiness sector by Esterhuizen et al (2006). Each determinant has been broken down 
into selected sub-determinants22 whose competitiveness trends are tracked from 2000 
through to 200623 - the heart of the deregulated period to date. The following comments 
should be noted in conjunction with Diagram 1.3 that depicts these trends. 
Whilst the factor conditions - cost of doing business, labour, infrastructure, capital and 
technology - show positive trends, there is still room for improvement on the quality of 
unskilled labour and availability of skilled labour according to the ABC Biennial Report 
(2006). The demand conditions - market size and market growth - illustrate a positive trend. 
However, in the FPEF's submission to the NAMC regarding the revision of the Marketing 
Act (FPEF, 2006b), emphasis was placed on the need for the fruit industry to capitalize far 
more on the burgeoning middle class market in South Africa than it currently does. 
Supporting industry factors - financial institutions, scientific research institutions, electricity 
supplies and local suppliers of primary inputs - generally show a static trend. Research by 
Esterhuizen et al (2002) indicates that the lack of competitiveness amongst supplying 
industries to the agribusiness sector is hampering its competitiveness. Note that the writer's 
2006 input on Diagram 1.3 reflects a weaker trend in electricity supplies as the state's 
electricity supplier, Eskom, continues its power outages across the country. Surprisingly, 
firm strategy, structure and rivalry factors are not considered in the diagram. Research by 
Esterhuizen et al (2000) suggests that the market power of buyers, the threat of substitutes 
and the threat of new entrants were constraining the competitiveness of the agribusiness 
sector at that stage. 
22 Van Rooyen & Esterhuizen (2002) list a fuller set of sub-determinants for each of Porter's six determinants on 
competitiveness as follows: (1) Factor conditions [labour, natural resources, infrastructure, location, capital, knowledge and 
technology]; (2) demand conditions [market size, market information, quality of products and market growth]; (3) related and 
supporting industries [financial institutions, research institutions, transport companies, suppliers of packaging material, 
electricity supplies, agricultural suppliers and related industries]; (4) firm strategy, structure & rivalry [adaptability, culture, 
structure, flexibility, pricing strategy, managerial capability, market power of suppliers, market power of buyers, threat of 
substitutes and threat of new entrants]; (5) government [indirect support, trade policy, land reform policy, labour policy and 
fiscal policy]; and (6) chance [economic stability, AIDS, political stability and crime]. 
2, The primary data for the sub-factors was gleaned from a survey of 400 business executives in the sector during 2000, 2002 
and 2004 (Esterhuizen et ai, 2006). The 2006 data in Diagram 1.3 are the writer's own update based on his personal 










Diagram 1.3 Spider Diagram of Identified Factors within Porter's Determinants 
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In terms of the role of govemmenf - trade policy. land reform policy, and labour poliCy - it 
has demonstrated a declining abi lity to positively influence the competitiveness of the 
agribusiness sector. Areas in which government could enhance the competitiveness of the 
sector Olccording to the ABC Biennial Report (2006) include admimstratlve regu lations, the 
tax system. BEE policy, the competence of personnel on the public sector and trust in the 
political systems. Lastly the factors of chance are low and remain low, part icularly in terms 
of crime and Aids The ABC Biennial Report (2006) also added the strong rand and 
developments in Zimbabwe as chance factors influencing the sector's competitiveness. The 
Report further states that random factors act as a constraint to the sector, evidenced by its 
Inability to cope with loca l and global shods. and its inabil ity to be flexible in exploiting 
business opportunities arising out of a fast-changing enVIronment 
The Porter model and its six determinants is the preferred model on which th is dissertation 










• Firstly, the structure, strategy and rivalry determinant of the export sector will be 
investigated, particularly surrounding the business models employed by grape 
exporters to procure quality product from producers (chapter 2); 
• Secondly, supporting industries will be the determinant covering the role of logistical 
services providers in the South African port environ in particular, including post-
harvest innovation required to improve the competitiveness in the chain (chapter 3); 
• Thirdly, the market demand determinant will attempt to demystify the competitive 
complexities of selling and marketing table grapes into the UK market (chapter 4). 
According to Van Rooyen & Esterhuizen (2002), the market demand determinant 
was to be a major, future focus of study considering that precious few local studies 
exist on this topic. 
Whilst sector level competitiveness trends are certainly worth knowing, they only provide 
context - not solutions - for the real arenas in which competitiveness battles are won or 
lost. This dissertation will therefore focus the competitiveness lens at grape sector and 
enterprise levels where dedicated and specialized capacity exists to remedy 
competitiveness shortfalls. Industry challenges will be diagnosed and solutions offered, 
particularly for the three mentioned determinants that hold the key to improving the 
industry's competitive performance. These solutions will try to: (1) differentiate between 
quick benefits and slow benefits; (2) understand the paradigm shift needed by the 
industry's leadership to plot its way out of marginally competitive territory as quickly as 











1.5 Current Industry Structures 
The current indust ry structures pertaining to the prod ucer and exporter bodies of the entire 
South Af rican fresh fruit export Industry are illustrated in Di agram 1.4 below Most industry 
associations are Section 21 companies. which in South African law carry a non-profit 
status. and are exempt from paying income tax Depending on the organization . worki ng 
capIta l is raised either by statu tory leVies or th rough VOluntary membership fees agreed 
upon by the members of the organization concern ed 
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Fruit South Africa (FSA), the umbrella organization for the whole industry. was reg lsteled in 
2001 . and has since accrued four shareholders the Deciduous Fruit Producers ' Trust 
(DFPT) that represents all grape " apple, pear and stone fruit producers via a statutory 
arrangement." the Citrus Growers' Associ<ltlOfi (CGA) which represents all orange, lemon . 
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grapefruit and easy peeler producers on a statutory basis; the Subtropical Association 
(Subtrops) which represents most of the avocado, mango, litchi and (recently included) 
macadamia nut growers on a voluntary basis; and the Fresh Produce Exporters' Forum 
(FPEF) which represents most of the marketing agents and some of the grower-exporters 
of all fruit kinds on a voluntary basis. Fruit South Africa, with strong support from the 
Department of Trade and Industry, originally focused its efforts in five areas of generic 
interest among the fruit kinds, namely market access, market development, transformation, 
logistics and information (FSA, 2004). However, with executive capacity never having been 
appointed within Fruit South Africa, the Chief Executive Officers of the individual 
shareholders have been left to manage the five generic portfolios within their own 
organizations. The FPEF manages the secretariat for Fruit South Africa, and uses the 
trademark at selected international marketing initiatives, most notably at trade fairs in 
overseas markets. 
Up until late 1997, the entire affairs of the deciduous fruit industry had been managed via a 
single desk at the offices of Unifruco. 26 Immediately after deregulation, the DFPT was 
established to manage the affairs of all deciduous producers27 to ensure that many of the 
functions of the former government agent (Unifruco) were not lost to the industry. After a 
financially disastrous season in 1999/2000, the table grape producers also formed regional 
associations28 to organize themselves, particularly in retaliation to the opportunistic 
marketing agents that were prolifically registering export companies in the wake of 
deregulation. 
It quickly became apparent that the industry urgently required self-discipline and 
coordination amongst its marketing agents. The FPEF was therefore established (originally 
by the DFPT) to visibly accredit reputable exporting companies and to foster 'co-opetition' -
a healthy mix of cooperation and competition - amongst them. Although the FPEF was 
registered as a company in 1998, it only employed executive capacity during 2001, 
arguably a little later than the producers would have liked. The FPEF is currently a 
consortium of about 70 accredited South African export companies (out of a registered 386 
:26 Unifruco was the government appointed agency of the Deciduous Fruit Board in the regulated era, and was responsible for 
all deciduous fruit matters - local and export. Outspan was the equivalent agency for the Citrus Board. 
n The DFPT had three major producer shareholders: the South African Table Grape producers (SAT); the South African 
Apple and Pear Producers' Association (SAAPPA); and the South African Stone Fruit Producers' Association (SASPA). 
:28 The BTA (Berg River Table Grape Association), HTA (the Hex River Table Grape Association), ORPA (the Orange River 
Producers' Association) and the NTA (the Northern Province Table Grape Producers' Association) were the regional 










companies with the PPECB)29 that collectively export more than 70% of all fresh fruits out 
of South Africa (Fairweather, 2004). Table 1.5 gives a break down of industry and FPEF 
member volumes for all fruit kinds exported in the 2005/6 season.30 
Table 1.5 Industry Versus FPEF Member Export Volumes (in metric tonnes) 
(2005/6 season) 
Product Group Industry Total % of Total FPEF Vol. % of Product 
Industry Group 
Avocados 35270 1,9 6202 17,6 
Citrus Fruits 1 061 449 57,6 790797 74,5 
Grapes 331 426 17,9 257 183 77,6 
Litchis 1 545 0,1 906 58,6 
Mangoes 2555 0,1 821 32,1 
Pome Fruits 372041 20,1 240005 64,5 
Stone Fruits 42604 2,3 36515 85,7 
Grand Total 1 846890 100 1 332429 72,1 
Source: Symington (2006a) 
The five stated objectives of the FPEF (FPEF, 2006b) are to: (1) find international markets 
for their members' fruits via trade fairs, export handbooks, supermarket promotions and 
sales missions to various countries; (2) promote its accredited members in producer circles 
to facilitate procurement of the fruit; (3) uphold accreditation standards via a Code of 
Conduct worth aspiring to; (4) ensure access to timely and accurate information across the 
whole value chain; and (5) source funds from the public sector and international donor 
agencies to enhance initiatives. Other major functions within the FPEF include resolving 
disputes through mediations and arbitrations, facilitating training of previously 
disenfranchised citizens (FPEF, 2007a) and facilitating post-harvest innovation across the 
whole value chain (FPEF 2007b). The FPEF has four sub-chambers31 or 'fruit marketing 
fora' which consist of those member companies exporting a particular fruit kind. The Grape 
:9 The Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) is an assignee of the Department of Agriculture assigned to 
evaluate the quality of export fruit according to regulated standards. All companies wishing to export fruit from South Africa 
are required by law to be registered with the PPECB. 
,0 The South African fruit calendar year officially starts on the 1" October of one year and ends on 30'h September of the 
following year. 
,1 These sub-chambers are not registered companies, but simply fall under the legal entity of the FPEF. They are the CEF 











Exporters' Forum (GEF) is one such fruit kind forum whose members meet during the 
season to discuss technical, marketing, quality and topical industry matters. 
It is apparent that producer and exporter structures in the deregulated period of the South 
African fruit industry have been set up along two separate lines, despite their 
interdependence on one another. However, this changed when, in late 2004, after a 
particularly poor season, it was decided by the SAT executive that the grape producers 
needed to work more closely with the exporters of their fruits. SAT producers invited the 
GEF members to partake in a 50/5032 joint venture in which two important portfolios -
market access and information - would be prioritized (FSA, 2005). This joint venture was 
registered in 2004 under a new Section 21 Company called SATI (South African Table 
Grape Industry), and its own executive capacity was appointed. This joint venture lasted 
two seasons. In 2006, the GEF (exporters) ceded its 50% shareholding in SATI back to the 
other 50% shareholder, SAT (producers), in favour of incorporating a wider spectrum of 
stakeholders33 in the company and at Board level. SATI has continued to operate as a 
predominantly producer-based organization, but with its Board members being a mix of 
both producers and exporters (some of which are from the GEF). 
This dissertation covers - from late 1997 through to 2007 - the interaction among and 
between the two major role-players in the industry: the table grape producers (via SAT, 
SATI and DFPT) and their exporters (via the GEF members of the FPEF). It deals 
specifically with the competitiveness issues that these industry stakeholders have had to 
grapple with amongst themselves at company level, and through their representative 
associations at industry level. 
:;2 Producers and exporters had an equal number of Directors on the Board, and both shareholders contributed equally 
towards the R4 million budget. 
:;:; SATI concluded that it was important to give non-FPEF table grape producers (who were doing their own exporting) the 










1.6 International Table Grape Production & Export Scenario 
In looking at Figures 16, 17 and 1.8 in conjunction with one another, the following 
interesting facts can be gleaned about global table grape production and exports 
• China is by far the biggest table grape producer in the world. and has a production 
nearly twice the size of its next global production rival Iran Yet neither of these two 
northern hemIsphere producing countries IS involved with exports of any 
significance. 
• In a similar vein, Chile and Brazil dwarf the rest of the southern hemIsphere 
producing countries - South Africa included However, while Chile exports 95% of 
its production Braz'lI exports only about 5% of Its production This suggests that 
Brazil has enormous potential to export significantly greater quantities than It 
currently does, and since it produces concurrently to South Africa, constitutes a 
major threat to its markets, including the UK 
• The southern hemisphere produces a fraction (10%) of the northern hemisphere 
volumes, yet two of the top four exporting countnes by volume In the wortd are 
southern hemisphere producing countries - Chile (no 1) and South Africa (no 4) 
• Italy is the only country that features amongst the top six producing and exporting 
nations in the world, making It the global industry leader 
Figure 1,6 Northern Hemisphere Production of Table Grapes (1997-2003) 
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Chapter 2: Procuring Table Grape Product for Export 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1997, a number of entrepreneurial firms entered the export domain of the former state-
controlled monopoly, Unifruco. Competition for product in the early years of deregulation 
was intensified by the proliferation of these exporting firms, and their desire for market 
share. This chapter starts by demonstrating how the manipulation of the vine at production 
level leads to product differentiation, product quality, consumer appeal and clear 
differentials in financial returns. 
The dominant export business models of marketing agents and producer-exporter 
companies are highlighted, including the strengths that they play to when competing for 
product. Although de-concentration has been significant, this chapter explains how the 
majority of smaller exporters were faced with the following barriers to entry: capital 
requirements, economies of scale, predatory pricing, rebates, asymmetrical information, 
product licensing and backward integration. Most of the major export houses are accredited 
to the industry's only exporters' association, the FPEF, which has played a major role in 
stabilizing and unifying the export sector, particularly in the latter half of deregulation. 
The chapter concludes with two competitive tools that are used by exporters to procure 
product from growers: minimum guaranteed prices (MGPs), and advance payments in the 
form of loans and disbursements. These financial instruments have ethical and legal 
implications that complicate the business and give the exporters an array of opportunities to 









2.2 The Nature of the Product 
In the eyes of the consumer. fresh table grapes need to have a good appearance for the 
pick-up. and a good taste for the return purchase, A good appearance is slgnl~ed by a 
bunch of grapes that is properly-shaped, firm , well-coloured and green-stemmed, whilst a 
good eating expenence is commonly described as grapes that are crisp, sweet, and 
~avourfu l to the pallet The product also needs to be appealing ly packaged to attract the 
attention of the consumer, and funcliOnally packaged to protect It from decay To achieve 
these product characteristics though , producers and exporters need to have a clear 
understanding of the nature of the product and how it affects exporters procurement tactics 
and consumers' purchasing decisions 
The complex nature of the tab le grape product requires the undivided attention of the 
producer. and accentuates the need for him to concentrate purely on the production of 
table grapes (as opposed to farmmg other deciduous crops simultaneous ly) Diagram 2 1 
below reflects thiS to be the case in 2006 where 83% (680 out of 820) of table grape 
farmers produced only grapes, compared with 47% producing only stone fruit. and just 31 % 
prodUCing only apples and pears. 
Diagram 2,1 Producers 01 Deciduous Fruit for Export (2006) 
Porn", Fruit (127) 
Table Grapes 
(620) 
Stolle Fruit (1015) 
Sourc~: eiAMD, 2006 1Note, di~gr'm not to . c . '~J 
Importantly. the table grape IS a non-climacteric fruit, ', n other words one that starts to die 
from the moment it is cut from the vine There is no opportunity to ripen , colour or 










immediately after being harvested. This necessitates the investment in cooling and pack 
house facilities by almost every table grape producer to ensure that the deterioration of the 
product is minimized at source. The fact that each table grape producer needs to pack his 
own product on farm means that exporters have to procure grapes directly from each 
individual grape producer. For exporters, no efficient, collective procurement opportunities 
exist in centralized pack houses as is the case with most other fruit kinds. By comparison, 
citrus is technically a more forgiving product that allows producers to pack cooperatively in 
relatively few, co-owned pack houses under less harsh temperature regimes. And in the 
apple industry, controlled atmosphere34 technology allows producers to store product for up 
to ten months. This allows exporters to time the advantageous release of product into the 
market with relative ease, and with a high degree of quality assurance. 
Up to the 1980s, table grapes were traditionally grown in the Berg and Hex River valleys of 
the Western Cape. Realizing the value of producing table grapes in earlier harvesting areas 
than the Western Cape, South African farmers started producing grapes in the Orange 
River in the early 1980s, and then in the northern parts of the country35 in the early 1990s. 
Premium prices could be achieved by exporters shipping product from these regions into 
relatively empty markets in the so-called 'early marketing windows' of the South African 
season. Exporters therefore need to procure product from all regions to ensure that (1) they 
spread their procurement risk,36 and (2) that they capitalize on continuous supplies for their 
customers throughout the marketing windows on offer. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate that the start of the season (in November, week 45) lies in 
the northern parts of South Africa, and then moves progressively southward, via the 
Orange River, Olifants River and Berg River regions, finishing finally in the Hex River Valley 
(in May, week 18). Whilst exporters' attention has been predominantly focused on finding 
early season marketing windows - especially for the UK market - Leon van Biljon, Grapes 
Manager of Dole (SA), believes that South Africans should be targeting end-of-season 
marketing window opportunities as well (especially for a late white seedless variety). 
34 Controlled atmosphere (CA) storage facilities replace the oxygen with nitrogen in a sealed room thereby effectively 'putting 
the fruit to sleep' and halting its decaying process. 
,5 Grapes are produced in the North West Province (Brits), in the Mpumalanga Province (Marble Hall and Groblersdal) and in 
areas of the Limpopo Province. 
36 Just as hail can decimate a crop in the northern region, so can unseasonal rain produce quality problems for a crop in the 










Figure 2.2 Grape Producing Areas of South Africa (Volumes 200314) 
GRAPE PRODUCTION 
BY REGION (2003) 
Source; FPEF. Trade Chain Manual (S<>o" 1. 2004) 
Figure 2.3 Order of Table Grape Intakes by Region (2006/7 Season) 
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To influence the quality of the product, its consumer appeal and the ability of the exporter to 
achieve the optimum price through product differentiation in the market place, table grape 
export product needs to be market-friendly, variety-friendly and quality-friendly. Each is 
discussed below. 
(1) Market-friendly. To enhance the marketability of the product, farmers are able to 
physically manipulate the number of bunches on a vine well before harvest time. 37 
This in turn affects the size of the berries on each bunch, the timing of the harvest, 
and ultimately the sugar to acid ratios found in the grape berries. 38 Consumers 
generally prefer bigger-berried, class one grapes,39 and are prepared to pay 
premium prices for them. Whilst manipulating vines to achieve these ends is 
financially viable, many a producer has been reticent to do so. This is, firstly, 
because there are additional labour cost implications to this process; and secondly 
because packing berry size at the expense of volume4o seems to defy logic for 
producers who have conventionally regarded volume-based production as the path 
to maximizing profitability. Table 2.4 demonstrates that the bigger the berry size, the 
better the delivered-in-port (DIP) price per 4.Skg carton for the popular varieties in 
each production region. The crucial point of interest is the differentials in the DIP 
prices between the regular and the extra-large berry sizes. This average differential 
is at its largest in the Orange River where the discrepancy in price (of a carton) 
between a regular and extra-large berry size is nearly R1S.00 per carton on average 
(and even greater for specific varieties). 
(2) Variety-friendly. Producers need to consider that certain, newer varieties are now 
more favoured in the markets by consumers than others - ones that are better 
flavoured, bigger berried and seedless in nature. Louis Kriel (snr) claims that 
despite the fact that in the early 1980s, the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) in 
South Africa produced more new grape varieties than anywhere else in the world, 
new varieties are now being imported as they are not regularly being developed in 
South Africa any longer. 41 Exporters vie for the rights to market these new varieties, 
either with the producers or with the intellectual property holders themselves. The 
,7 This is achievable through pruning and thinning techniques, and applying growth-enhancing hormones to the vines (like 
~ibberellic acid). 
,8 Acids give the product shelf life, and sugars give the product its sweet taste. 
39 Class one grapes consist of regular, large and extra large berry sizes. The smaller berries tend to have weaker stems that 
dry out sooner than the larger berries' stems, making them ultimately inferior to the larger berries. 
~o Leaving more bunches on a vine produces more cartons per hectare of regular sized grapes; whereas reducing the number 
of bunches on the vine increases the berry size but yields fewer cartons per hectare. 
~ lOne has to consider that the development of a new variety is a very expensive process, takes in excess of 10 years to 










'right varieties' also need to be grown in the 'right areas' according to Jan Le Roux, 
a large producer and exporter in the Berg River. For example, the Orange River 
should be growing the Flame, Prime and Superior Seedless varieties, and not the 
Thompson and Crimson seedless varieties that need too much to be done to their 
vines to make them sufficiently profitable. 42 
Table 2.4 DIP prices (rands) on berry size for the 2003/4 season 
Discount I premium relative 
to the average DIP price 
Average Extra-
Region Cultivar DIP Price Regular Large Large 
(rands) 
Flame Seedless 66.34 -19.48 0.76 8.29 
Prime Seedless 68.81 -13.67 4.25 5.51 
Orange Sugraone 45.27 -10.47 0.67 2.37 
Thompson 40.64 -10.31 0.21 7.34 
Seedless 
Average 47.00 -9.16 0.48 5.48 
Dan-ben-Hannah 35.95 -5.73 0.00 5.01 
Sunred Seedless 32.95 -0.29 -0.37 1.07 
Berg Waltham Cross 32.01 -4.17 -1.42 9.50 
Average 31.42 -4.22 -1.12 3.97 
Barlinka 25.10 -1.69 0.24 2.10 
Dauphine 34.30 -3.06 0.63 -0.12 
Hex Flame Seedless 54.39 -7.74 -0.20 5.85 
Red Globe 26.08 -4.06 -0.69 2.66 
Average 29.67 -2.06 -0.03 1.72 
Source: Frudata (2005) 
.12 For example, Thompson Seedless is originally a raisin grape that grows prolifically in the wild. But to achieve the right 
characteristics for table grape consumption, a costly, labour-intensive approach has to be taken towards preparing each 










However, there are commercial implications in switching to new varieties in certain 
areas. In the Hex River valley, for example, there is very little space left for planting 
new vineyards, so existing plantings have to be pulled out and replaced with new 
plantings. Producers have to wait several years before an income stream is 
achievable on the new vineyards. 
Many grape varieties are naturally labour intensive, with pre-harvest manipulation of 
the vines requiring between seven and eleven separate handlings for each bunch 
on the vine. Extensive labour input is also required in the post-harvest sorting, 
packing and cooling of the product. This not only makes the chain more costly than 
other fruit kinds for example, but also has the potential to spoil aspects of the 
product like the bloom.43 Sarel Joubert maintains that in the eastern countries in 
particular, a premium is paid for a preserved bloom, because it signifies product 
freshness. This implies that many South African producers would have to change 
their picking and packing processes to ensure that the right workmanship could be 
instituted to protect the bloom. 
Producers tend to prefer varieties that are yield-friendly, since the more product they 
can pack per hectare, supposedly the better their financial returns will be. Chris 
Conradie cautions against these varieties as some of them - no matter by how 
much their yields are improved - simply won't pay for the post-harvest costs 
because the prices achieved in the market are insufficient in relation to the costs 
incurred. He cites Red Globe for much of the latter part of the season as a case in 
point. Marthinus Strauss, MD of Capespan Grapes, concurs and suggests that 
Regal Seedless can also be added to this list. However, Marthinus Strauss 
emphasizes that there is no sense in producing a yield-friendly product if the market 
is not able to pay the required price. 
In general, South African exporters and their customers have to live with the existing 
varieties listed in diagram 2.5. But in order to differentiate their products from 
competitors' products, and to satisfy the increasingly discerning product quality 
standards imposed by consumers in developed countries (such as the UK), 
producers will in future need to consider: (1) eliminating certain unpopular varieties44 
.1> The bloom is a waxy, protective coating found on the skin of the grape, particularly in black varieties (Hurndall, 2005) . 
.J.J The exporters (of the GEF technical group) proposed to the producers (of SAT) in May 2005 that, from a strategic point of 
view, the following varieties should be phased out of production over the following two years: Queen of the Vineyard, 










entirely from productlOll (2) halting delivery of certain varieties into the markets after 
certain weeks when it is no longer financ ial ly vi~ble to do so: and (3) introducing 
new varieties - like black seedless grapes - to keep the customer base interested in 
South AfrICan product. In turn the exporters will need to be disciplined in procuring 
and delivering only varieties that the m~rket wants, and in the volumes that they 
w~nt them 
Diagram 2.5 Popular South African Export varieties 
V,ctolla Thompson Red Gtobe flame 
Dauph,ne Sug'ilone Sunred 
Waltham Cross Prime Cnm:;on 
Sourc~: FPEF. Trad~ Chain Ma nual (Book 1,20041 




(3) Quality-friendly. Once the product has been cut from the vines. decay is r~pld 
Producers therefOle need to cool the product down to -0.5' C on site as quickly as 
possible. Otherwise the shelf life of the product which is already just 6 to to weeks 
depending on the variety concerned , will be further reduced Louis Kriel (snr) says 
that In days gone by, those producers who picked their grapes at 4am (in the coolth 
of the day) and were finished by tOam, had product that performed consistently 
better In the market than the rest. The same holds true loday Cooling grapes down 
quickly ensures prolonged shelf life Allied to the cooling of grapes is the application 
of the correct cooling rlethods to avoid problems such as freeze-burn and 
browning 
The nature of the grape product IS such that it also attracts pests and fungal 
dlse~ses In terms of pests, George Hendrikse. Manager of Special Export 
Programmes (DFPT) states that vine snout beetle. pear leaf roller fruit fly and false 
codling moth (the latter two particularly on organic grapes) are the more common 
~g~inst wh'lCh producers have to safeguard the" crops. Of concern is the infestation 
in more recent seasons of new pests in areas where farmers have practiced crop 










pests, maximum residue level (MRL) protocols have to be strictly observed in terms 
of food safety legislation promulgated in South Africa's major markets. 45 In the 
marketing of fresh produce, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) protocols have to be 
adhered to; otherwise access to markets could be negatively affected. 46 Those 
grape varieties that have a propensity for fungal disease47 through moisture contact 
are particularly susceptible to the unseasonal summer rains that have plagued the 
Western and Northern Cape regions in recent years. Table grapes are prone to one 
such fungal disease called botrytis, which is exacerbated when producers pack too 
quickly after rain. It necessitates the use of specialized overlay packaging in every 
carton destined for export. This packaging comes in the form of slow release 
sulphur pads that emit sulphur gas over the grapes for the entire duration of the 
voyage to the overseas market. This process retards the development of botrytis, 
and is designed to preserve the integrity of the product. Again, costly preventative 
measures against product deterioration need to be adopted, and with the recent 
attempt at banning the use of sulphur pads48 in the all-important European market, 
the industry constantly needs to research new ways of protecting the product, and 
to overcome non-tariff barriers such as these. 
Despite the difficulties and costs in producing and shipping the complex grape product to 
overseas markets, it has become a highly homogeneous product in relation to grape 
products delivered from other competing countries. The international tide of table grape 
commoditization is unmistakable where quality status, sizing and colour have become 
indistinguishable from one country's product to the next on the retailers' shelves. The only 
visible point of product differentiation may be the country of origin label - if the consumer is 
investigative enough, and if the consumer believes that the South Africa product offers a 
superior eating experience. As a result, price discrimination is hard to achieve, and South 
African grape producers invariably find themselves being price-takers in many of today's 
markets. 
In order to avoid the commoditization that so characterizes grape products in South Africa's 
traditional markets,49 producers and their exporters are attempting to differentiate their 
wares in the following ways: 
~5 Traceability requirements also have to be observed to support food safety. 
~6 For example, the USA had its access to the UK market jeopardized due to the presence of the black widow spider. 
~7 The three most prevalent fungal diseases are downy mildew, powdery mildew and botrytis rot (Hurndall R 2005). 
~8 I n January 2005, the Scandinavian assault on the use of sulphur pads in the EU was successfully rebuffed by the collective 
action of Southern Hemisphere supplying countries and their importing organizations in Europe. 
~9 The UK and the European Mainland, where 84% of her product was sold in the 2006/7 season, are regarded as South 










(1) By displaying product of varied quality in highly attractive and sophisticated 
packaging material; 
(2) By offering value-added products by way of newer varieties and composite 
punnets,50 especially in thinly-supplied marketing windows; 
(3) By supplying organic product51 that is becoming increasingly popular, 
although off a very low base; 
(4) By ensuring that the product legitimately carries the 'fair trade' label, 
indicating that production occurred under socially and environmentally 
acceptable standards; 
(5) By branding the product where permissible. Many of the UK supermarkets 
insist on imposing their own house brands on South African product, but the 
wholesale markets on the European Mainland - and in most of South Africa's 
other markets - still afford product brand differentiation for suppliers. 
The more recent concerns about the 'carbon footprint' of products traveling great distances 
to markets has an enormous potential impact on the sales of South African grapes to the 
UK market. In time to come, exporters may well need to identify the mass of carbon 
emissions produced per kilogram of table grapes, and indicate this figure on the grape pack 
for the consumer to see. Exporters could therefore differentiate their products from 
competitors by supplying product with a comparatively low carbon emission weight to fruit 
ratio - if they could find legitimate reasons to do so. 
50 Composite punnets consist of two or more grape types packed in one plastic punnet; for example, green and red seedless 
grapes packed together in one punnel. 
51 Organic products however do not appear to be fetching the premium prices previously anticipated, and the justification for 










2.3 The Exporter Fraternity in Deregulation 
Prior to 1994, all fresh table grapes exported from South Africa were marketed through 
Unifruco, the sole agent of the Deciduous Fruit Board. 52 Between 1994 and 1997, the 
Deciduous Fruit Board started to relax the single desk approach (in anticipation of 
deregulation) by issuing a limited number of export licenses. These licenses carried quotas 
that allowed a select few companies to operate alongside Unifruco. However, in defiance of 
the government's modus operandi of gradual and selective relaxation, other grape 
exporting companies began to operate 'illegally', some of which used the Namibian, 
Angolan and Zambian loopholes as their springboard for exports to the UK and other 
markets. Therefore, by the time deregulation was officially introduced in October 1997, 
Unifruco's table grape export sales only accounted for about 66% of the country's export 
volumes. 
The reasons for grape producers giving their product to a particular exporter in the first 
couple of years of the post-deregulation era were based more on cultural affinity than on 
anything else. As Gaby Gess of Gess Attorneys notes, relationship marketing may not have 
yielded the best price, but it was built on trust, which was worth more than price to many a 
producer in those early, deregulated years. However as more and more exporters entered 
the fray with the former monopoly, financial returns to producers started diminishing. Trust 
was traded for temptation as producers accepted offers that promised 'guaranteed', 
superior returns back at the farm gate. Bruce Brodie, former producer and CEO of the table 
grape producers' association (SAT), admitted that in an attempt to hedge his bets and 
maximize returns, he and other producers sold their crops to sometimes as many as eight 
exporters each in one season.53 Unfortunately, badmouthing, scare tactics, rumour-
mongering, biased price comparisons, promises of minimum guaranteed prices (which 
sometimes never materialized) and lower commissions were all part of the exporters' 
arsenal in luring producers' fruit away from one export house to another early in the 
deregulated period. 
Eight years after deregulation, Louis Kriel (snr), former CEO of Unifruco, maintains that low 
entry barriers to the export industry still accommodate fly-by-night exporters who don't have 
the interests of the major risk-taker at heart, namely the grower. Chris Conrad ie, Financial 
52 The Deciduous Fruit Board (DBF), a state controlled monopolistic institution, was given executive powers in terms of the 
Marketing Act that created a single export channel for all deciduous fruits exported from South Africa. 
53 Producers usually use two exporters in a season, maybe three if they are big volume producers. Using eight or more 










& Procurement Director of Afrifresh concurs, claiming that with R20 000, a cell phone and a 
car, it is not difficult for an unscrupulous agent to procure a considerable number of cartons 
of grapes from avaricious or unsuspecting producers. Despite this, Mike Grobbelaar, Head 
of Colors Grapes, feels that the industry has now matured to a level where producer loyalty 
to FPEF-accredited export companies has risen to significant levels. Not too much 
sympathy gravitates any longer to those producers who continue to have bad experiences 
hopping from one exporter to the next, especially when they give their grapes to non-
accredited exporters without any formal, written agreement. 
With the growing wisdom of exporters has come the realization that not all product offered 
to them by producers is suitable for export. In fact, Riaan van Wyk, MD of Colors Fruit 
claims that many of the established exporters chase the same list of top quality producers 
that have the right varieties, in the right quantities and in the right marketing windows. 
Neither do all the producers necessarily have good cultural fits with the export houses that 
target them. GEF exporters claim that procuring big volumes from a big grower54 today may 
be a useful point of entry into a market, but if accompanied by a big expectation, may be 
financially detrimental to the export company. This type of producer may want to pay less 
commission to his marketing agent, demand access to better markets than his competitors 
and press for directorship and possibly shareholding in the export company if he senses 
the opportunity. And this all comes at a cost to the export company concerned. 
'Exporters' is a generic term given to those companies that sell their own product, or that of 
other suppliers,55 offshore. The business models of these various export companies is 
based generally on the size of the business involved and the type of business being 
conducted. In theory, producers can select their exporters according to their own particular 
needs and according to the advantages being offered by the particular exporter's business 
model. In practice however, not all producers enjoy this freedom of choice. Due to debt 
repayments and contractual commitments, many producers have found themselves 
obligated to certain exporters for protracted periods of time. Be that as it may, four types of 
exporters currently operate in the SA grape export milieu. They are: 
(1) Marketing agents; 
(2) Producer-exporter companies; 
S~ GEF exporters agree that a small grape grower is one who packs less than 50 000 cartons per season; a medium-sized 
~rower between 50 000 and 150 000 cartons; and a big grower over 150 000 cartons. 










(3) Trading companies;56 and 
(4) Brokers (or facilitators).57 
This section covers the business models of only marketing agents and producer-exporter 
companies. Whilst there were 161 registered grape-export companies in South Africa over 
the 2006/7 season (PPECB, 2007), the examples of the export companies discussed in this 
paper will be drawn from the accredited members of the FPEF in Table 2.6 on the following 
page. 
The GEF members - which form a sub-chapter of the FPEF - exported 93% of all South 
African table grape products during the 2003/4 season. By the close of the 2006/7 season, 
these same FPEF members had exported 71 % of the crop. This drop of 22% over the last 
four seasons is indicative of the major producer-exporter companies entering the export 
arena, many of which emanated from the Capespan Grapes Trust after it was dissolved in 
early 2005.58 It is unclear as to why some of the major producer-exporters have not joined 
the FPEF. Most, if not all of these producers doing their own exporting are, in fact, 
marketing agents, since they export product on behalf of their fellow producers as well. The 
most common reason given for these producer-exporters not joining the FPEF is because 
they would have to pay membership fees to the FPEF in addition to the statutory levies that 
they are already obligated to pay to their producer association. 
56 A trading company is one that buys the produce at a fixed price from the supplier at some designated point in the trade 
chain. and then sells it into offshore markets entirely for its own account. 
57 A broker is an individual (sole trader) or company that puts the buyer and seller together through relationship marketing. 
The broker takes no risk in the transaction, provides no trade chain services, and charges a brokerage fee usually based on 
rands per carton. 
58 The two most prominent producers that have exported their own volumes in the last two seasons are New Vision Fruit and 










Table 2.6 FPEF· Accredited Grape Exporting Companies 
(2003/4 season to 200617 season) 
Exporter 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2006/7 
Pallets ('000) % 
Volume 
AFRIFRESH I SUNPRIDE 15 20 21 20 6 
CAPESPAN 69 62 59 54 17 
COLORS 14 20 21 23 7 
DElECTA 4 7 8 10 3 
DOLE 21 26 22 23 7 
EXSA 25 25 30 13 4 
FEDFA 1 1 2 1 0 
FRESHWORlD 2 2 3 2 1 
FRUITS UNLIMITED 12 10 14 7 2 
GREEN MARKETING 9 8 10 7 2 
IN SEASON 0 0 1 1 0 
INTERTRADING 2 1 2 1 0 
KATOPE 5 4 3 4 1 
lE ROUX 7 8 8 8 2 
OCEANIC 0 1 1 1 0 
OREX 0 1 3 2 1 
SAFPRO 2 2 2 3 1 
SAFE 8 9 9 8 2 
SOUTHERN FARMS 0 3 1 1 0 
SOUTHERN FRUIT GROWERS 2 2 4 6 2 
SUNPRIX 0 2 1 1 0 
THE GRAPE COMPANY 16 21 25 25 8 
UNIFRUTTI 0 1 1 2 1 
VAN DER lANS 0 1 1 1 0 
VANGUARD 0 1 2 2 1 
Xl INTERNATIONAL 0 1 1 1 0 
OTHER 8 7 6 5 3 
Industry Total Volume (Pallets) 239 295 331 327 100 
GEF Total Volume (Pallets) 222 246 261 232 71 
GEF % of Industry Exports 93 83 79 71 










2.4 De-Concentration of the Exporter Environment 
2.4.1 De_concentration of All Fruit Kinds 
The table grape export industr{s competitiveness IS pr imarily centred on the companies 
that export the product offshore The number of deciduous fru it exporters - under which the 
tab le grape exporters are classified· has risen substantially since deregula\lOn. so much so 
that the market power of Unifruco" was eroded from nearly 100% of the export volumes 
pre-1997 to 17% of the volumes In 2007 Diagram 27 graphically represents the 
Herflndahl -H irschman index':O (HH I) based on all " fruit-exporting companies registered with 
the PPECB during the years indicated 
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A few interesting points emerge from diagram 2.7. 
(1) The HHI values for the subtropical export sector hovered continuously between the 
1000 and 1500 mark up until 2002, indicating a highly de-concentrated or 
competitive status prevalent up to that point. This reflects the fact that this industry 
has never been regulated. However in the last three seasons there has been a 
noticeable re-concentration of the industry back above the 1500 level, making it now 
the most concentrated of all the fruit industries. This has totally reversed the HHI 
picture to what was occurring at the start of deregulation (when the subtropical 
industry was clearly the least concentrated of all the industries). 
(2) The HHI of the citrus industry shows a slower market de-concentration with the 
onset of deregulation compared to the deciduous industry. But by the close of the 
2001 season, the citrus HHI was at a comparable level to the deciduous and 
subtropical industries, all reflecting a highly competitive export environment. From 
2002 to 2006, however, there has been a continuous, gradual decline in the citrus 
HHI where it now matches the highly de-concentrated (and therefore highly 
competitive) levels of the deciduous fruit industry. 
(3) The HHI for the deciduous export industry - under which grape exporters fall -
started off at values well in excess of 180063 in 1997, suggesting a high degree of 
concentration at that time. The market then de-concentrated rapidly reaching values 
in the 2001/2 season lower than that of even the subtropical industry. It appears that 
the HHI values have gradually declined in the last few seasons, and by 2006 - along 
with citrus - is regarded as particularly de-concentrated and therefore highly 
competitive. 
2.4.2 De-concentration of the Deciduous Fruit Sector 
When comparing the HHI values for the exporting firms in the deciduous industry only 
(i.e. for the pome, stone and grape sectors in diagram 2.8 on the following page), a few 
points are worthy of mention: 
63 In the USA, an industry with an HHI value of less than 1000 is considered un-concentrated or competitive; between 1000 
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(1) The apple and pear sector sta rted off the most concentrated af the three sectors, 
and wi thin two seasons slter deregulation, wss the least concentrated of them all 
This probably indicated the relative ease with Which an exporter could take these 
products offshore without suffering technica l or qualitative difficulties With this 
deciduous frUit product Ihe exporters' risks are probably lower than other deciduous 
fruit kinds. 
(2) The much smaller stone fruit sector followed the Industry average closely lying 
between the pome and the grape sectors' HH ls . 
(3) Interestlngty the grape sector traced the slowest de-concentratIon with the onset of 
deregulation This was probably as a resul t of a combination 01 Issues, Firstly. the 
nature of the grape product makes it mckler lor exporters to manage as easily as 
perhaps the ather deciduous products Secondly, the earlier ijnd lijrger markellng 










from effectively entering the sector and procuring product. 64 And thirdly, the 
intervention of the producers after the disastrous 2000/2001 season aided the 
slower pace of de-concentration thereafter. However de-concentration has been 
continuous thereafter to a point where the competitiveness levels of the grape 
export sector now match those of the po me and the stone fruit export sectors. 
2.4.3 De-concentration of the Table Grape Export Sector 
By the end of the first officially deregulated grape export season in 1997/8, Unifruco had 
retained 66% of its volumes and had 51 exporter companies trading alongside it (see Table 
2.9 on the following page). The conservatism of the producers waned continually over the 
following ten years as the number of exporters in the industry trebled from 52 in 1997/98 to 
161 in the 2006/7. Despite the rise in the industry's export volumes from 136 000 mt in 
1997/8 to 327 000 mt in 2006/7, Capespan (formerly Unifruco) found its own export 
volumes from South Africa declining from 91 000 mt in 1997/8 to 54 OOOmt in 2006/7. This 
meant that by the 2006/7 season, Capespan's volumes had declined to 17% of the 
industry's total export volumes, though it still remains the biggest single export company of 
grapes out of South Africa. 
Another look at Table 2.9 reveals the fact that since the start of deregulation, the top 20 
exporters of table grapes have never exported less than 80% of the product. In only two of 
the ten years of deregulation was the amount of product exported by the top 20 exporters 
less than 85%. It is apparent then that the long tail of small exporters - from about the 
1999/2000 season onwards - has been unable to grow its share of the business. 
Interestingly, the number of producers doing their own exporting has been on the rise, 
particularly in the last three years. This chapter examines some of the reasons giving rise 
to that trend, including what factors may limit that trend. 











Table 2.9 Table Grape Export Statistics of the Deregulation Period 
10-Year Period of Grape Seasons in Deregulation 
97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/6 06/07 
Volume of SA 
grape exports 136 172 167 175 198 210 239 295 331 327 
('000 mt) 
Total number of 52 103 131 144 165 158 154 127 156 161 
exporters 
Total number of 
producer-
3 5 7 11 10 8 14 27 25 34 
exporters 
Export volume 91 98 71 82 72 58 68 62 59 54 
('000 mt) of 
Capes pan and 66% 57% 42% 46% 36% 27% 28% 21% 18% 17% 
its industry % 
Export volume 
share of top 20 97.5 91.4 87.7 87.0 817 85.3 85.4 85.0 86.2 81.8 
exporters (%) 










2.5 Business Models of Exporting Companies 
2.5.1 Marketing Agents 
A marketing agent (or export agent) sells product overseas on behalf of his principal, the 
producer. He adds value to the consignment deal in terms of his product knowledge, his 
ability to sell to the various international markets, and his skills in coordinating the 
necessary logistics service providers to move the product successfully through the chain. In 
return for this value-add, an agent charges his producer a commission 65 on sales. 
Pure agency implies that no monies are guaranteed or advanced by the agent to the 
principal, but this is rarely found in practice in the grape export sector. According to Leon 
van Biljon, the perception of a marketing agent in South Africa now is rather one who pays 
advances, takes a relatively small commission, gives sound technical advice, and if he is 
good, gives production loans (and if he is really good, gives production loans for longer 
than a year). In today's grape exporting environment, the export agent is financing many of 
the disbursements on behalf of the cash-strapped producer. And the more an exporter can 
finance the producer's costs, the more attractive it becomes for the producer to use that 
exporter. 66 
Jan van Nes, Commercial Manager of SAFE purports that the major risks of an export 
agent are losing his supply base, non-payment by the importer and non-payment of monies 
loaned to the producer. But the primary risk is losing his supply base. A marketing agent 
can never be guaranteed of his supply base, since producers can withdraw their product at 
any time, and for any reason. Without the product, the agent has no business. There is, 
understandably then, a persistent pressure for agents to constantly satisfy their growers 
with above-average financial performances. And an export agent is only as good as his last 
season's returns. Hubert Leclercq, MD of Katope Cape, states that in order to engender 
professionalism and to entrench their supply bases, many export agents employ full-time 
procurement personnel that sometimes double up as technical specialists. An export agent 
can differentiate himself from other agents over and above satisfactory financial returns and 
sound technical advice through an attractive business model. It is now appropriate to take a 
65 Generally, marketing agents charge commissions quoted in elF terms (6%) or in the equivalent FOB terms (9%). These 
commissions are a (varying) percentage of the sales price of the product. This produces a sliding scale income for the 
exporter where income is a function of the price and the volume sold. Other marketing agents charge the producer a fixed 
cost per carton to export the grapes, regardless of the price achieved in the market for the fruit. 
66 It is estimated that about R1.5 billion worth of exporter loans to producers are currently circulating in the whole fruit export 










closer look at some of the business models - and their unique selling points - that marketing 
agents use to compete for suppliers' product. 
Most South African table grape exporters at this stage of deregulation can be regarded as 
marketing agents. For explanatory purposes only, they can be categorized into one of 
several types of agents depending on the size of the companies, the functions that they 
perform, who owns the companies and where that ownership resides. These export agent 
categories are not mutually exclusive in that aspects of their business models will overlap 
with one another. They are divided here, for convenience, into: (1) Multinational companies; 
(2) South African-owned and -based export agencies; (3) Foreign importing companies with 
branches in South Africa; and (4) South African based producers who export their own 
product and a few of their fellow producers' crops. 
(1) The multinational companies like Dole, Capespan67 and Katope offer producers 
an array of advantages that their competitors cannot easily match. They can be 
summarized as follows: 
• A multinational's profitability is not dependent on anyone fruit kind, from any 
one company in anyone country. It spreads its procurement risks across a 
basket of different fruit kinds from supplying countries around the world - 365 
days a year. These products are then sold into a host of markets spreading 
their suppliers' sales risk on that basis too. Leon van Biljon claims that 
Dole's only Achilles' heel could be regarded as its dependency on banana 
sales (particularly in Europe).68 Producers therefore perceive multinationals 
as having a lower financial risk profile and as being more financially stable 
than other South African marketing agents. 
• Multinationals have access to (a) cheap international finance due to their 
head offices being located in foreign countries where low interest rates have 
prevailed; (b) ships and preferential shipping rates due to the product 
volumes that they move around the world through certain shipping lines; and 
67 Capespan is somewhat of an anomaly being a South African company with a locally based Group corporate headquarters. 
The group is producer-owned with 10% of its shares being owned by a foreign multi-national company (MNC). The control of 
its marketing companies in other parts of the world varies from 50% in Europe (Capespan PLC) and the Far East (Metspan), 
to 100% in the case of North America (Fisher-Cape) and Japan. The Middle East is handled as a Business Unit as part of the 
export company. Unlike Dole and Katope, for example, Unifruco, Outspan and later Capespan all were - and still are - South 
African grower-owned and therefore grower-controlled. So for convenience purposes only, Capespan will be categorized here 










(c) valuable international marketing information due to their global networks. 
Sarel Joubert states that the financial strength of multinationals also enables 
them to invest in much needed research. 59 
• Multinationals tend to have their own receiving offices overseas allowing 
them, in principle, to manage their suppliers' costs more efficiently, and in a 
more transparent manner than their competitors. This is all the more 
significant considering that the cost chain overseas is based in foreign 
currency, making it a relatively expensive part of the chain. On the contrary, 
non-multinational agents usually relinquish control of the product to 
commission-based foreign receivers who tend not to disclose costs or 
important information as a means of self-preservation in the chain. However, 
the receiving offices of a multinational company need not necessarily be of 
benefit to the producer. MNCs are invariably restricted to sending product 
largely to their own offices in a particular region, thereby limiting the number 
of companies to which they can sell product in a region. In addition, it is not 
certain as to how much control is exercised over which products are sold to 
which customers, and whether all information pertaining to sales is actually 
fed back to the South African office and back to the producers. 
• Multinational companies have established powerful product brands for 
decades in the international markets, like Chiquita and Dole bananas, and 
Del Monte pineapples. With the current trend of retailers de-branding 
suppliers' products, these multinationals will probably be the last to survive 
the product de-branding campaign (because of the goodwill and sales that 
these product brands still continue to generate with consumers). These 
same multinational companies have also developed strong corporate brands 
that can supply the volumes required by large, internationalizing retailers. 
Producers that supply grape product to such MNCs should be direct 
beneficiaries of their product and corporate branding. 
Chris Conradie is more circumspect on the so-called blue-chip status of 
multinationals. He cites the demise and exit of Del Monte in the South African 
68 Fruit sales and fruit prices in the major markets are dependent on the under-supply or over-supply of bananas because 
bananas are by far the most popularly consumed fruit in the world (25% of all fruit sales). Dole's reliance on banana sales is 
big, and many of its other fruit products ride into customers on the back of its banana sales. 
69 Sarel Joubert cites the recently released and patented V-channel carton by Experico (Capespan's technology development 










grape-exporting arena in 2003 as being a case where an overly large cheque book 
was a distraction from the company adding adequate value in the chain for its 
producers. Jan Ie Roux is convinced that the weight of a multinational's interest lies 
with the supermarket rather than with the producer, because he is dealing with the 
supermarket 365 days a year, and with a South African grape producer for maybe 
twenty days of the year. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the smaller 
producers with their minuscule volumes would not receive the kind of prioritized 
attention from a large multinational that they would from a smaller, more niche-
market orientated export agency. 
(2) South African owned and based export agencies vary in size from one-man-
bands through to companies of 50 employees or more with turnovers70 of hundreds 
of millions of rands. These agents are essentially divided into two camps: larger 
agents71 and smaller agents. 72 This division has generally manifested as a result of 
how early the agents started their businesses after deregulation,73 where on the 
product quality spectrum they decided to position their businesses, and what their 
philosophies were on being volume driven. Marketing agents' business models are 
tailored to meet their own objectives as well as the needs of their producers. The 
ingredients of the agents' business models are many and varied, with some of the 
better-known drivers of the agents' business models described below. 
(a) Targeting the best quality producers. Hanno Scholtz, MD of The Grape 
Company, states that his company was founded at the start of deregulation 
on the principle that only the very best producers would be targeted for 
supplying his company's needs. He maintains that their producers were 
identified on the basis that they: (i) consistently delivered the right product 
specifications for particular markets, year in and year out; (ii) took no 
chances; (iii) showed financial strength in their farming businesses and 
therefore had no need to take short-cuts; (iv) practiced state-of-the-art 
farming methods; (v) had cultivar renewal programmes particularly for the 
surging seedless demand in South Africa's markets; and (vi) were generally 
innovative. After considerable trial and error in the early period of 
"0 There is some debate as to the legitimacy of an agent declaring his principal's proceeds as his own turnover. Agents do so 
to show financial strength on their income statements and thereby secure loans more readily from financial institutions to fund 
the export costs on behalf of their producers. 
71 The bigger (non-MNC) marketing agents are companies like The Grape Company, Colors, Afrifresh, Sunpride, Green 
Marketing and SAFE. 










deregulation, the top quality producers have found and settled with their 
selected agents who adopted this approach. In 2001, Capespan started the 
Capespan Grapes Trust (in which 90 producers resided) in a bid to retain 
what it perceived to be the best producers. Any new export entrant wishing 
to corner the best producers today would be hard-pressed to supersede the 
arrangements instituted by existing export agents at the start of the 
deregulated era. 
(b) Targeting top-end retail clients. The bigger agents are able to reach the top-
end retailers with the volumes and quality demanded by these retailers. And 
they are able to do so somewhat more directly than multinationals which 
normally have to go through their subsidiary companies (receivers) based in 
the country of the targeted retailers. Riaan van Wyk (MD of Colors) claims 
that from the start of deregulation, his company had very strict control 
measures in place to ensure that his supermarket clients received only the 
best of Colors' branded fruit. Consequently, Colors is now renowned for 
being able to cherry-pick amongst the best supermarket programmes on 
offer to South African producers. According to Riaan van Wyk, internal 
business units in his company have to match the exact volumes of their 
supermarket demand plans with the supply available from their producers. 
Only in exceptional cases are their business units permitted to deviate from 
this plan. To ensure that their fruit desks do not over-procure for their 
programmes, Colors' business units are penalized if they ignore this 
business principle. This is a disciplined approach in relation to many 
marketing agents whose commission-based income74 tempts them to take 
on more product volume than their business systems can handle and that 
they have overseas outlets for. 
(c) Charging producers a 'fixed cost per carton' rather than a 'commission 
proportional to sale value'. For producers, agents that charge 'reasonable 
commissions' for services rendered are naturally more attractive to deal with 
than those who do not - unless a premium commission can be justified for a 
7, The earlier the agency started the more of a chance it had to build substantial volumes over time. EX SA and The Grape 
Company for example started their companies before the official deregulation date. 
7~ The greater the volume of product an export agent can procure, the greater his turnover; and where his commission is a 










value-added service. 75 Normally, an agent charges a producer a fixed 
commission that is a percentage of the purchase price of the product (e.g. 
6% CIF or 9% FOB). On this basis, an agent can make a disproportionate 
amount of money from the producer in a good year. However, in a bad year, 
the exporter could become insolvent, as he is unable to cover his fixed 
overhead costs with the total commission earned. Chris Conradie of 
Afrifresh feels that his company's financial model of negotiating a fixed cost 
per carton (inclusive of any rebates obtained) with his producers for his 
marketing and logistical services is not only appropriate, but also 
advantageous for a producer. He reasons that as long as the producer 
knows his own costs, he can calculate at the point of sale (particularly for 
FOB deals) what his farm gate return will be. This affords the producer the 
opportunity of securing bridging finance (if it is needed) so that he can 
undertake timely and critical post-harvest treatments to his vineyards. It also 
ensures that no shocks will be encountered by the producer on his sales 
accounf6 from his exporter - especially when it comes to the declaration of 
rebates earned which can make or break a producer's business in a tough 
season. 
(d) Targeting as much volume as possible. Securing big volumes of table 
grapes allows the bigger agents to place the fruit in all market segments, 
namely with supermarkets, wholesale markets and traders. These agents 
can also access substantial rebates in the chain which are essentially 
volume-driven discounts offered by suppliers of goods and services in the 
chain. If one combines these facts with the reality of the commission-based 
remuneration system - that exporters are able to generate income 
regardless of the price of the product achieved and regardless of whether 
the producer is making or losing money on the consignment - this model is 
indeed tempting for agents to adopt. However the countervailing power for a 
producer in this business model is that if the export agent does not achieve 
an acceptable return for him, the exporter will simply not receive fruit from 
him (the aggrieved producer) in future. 
75 A producer-exporter with small volumes cannot access the lucrative, volume-orientated supermarket programmes unless 
he piggybacks one of the large marketing agents into that supermarket programme. This is a typical value-added service for 
which a producer-exporter will pay a premium commission. 
76 The sales account aspect of agency business is highly contentious. The enigmatic formats of agents' sales accounts can 
conceal superfluous costs in the chain that financially compromise credulous growers. For growers to be kept waiting for 
months on end to hear whether they qualify for some unquantifiable rebate - an amount that can make or break a producer's 










(e) Paying favourable terms. David Powter, major shareholder of The Grape 
Company, claims that his company is amongst the leading payers in the 
industry. He qualifies 'leading payers' as those companies who not only give 
advances to their producers but are also the first to pay their producers. 77 
The advantage of being a leading payer - about 60 days from delivery of 
product to the exporter - is that apart from being considered the benchmark 
of the industry by paying relatively good returns timeously, it puts the later-
paying agents under pressure to pay as quickly as possible thereafter - and 
to match or better the leading payers' returns. 78 
(f) Procuring from early harvesting areas. Some agents deliberately procure a 
considerable percentage of grape product from the Limpopo and Namibian 
growers - both early production regions. Both regions afford the agent the 
opportunity of selling into early overseas marketing windows that tend to 
return higher prices to producers than those following in later weeks. 
(g) Securing new varieties. As was noted earlier, the growth of seedless grapes 
in world markets is evident; and the ARC has not continued the 
development of new South African seedless varieties. As a result, certain 
agents like Capespan, Dole and Colors have prioritised securing new 
varieties for their producers from overseas sources, like those from 
Sunworld. The initial cost of the vines and the royalties on the intellectual 
property are worth investing in, claims Leon van Biljon of Dole, not only 
because Dole's producers can differentiate themselves in the market place; 
but also because current technology via genetic coding enables new 
varieties to be effectively enforced in international courts of law where there 
is a question of fraudulently obtained rootstock. 
(h) Securing funding. Part of volume growth in these agents' businesses has 
been the need to secure capital to fund that growth. Unlike multinationals, 
bigger South African-owned and -based marketing agents do not have 
77 An exporter may give his producer a very late additional payment, sometimes well after the end of the season. When an 
'agterskof like this is paid, it could elevate the exporter concerned to being amongst the better paying agents for the season 
concerned. So an early-paying agent does not necessarily equate to it being a best-paying agent, but it is normally a good 
indicator of a well-paying agent. 
78 Interestingly, a number of producers interviewed believe that the later-paying marketing agents go through a 'mixing and 
matching' payment process. In other words, agents determine which producers they want to keep (by cross-subsidizing them 
with superior returns); which producers they are ambivalent about (by giving them ordinary returns); and which producers they 










access to a parent company's offshore foreign capital. In order to fund the 
increasing cost of doing business with financially demanding producers, 
these agents secure capital from their importers, local commercial banks, 
specialist finance houses and, to some extent, their own cash reserves. 
Funding is not made any easier to secure due to the generally assetless 
balance sheets of many of the export agents. Naturally the bigger and more 
established of these agents are able to secure considerable amounts of 
capital to fund their businesses to the benefit of their producers. 
(i) Achieving favourable market splits. A grower wants to know that his export 
agent can give him sufficient market options so that he can split his 
volumes, and therefore his risks, across a number of markets. In one sense, 
a producer who dictates the marketing mix to his agent gives the agent the 
responsibility of optimizing that producer's return in the identified markets. 
And the producer can hardly complain if any of the markets are 'bad', 
because he chose those markets. However, if a producer leaves the market 
split to the agent (to essentially sell 'at best'), the agent is under pressure to 
maximize his producer's returns. An agent will then need to have access to 
several well-paying supermarket programmes in several different markets 
(like those of Canada, the UK and Sweden for example) to spread the 
income risk for the producer. 
U) Securing customer patronage through share ownership. One of the more 
recent developments is the backward integration of UK importing companies 
into South African exporting companies. Some marketing agents have sold 
a percentage of their business to their customers overseas in a bid to 
strengthen the relationship and secure their sales. This would hold appeal 
for producers wanting to have guaranteed access to certain UK 
supermarkets during certain weeks of the supply season. 
Smaller export agents have an entrepreneurial agility that some of the bigger agents lack. 
They also have lower overhead costs than their bigger counterparts and are often able to 
return above-average prices in niche markets for their producers. One of the easiest points 
of entry into an offshore market for a marketing agent with a relatively small volume of 
product is on the wholesale markets in Europe, or through a Dutch trader to any market in 
Europe. According to Jan van Nes, this type of South African product can find its way from 










Dutch can do best with their renowned trading skills. Often, due to the nature of their size, 
the smaller agents are unable to place their product into the rewarding UK programmes. 
Sometimes these smaller agents will therefore on-sell79 their product to bigger marketing 
agents who have access to such retail programmes. Strategic alliances of this nature do 
occur within the export agent fraternity. The most common example of agents working 
together with product is the sharing of logistics (like the chartering of vessels together) 
where the economies of scale achieved in working together outweigh the apparent 
contradiction of agents being competitors. 
Importantly, all of these marketing agents - big and small - are now having their traditional 
business models challenged. The bigger and more capable producers have started 
exporting large percentages of their own product, substantially modifying the agents' 
traditional role of taking their product overseas on their behalf. Several evolutionary 
business models are unfolding as a result. 
• Firstly, a number of the bigger table grape producers are forming producer 
alliances. Together these producers are amassing critical volumes of product to 
export - for their own account. In order to get their product to market, this group of 
producers employs marketing expertise, most typically the skills of a former 
marketing agent. The producer alliance therefore ends up paying a salary to acquire 
this marketing expertise as opposed to paying an ad valorem commission to some 
marketing agent. 80 It will be interesting to see, in time to come, if many of these 
producer alliances become members of a co-operative (like the citrus producer 
alliances did with the South African Cooperative Citrus Exchange (SACCE). In 
which case, if the co-operative then takes on the marketing function for its 
members, a form of centralized selling will be re-introduced back into the industry. 
• Secondly, the bigger agents are integrating backwards in the value chain by 
acquiring production units. 81 By doing this, marketing agents are securing product 
for themselves that they may have lost. Various models around this backward 
integration are evolving, and it will be a while before these export agents find an 
-9 The on-selling of a grower's product by one agent to another agent is controversial. One school of thought says it adds 
value to the producer where the originally selected agent is unable to move it profitably for some reason or other. The other 
school of thought suggests that on-selling lengthens the chain and makes it ultimately more costly for the producer. Some 
agents are known for their policy of forbidding on-selling to other agents. 
so Some of these alliances claim that the cost of employing the skills is about 2% of the gross sales price of the product as 
opposed to the much higher percentage that the independent marketing agents usually charge. The bigger the producer 
alliance's volumes, the more significant are the savings and the better the return per carton for each producer in the alliance. 










acceptable level of risk between becoming farmers and remaining export agents. 82 
Chris Conradie maintains that if an exporter can buy a stake in the right farming 
operation, and retain the best on-farm management, it is a win-win for the producer 
and the exporter. He believes that taking a shareholding in a farm does not secure 
the fruit as much as it reduces the volatility in the relationship between the exporter 
and the producer. This type of investment in all fruit kinds also guarantees the 
export company a flow of product throughout the year, and gives the exporter a 
business rather than a seasonal enterprise. Sarel Joubert also points out that in 
Chile, South Africa's major grape exporting competitor, a more advanced system 
has evolved where the big five exporters there either own, rent or lease the farms 
and therefore 'take ownership' of a big percentage of the product for export (these 
Chilean exporters are therefore understandably called grower-shippers). 
• Thirdly, producers are forward integrating and becoming co-shareholders of export 
agents' companies. This is a win-win scenario where the export agent secures a 
guaranteed supply base, and the producer secures a financial investment in an 
exporting company that deals not only with his product but with many other growers' 
products, thereby potentially increasing his profits. 
(3) Foreign importing companies with branches in South Africa like Vanguard 
(American-owned) and Van Doorn (Dutch-owned) do not account for a large volume 
of grape product being exported from South Africa. Their greatest appeal to 
producers is the relatively 'direct deal' that the South African branch facilitates with 
the parent company offshore. The South African leg of the business simply 
streamlines the movement of the product to the destination market, firstly by 
sourcing the right product, and secondly by assisting with the South African 
logistical side of the chain. The sales proceeds are paid directly by the overseas 
parent company into the producer's account, thereby achieving a level of 
transparency and directness desired by some producers. The FPEF's experience of 
this type of business model has sometimes been far from reassuring though. A 
number of industry disputes has surrounded this type of agency model that tends to 
have a very thin capacity at the South African end, and is subject to the whims of its 
Rc One of the more appealing models in a backward integration deal is the inclusion of black economic empowerment. In a 
business model that has the farmer, the exporter and the workers all as co-shareholders of the production unit, the export 
agent effectively secures some of its supplies from historically disadvantaged South Africans. This is a socially responsible 










distant parent company's business decisions. With the exit from the FPEF of both 
Agrimax83 and Orion Pacific,84 who typified this business model, it remains to be 
seen whether this model can sustainably grow its business interests in South Africa 
in the medium to longer term. 
(4) A single producer that exports his own and his fellow producers' crops also 
constitutes a relatively small part of the South African export business. Because 
there is a natural empathy between producers, one producer moving product on 
behalf of another producer is an endearing system. Producers like Hoekstra Farms, 
Suiderland Plase and the more recently established River Fruits85 are motivated to 
take other producers' crops to achieve the necessary economies of scale and the 
associated cost benefits with service providers. Combining neighbouring farm 
volumes also enables a producer to access the more volume-orientated 
supermarket programmes. Retailers are tending to buy more produce directly from 
the farms believing that they are making a saving of the agent's commission in 
doing so. However, the success of a producer acting as an agent for a few other 
producers is subject to the business and marketing skills of that producer whose 
skills are originally of production - not marketing. Producers in this model also need 
to bear in mind that the bigger the exporting volumes become, the more the 
business starts to take on the infrastructural requirements - and costs - of a fully 
fledged marketing agency or producer-exporter marketing cooperative (discussed in 
the following section). 
2.5.2 Producer-Exporter Companies 
A producer-exporter company can be described as one whose shareholders are the 
producers that supply the majority of product for export. 86 They could consist of a single 
83 The manager of the South African end of the Agrimax business left the company, and with no one to replace him, the 
company is in a state of limbo. 
84 Orion Pacific claimed that it could not afford to pay the various FPEF membership fees (like those levied on the GEF 
members), and so withdrew its membership. The degree to which foreign owners appreciate the contribution made by 
industry associations in supplying countries is questionable. 
85 Riverfruit is an agency that was established by Gerhard de Kock, a producer of substantial volumes in the Hex River and 
Namibia, and who formerly supplied Capespan through the Capes pan Grapes Trust. Riverfruit procures table grapes from 
other producers and sells them on an agency basis. 
86 Interestingly, some of the marketing agents claim to be of the producer-exporter model because a minor percentage of their 
total product sold is supplied by their own shareholders. Just because supplying producers sit as directors on the Boards of 
some of the export agent companies, it does not qualify them for producer-exporter status. With the current trend of 
supermarkets wanting their service providers (category managers) to buy direct from producers, it is simply a case of these 
marketing agents spin-doctoring the overseas buyer into believing that the product can be acquired 'as directly' as through the 










producer marketing his own product like the Le Raux Group or Karstens Boerdery,87 to a 
group of 40 producers or more marketing their own product through their own export 
houses, like EXSA and Fruits Unlimited. The ideal number of producers in the bigger 
'marketing co-operative' type of export business model depends on the number of cartons 
that need to be packed, the varieties available and the spread across the production 
regions (to capitalize on all of the marketing windows available to South African product). 
Samuel Pieterse of EXSA claims that his company retains enough producers to market 
10% to 12% of the South African product volume - big enough to be taken seriously by the 
international buyers, and small enough so as not to attract unnecessary attention from 
industry competitors. The following are the benefits associated with the producer-exporter 
model: 
(1) The sales office can confidently generate its marketing plan knowing that it has 
consistent producer representation with a guaranteed supply base. As a result, the 
sales office can also develop a market-led varietal mix amongst its shareholders;88 
(2) The trust and transparency that are indigenous to this business model are also of 
benefit to the producers that are essentially shareholders of their own export 
company; 
(3) Producer-exporter companies can save on procurement costs,89 since the product 
is already in-house via its shareholders; 
(4) It is not necessary for shareholders to guarantee themselves minimum prices or to 
insist on advance payments - sufficient confidence prevails in a company that is 
essentially managed by the shareholders' employees or the shareholders 
themselves; 
(5) Capital is not absorbed either in cross-subsidizing one producer with another, or in 
non-core business activities which can often be the case in a marketing agents' 
87 Karstens Boerdery, formerly a supplier from the Orange River to Capespan through the Capespan Grapes Trust, now 
markets its own product through its marketing company New Vision Exports. Karstens Boerdery has also purchased or leased 
production units in other grape-producing countries. This enables Karstens Boerdery to supply supermarkets with grape 
product outside of South Africa's traditional marketing windows - a model that starts to resemble that of a 'multinational 
producer-exporter' . 
88 An advantage of the producer-exporter business model is the on-farm varietal changes that the marketing department of 
the producer-exporter company makes to its shareholders. EXSA's Managing Director, Samuel Pieterse states that with 
sophisticated computer models giving technical and marketing considerations to each individual shareholder's varieties and 
volumes, the producers are motivated to take seriously the market-led advice given to them by their own company executives. 











business model. The focus is on minimizing the costs and maximizing the returns 
back to the producer-shareholders; 
(6) This model enjoys revenue recognition in alignment with the total turnover achieved 
in product sales - not just the ad valorem commission on the sale as is technically 
the case for marketing agents. The ramifications are that turnover is higher, 
borrowings easier and cost of borrowing cheaper. Capital requirements for 
expanding the producer-exporter's market base, for example, are readily 
forthcoming from lending institutions. 
The drawback of the producer-exporter model - especially amongst the larger producer-
export houses - is that there can be too many shareholders who all need to be heard by 
management, many of which would prefer their own interests to be prioritized above fellow 
shareholders. Marthinus Strauss, MD of Capespan Grapes at the time noted in the 
Capespan Courier (2005) that decision-making can become unwieldy when too many 
producers are involved in this type of model. Part of the difficulty is determining the fairest 
pooling system to be used. For example, a sought after supermarket programme with a 
limited volume off-take cannot be served by all the producer-shareholders in the company 
(where there is more product available of the required specification than required by the 
supermarket). Deciding which producer-shareholders supply these sorts of programmes 
leaves management exposed to criticism, even if nepotism is sheer perception. Samuel 
Pieterse claims that to placate their shareholders in such matters, they pool the returns of 
their growers by market, by week, and pay the average return to each producer. Whilst it is 
management's task to try and satisfy the supplier-shareholders by ensuring that their 
returns are consistently acceptable and that systems implemented are fair, this is not 










2.6 Procurement Strategies of the Marketing Agents 
There were two important issues behind the race to procure table grapes by the marketing 
agents early in deregulation. Firstly, realizing the importance of marketing top quality fruit, 
exporters all targeted the finite number of top quality producers available to them. Attaining 
top quality product from reputable producers would not only give the successful exporters a 
competitive edge with discerning UK supermarket buyers; it would also minimize quality 
claims in the chain. Secondly, procuring substantial volumes would give the early exporters 
the economies of scale so vital to securing substantial credit lines and rebates from various 
service providers in the chain. In consignment business, once the agent's fixed office costs 
have been covered, profits are directly proportional to volume-based commission. This 
afforded these exporters certain additional opportunities like chartering their own vessels, 
and procuring the services of technical field staff to assist their producers with production 
matters. And it further entrenched the capital requirements needed by smaller exporters to 
compete against them. 
This section examines the procurement strategies that the bigger exporters90 have 
exploited over the course of deregulation to keep smaller export companies out of the 
mainstream of the table grape export business. In the first few years of deregulation, 
certain market forces entrenched the position of the bigger export agents in the industry, 
and they were as follows: 
(1) Many conservative producers were unwilling to be 'experimental farms' for 
inexperienced agents, and preferred to stay with the former monopoly, Unifruco 
(later Capespan) whose 'Cape' brand and loyal customers appeared to remain a 
safe haven for them. These same producers chose to wait and see what transpired 
in the exporting arena before spreading their product - and their risk - amongst a 
number of other competing exporters. In 2001, 90 such producers who could have 
'gone it alone' decided to join forces with Capespan and formed a Trust in which 
prominent producers were elected as trustees. Marthinus Strauss recounts the 
establishment and motivation behind the Trust as follows. The producers in the 
Trust felt that in combining their resources they could have a greater say and 
control over the export of their product. They also realized that if they should 
compete directly with each other, the industry and its export effort would become 
90 For the purposes of this dissertation, the top 20 exporters can be considered as those members of the FPEF illustrated in 
Table 2.6. However Hoekstra Farms, New Vision Fruit (Karstens Boerdery) and Riverfruit (Gerhard de Kock) are notable 










more unstable. As a producer group they negotiated with Capespan to put their 
grape business in a separate company called the Capespan Grapes Trust (Pty) Ltd, 
in which they had a 50% stake. This would provide them with control and a share in 
the profits. In turn, the group was to supply its product to Capespan Grapes on an 
exclusive basis and guarantee an agreed supply volume. Essentially, Capespan 
traded some company control and a share of the profits for security of supply. This 
lasted for four years but for a host of reasons unity of vision could not be 
maintained, and the structure was dissolved in May 2005. 
(2) At the time of deregulation, multinational companies like Dole, Katope, Unifrutti, Del 
Monte (at the time) and Capespan started investing in the South African fruit export 
environment. They brought foreign currency, established offshore markets and 
powerful brands with them, including financial offerings for their producers in the 
form of production loans, disbursements, minimum guaranteed payments and paid 
directorship positions on export company boards (the financial tools that the 
exporters used to procure product are comprehensively covered in section 2.7 that 
follows). These activities all raised the financial barriers that the smaller and newer 
exporting firms could not hope to match. 
(3) Part of the volume-seeking strategy by the bigger exporters was the growth in 
market share that it afforded them. If an exporter was unable to secure sufficient 
access to the supermarket buyers,91 he was able to buy market share through 
predatory pricing, and run the product as a loss leader for a while if necessary. A 
keener price to the supermarket could lead to a greater allocation of product 
volume by the supermarket to that exporter. To further entrench their positions with 
supermarkets, the bigger exporters offered the supermarkets post-season rebates92 
to lure them into switching additional volumes to their businesses (now 
supermarkets are in such a commanding position that they actually demand these 
rebates from their suppliers through an upfront, tendering system 93 where the 
supplier's rebate is included in the supply price). Once an exporter had developed a 
significant programme with a supermarket, it was very difficult for another exporter 
company to unseat such an established relationship. 
91 Most UK supermarkets do not deal directly with a South African exporter, but rather through an importer or a service 
provider. 
9:' A rebate is a volume-related discount that, in this case, the exporter would give to the importer at the end of the season 
based on how much fruit the importer had bought from him. 
93 Due to the market power enjoyed by the supermarkets today, exporters are forced to offer rebates as part of their 'supply 
quote' to the importers. If their quote is accepted, that rebate comes off the top of every invoice as the season progresses -










(4) Much of the early trading (1998 to 2001) took place in an enormous information 
vacuum. Multinationals were at a distinct advantage since their overseas offices 
could secure vital market information, timeously and cheaply. The bigger export 
companies could, at a price, buy similar information. But the smaller export 
companies, relying on industry bodies to provide information to make their 
decisions, were hamstrung by the fragmentation and dearth of industry information 
so prevalent in those early days. This asymmetrical information so rampant in the 
industry was also a disadvantage to those producers who were big enough to 
possibly export their own product, but who were effectively barred from doing so 
due to a lack of market intelligence available to them. 
By the time the 2000/2001 season had arrived, the overseas markets had been over-
supplied by overly competitive South African marketing agents. 94 The situation had been 
exacerbated by one critical fact that many industry role-players somehow tended to 
overlook: that there was a minuscule local market opportunity for the volume of table 
grapes produced. The local market for South African table grapes has been statically small 
for 15 years, as indicated by Diagram 2.10. This effectively meant that there would be as 
many exporters as there were willing producers to supply them with the product. And with 
the early and bigger agents having already secured the top quality produce, the remaining 
produce had to be offloaded, sometimes in desperation, to unqualified and sometimes 
unethical95 export agents. In cases where the producer had product of mixed quality, the 
exporter was often coerced by the producer into taking his good product with his not-so-
good product. If the exporter refused, there would be a high chance of him not being able to 
procure any fruit at all from that producer again. The burgeoning over-supply of South 
African volume in the European market also caused South African exporters to compete 
against one another - but with the same producer's product. 
9~ It was also a case of too much product entering the EU market simultaneously via South Africa's competitors like Chile, 
Brazil, Peru and Argentina. 
95 The ease with which exporters could exit the table grape export industry probably peaked in the 2000/2001 season. 
Liquidations of marketing agents were more commonplace, either because the agents had miscalculated the intricacies of the 
business, or because self-liquidating agents actually facilitated defrauding producers. With few sunk costs for many of the 
'one-man-band' export agents, the exit barriers were extremely low. To add insult to injury for the producers, a lack of industry 
institutional power and an impotent South African law seemed incapable of preventing the owners of previously liquidated 










Diagram 2,10 The Local Market versus the Export Market (1991 .2006) 
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Province Table Grape Association (NT A). The motivation behind their start-up was the 
unacceptably poor financial returns as a result of the ill-disciplined export agents that were 
too many in number, and overly competitive in nature. Export agents wishing to procure 
product from the various regions would, in future, have to be accredited with the producers' 
regional offices. The regional producer accreditation criteria varied slightly from region to 
region, but were subject to each individual export company signing a contract with the 
regional association to qualify for receiving product from producers in that region. This 
process was controversial because it was: 
(1) Conditional to the exporter providing his sensitive marketing information to the 
production region's governing body which included disclosing his customer names, 
the varieties and the volumes delivered in each sale's week; and 
(2) Based on a minimum volume off-take (for the Berg River region only) of around 
200000 cartons per exporter. This minimum off-take would have entirely eliminated 
the smaller export agents, some of whom serviced niche markets very effectively for 
the smaller producers. The exporters challenged the minimum volume concept as 
being unconstitutional, largely because it also flew in the face of government policy 
that supported small, micro and medium enterprises (SMME) and black economic 
empowerment (BEE) companies which tend to be small volume players. 
This producer accreditation process marked the first 'manufactured entry barrier' 
established in the post-deregulation period to ostensibly reduce the number of market 
agents operating in the production regions. The producers claimed that they were not 
deliberately excluding export agents based on their size, but instead were trying to curb 
inexperienced agents - who did not have established clients overseas - from procuring fruit. 
However, these producer associations were in no legal position to prevent producers, as 
owners of their own product, from arranging the marketing of their own grapes through a 
marketing agent of their choice, or from marketing their own crop.99 
99 As far as the accredited exporters in the FPEF were concerned, many of those producers trying to export their own crop 
were just as capable of inflicting much damage on the markets as the small. unaccredited and relatively inexperienced export 
agents. In addition to this, exporters were distrusting of the producers (in the producers' association) who were responsible for 
vetting their sensitive, marketing information. What would stop an entrepreneurial producer from using that information to set 
up his own export company and going it alone? To this day, GEF members believe that, in two separate cases, the 
compulsory submission of their highly confidential information led to the abuse of that information that aided the establishment 










Reluctantly, the majority of exporters conformed to the producer associations' draconian 
contracts. However the agents that were accredited with the FPEF 100 were in no mood to 
risk the supply of their product being cut through vengeful or misguided producer 
association personnel. Exporters were concerned that producer associations might 
encourage producers to export their own product, or insist that product from a region be 
given only to a few select export agents. In a show of countervailing power, these agents 
organized themselves into a sub-chamber of the FPEF called the Grape Exporters' Forum 
(GEF) to deal exclusively with the management of their relationship with the producer 
organizations. This body convinced the producer associations that the management of 
exporters should be left to the devices of its own association. By the 2002/3 season, the 
producer associations determined that only export agents that had achieved FPEF 
accreditation were entitled to product from their regions - with a couple of exceptions. 
For new exporter entrants and for existing agents operating outside of the GEF, the barrier 
for procuring product had been further raised. The accreditation criteria established by the 
FPEF were, in a sense, more stringent than those imposed by the table grape producer 
associations themselves. For FPEF agents, accreditation involved, inter alia, signing a very 
strict Code of Conduct, lodging copies of marketing agreements with the FPEF's secretariat 
and opening producer trust (banking) accounts 101 to avoid producer monies from becoming 
attached to liquidated exporters' estates. 102 The FPEF had also become the secretariat of 
the registered Export Council with the dti, which entitled its members to substantial financial 
assistance towards its members' collective marketing campaigns. 103 Without membership 
to the FPEF access to the product had indeed become very difficult, but largely at the 
behest of the producers. 
In more recent years, additional procurement strategies have been adopted. Some 
exporters have secured the rights to new grape varieties from overseas plant cultivators. 
These varieties are then issued (sometimes in restricted quantities) to producers who are 
contractually bound to deliver the crop to the exporter concerned. In other procurement 
IlIO The Fresh Produce Exporters' Forum (FPEF) is the only Forum in South Africa accrediting export companies of all fresh 
fruits. Members are required to sign a strict Code of Conduct that governs various aspects of agency business. 
101 This trust account is not required by SA law (as is the case for estate agents' establishing trust accounts for example), but 
instead is required of the FPEF's members as signatories to the FPEF's Code of Conduct. 
102 In late 2004, during the liquidation of a non-accredited export agent, the affected agent went as far as to suggest that it 
had been the victim of an FPEF cartel of exporters protecting its already established members by controlling the supply of 
product through exclusive arrangements with industry producers. 
l(j~ The FPEF is the registered Export Council with the dti which has financially assisted its members with regard to (1) 
hosting international trade fairs annually in many of its major markets; (2) conducting outward selling missions to customer 
countries; (3) conducting inward buying missions by bringing major international buyers to meet the FPEF exporters; and (4) 











strategies, exporters have integrated backwards and purchased shareholdings in farms in 
order to secure future grape supplies. Forward integration by producers into export houses 
has also been a strategy whereby exporters secure product by their suppliers acquiring an 
interest in their businesses. Those producers who have chosen to do their own exporting 
(and have sufficient economies of scale to do so), have been able to circumvent the 
procurement strategies adopted by exporters over the deregulated period. 104 Their product 
is mostly excluded from being available to agents, and as more producers and producer 
alliances take on the marketing function, procurement will become more of a challenge to 
under-supplied marketing agents in future. 
Of concern is the inability of historically disadvantaged individuals to penetrate the grape 
export sector in any meaningful way due to the entrenched procurement strategies of 
already established agents. Many existing role-players would argue that these procurement 
barriers are healthy, because deregulation has cost the industry dearly. Had there been no 
intervention by the producers to discipline the exporters along the way, the industry might 
have self-destructed further. In that case South Africa may well have lost valuable market-
share to its growing competitors in the Southern Hemisphere, and become a shadow of its 
former self as a world leader in the marketing of fresh table grape products. 
IO~ Some of the bigger volume producers who left the Capespan fold were able to buck the trend and 'go it alone', especially 










2.7 Financial Procurement Tactics Used by Exporters 
2.7.1 Contracting with a Minimum Guaranteed Price (MGP) 
In managing his risk, an exporter needs to decide whether or not it is feasible to give a 
producer a minimum guaranteed price in order to secure his product. Where an exporter 
willingly offers a producer an MGP for his product that he is confident that he can sell at a 
particular price, and for which he is prepared to take that risk, then that MGP becomes a 
natural element of a consignment deal in a free-market system. Marthinus Strauss declares 
that exporters might give producers an MGP for some undisclosed strategic reason like 
strengthening its position with early product, servicing a programme to an important 
customer where stock is in short supply and securing a specific (leading) producer for his 
supply base. Chris Conradie claims that exporters might use MGPs to procure fruit from 
new producers where using other company resources (like executives' time) to win the trust 
of that new producer is too time-consuming to justify. This is especially the case if it is a 
small volume of fruit, and if it is considered probable that the new supplier might not stay 
with the exporter after the first year of supply. 
All MGPs are essentially conditional to the producer satisfying a number of requirements in 
full, namely delivering the agreed quality specifications, in the designated weeks and at the 
specified volumes. Only part delivery thereof usually renders an MGP null and void, making 
it a brittle financial instrument. Gaby Gess advises exporters that such an MGP is legally 
enforceable by a written, contractual arrangement between the two parties, but that there 
should be clarity between the parties as to whether the MGP is payable per carton 
exported, or payable as an average per carton exported over the whole season. 
In theory, consignment sales provide the producer with the highest financial returns. 
However it is attractive for some producers to 'sell' part of their risk in the form of an MGP 
to his exporter. In a sense, MGPs encourage a more calculated approach to consignment 
business by both producers and exporters. A producer will be incentivized to grow a top 
quality product knowing that an exporter will make use of an MGP to procure highly 
marketable fruit from a reputable producer. The producer is comforted by an MGP for 










• Firstly, it avoids the producer carrying all the risk in a consignment deal where the 
commission-based exporter theoretically carries no risk at all - only a reduced 
commission in the case of a reduced selling price. 105 
• Secondly, an MGP can cover a large percentage of the grower's production cost, 
and is ideal if it approximates his break-even cost. Mike Grobbelaar is adamant 
though that the good growers find the good exporters who find the good markets, 
and these growers do not insist on an MGP from their exporters. For an exporter, 
agreeing to an MGP only creates potential downside risk for him, and so he has to 
build in an increased margin to accommodate the risk. The anticipated market price 
that makes the exporter's additional risk appear commensurate to reward - at the 
time of the procurement - may not materialize. This is due to the many and varied 
forces affecting the sales prices of fruit in the market place (Symington, 2003) -
particularly the practice of over-procurement by supermarket buyers. 
In practice, however, an MGP does tend to produce undesirable results. The short-term, 
overt unpleasantry of an MGP is the acceptance by a producer of an unrealistically high 
MGP from a reckless exporter where both parties have scant regard for what the market 
can actually afford. The market rarely pays a premium for a producer who demands an 
MGP, let alone one that is extortionate. The FPEF secretariat can testify to the number of 
mediations that have occurred around such deals which usually have no accompanying 
contract, and that incur financial losses for both the producer and the exporter. The 
unhappy conclusion of these circumstances is that the producer consumes resources trying 
to recover the unpaid balance of the MGP from the errant exporter, while the exporter 
erodes his income statement further with every payment that he is required to make 
towards that MGP. As one exporter cynically inferred, in cases where the MGP per carton 
is noticeably higher than the production cost of the carton, the producer is attempting to 
transfer the risk to the exporter and secure guaranteed profit in the deal for himself. 
Producers who do this are sometimes unsure of their costs - as hard as this may be to 
believe - and they therefore peg an MGP where they think they have safely covered their 
own costs. Hubert Leclercq states that the circumstances surrounding an MGP that is 
pegged at or above the production cost simply reduces it to being a 'maximum' guaranteed 
105 Marthinus Strauss notes that most producers do not mind paying a higher commission when they are making money or 
getting higher than expected prices. However, most producers would like to see their exporters suffer with them when the 
proceeds are lower than expected. He further notes that some exporters take 0% commission when proceeds are less than 










price. In this case the producer will not see any additional income from the market above 
this kind of MGP. 
The longer-term problems associated with an MGP are somewhat more latent in the value 
chain. In a sobering statement, Louis Kriel (snr) claims that the exporter is simply not 
making a big enough margin to support an MGP. So he fetches it from elsewhere in the 
chain, and the MGP can be considered a form of subsidy. Exporters in such cases tend to 
revert to the cross-subsidization opportunities afforded them by the pooling system that is 
legitimately used by shipment, or by market per week. Those producers without MGPs 
could subsidize those producers with MGPs. Or those producers in the early growing 
regions (with premium market prices) could subsidize those producers in the later growing 
regions. The point is that the gross income of the industry is unlikely to increase as a result 
of the implementation of an MGP. According to Leon van Biljon, a more serious defect of 
MGPs that directly compromises the competitiveness of the industry is as follows. An MGP 
forces a receiver overseas to set a minimum price (to his customer) to accommodate the 
MGP. But if the competitor's consignment price to that receiver is lower than the South 
African MGP, it skews the marketing of the South African product. The receiver stores the 
South African fruit until he feels he can sell it at the price required and if it remains unsold 
by its sell-by-date, the quality claims start appearing. The moral here is that the flow to 
market of a perishable product should never be inhibited, otherwise it becomes 
problematic. 
Due to the recent parlous financial state of the industry (brought on by the 2003/4 and 
2004/5 seasons) producers have mooted the possibility of implementing an industry-wide 
MGP. An industry-wide or blanket MGP is essentially a floor price. The concept of a floor 
price was tested three years ago in the citrus industry, and the writer compiled a document 
for the citrus industry that carried the following message. The use of a floor price in the 
2003 citrus season penalized the exporters because exporters landed up subsidizing 
producers in markets that collapsed. The floor price concept was also flawed from the 
marketing agents' viewpoint because producer-exporters landed up selling some of their 
product to marketing agents at the floor price, and then going into the markets themselves 
with the balance of their product and selling it to buyers under that floor price. 106 This action 
effectively sabotaged any potential profits for the commission-seeking export agents. The 
2003 floor prices were applied to citrus exporters in the FPEF only, and so a mob of free-










concept. These issues, and others, undermined the original intent of the floor price in the 
citrus industry, which was for exporters to share some of the risk in consignment sales. The 
floor price also turned out to be the level to which most prices eventually gravitated -
because it was perceived by exporters and importers to be the absolute minimum price that 
producers could tolerate. Instituting a floor price therefore served to be a price-deteriorating 
and self-defeating exercise. 
Despite this, table grape producers - in a collective bargaining approach - have entertained 
asking for an industry-wide MGP for the following reasons: 
(1) Producers would prefer to share the risk in consignment business more equitably 
with the marketing agents. And they would like to do so by being given some type of 
guaranteed return in the form of an MGP by the exporter. But asking exporters to 
now share the risk of a decision that producers took many years ago when they 
decided to invest in the ground is a controversial perspective on risk sharing -
especially in agency-orientated business. 
(2) Producers would prefer exporters not to put grapes into overseas markets without 
programmes (i.e. without a firm buyer for the product) unless they are prepared to 
pay producers an MGP for that (unprogrammed) product. At first glance, it is a 
logical statement - fruit without an address on it is destined to flood the markets, 
and prices for that fruit will in all likelihood yield inferior returns. It will also put the 
prices of programmed fruit under pressure. However the mere request of an MGP in 
such circumstances is flawed, since South Africa's grape production volumes way 
exceed what the local market can absorb, and many grape producers are forced to 
find an income for their produce abroad - with or without an address on it, and with 
or without an MGP attached to it. 
(3) Producers would justify an MGP on the grounds that only good quality107 fruit would 
leave the country if exporters were made to pay a minimum price for product worth 
paying for - and to leave behind fruit not worth paying for. Putting quality product in 
the market place is considered a cornerstone of the industry's competitiveness, so if 
a 'minimum guaranteed price' equated to a 'minimum guaranteed quality', then it 
106 Producer-exporters, whether they sell to export agents at all or go into the markets themselves, are unaffected by a floor 
price and so will always be potentially more price competitive in the market than an agent who has had to pay a floor price. 
107 Quality refers to the specifications to which fruit is packed at source, namely class, size, variety, sugars to acid ratios etc. 










would be worth considering from an exporter's viewpoint. However the following 
systemic problems militate against the hypothesis that better quality fruit would 
reach the markets if an MGP was in place: 
(a) Exporters, lacking confidence in the current quality control systems in the 
country, would not wish to implement MGPs because sub-standard quality 
fruit can be 'hidden' in the system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that poorer 
quality fruit tends to be located in the centre of pallets which fruit inspectors 
are unable to reach through time, volume and manpower constraints. 
Francois Smit, PPECB National Programme Manager: Grapes says that, in 
his experience, the financial incentive systems that most producers have 
with their pack house managers encourage volume rather than quality to be 
packed. 
(b) Further to this, an exporter that has not wanted to take a producer's poorer 
quality product in the past has been pressurized to do so on the basis that if 
he wanted any product at all, he had to take the 'good with the bad'. 
Otherwise the producer would find another exporter to oblige him. Jan Ie 
Roux, a producer himself, states that unfortunately, producers tend to want 
to sell their worst fruit under such conditions, and this simply makes the cost 
of doing business more risky and therefore more expensive. 
(c) Fruit can deteriorate unexpectedly en route to the market, leaving an 
exporter stranded with product he is unable to sell at an MGP-related price. 
Poor fruit condition on arrival in the market can be due to an unfortunate 
quirk of Mother Nature. It can also be the result of technical failure or 
mismanagement of the product in the cold chain, and in this case there are 
potentially as many culprits as there are technical complexities. Mike 
Grobbelaar feels that fruit landing in poor condition in the market also drags 
down the price of good quality fruit in the same market which may have an 
MGP attached to it. To then assign the accountability of prices via an MGP 
to an exporter under these sorts of circumstances is considered 
unreasonable. 
(d) Some exporters would argue that an automatic MGP would breed 










an MGP. There would be no further incentive to lift quality if the notion of a 
pre-paid price was on the table before the grapes were harvested. 
In conclusion then it seems that the quality of the product, the quality of the industry 
inspection systems, the quality of the technical performance in the value chain and the 
quality of the markets cannot be consistently guaranteed to make provision for an industry-
wide MGP. And it would be a tricky exercise trying to determine where that industry-wide 
MGP would be pegged, because producers can have vastly different costs from one 
another. As long as agency business continues to operate successfully for those producers 
and exporters that remain profitable in exporting table grapes, exporters cannot be 
expected to carry risk for the producers through blanket-MGPs. However, those producers 
who successfully command MGPs from their exporters on a one-to-one basis will continue 
to do so based on sound production quality, and sound business practices. It will also 
depend largely on whether markets are under-supplied or over-supplied at the time. If 
producers understand their costs well - and there still seems to be doubt about this - then 
they should have a good understanding of where to peg an MGP - certainly not above cost, 
as that is total transference of risk from the producer to the exporter plus a guarantee of 
profit for the producer. Perhaps then an MGP should more sensibly be called an MCP - a 
minimum cost price. Producers could then look to incentivizing their exporters to fetch 
optimum prices by creatively profit sharing on the differential between cost price and final 
price. 
2.7.2 Managing Risk Associated with Monies Advanced 
A significant number of South African grape export companies have been established by 
entrepreneurs in the last ten years, many of whom have had a limited understanding of the 
financial and legal implications of their dealings - particularly with their producers. Giving a 
producer an advance payment108 can constitute a substantial risk to the financial well being 
of the exporter, and therefore the stability of the industry as a whole. In order to secure their 
supply bases, exporters have fast become finance houses in an industry where many 
producers are illiquid and some even technically insolvent. Commercial banks have 
traditionally loaned monies to the producers based only on their fixed assets, namely the 
value of their land. But the value of the vineyard (and its future harvests) can exceed the 
value of the land, particularly in weak property markets and a weak rand exchange rate 










environment. Exporters have capitalized on this by securing their advance payments to 
producers by taking out various forms of security on their producers' moveable assets, 
most notably their harvests. Whilst the financing of producers by exporters may be 
controversial (in that producers land up being financially beholden for years on end to non-
financial institutions like export companies), it is an economic reality - or market force - and 
a means by which many a producer has lived to fight another season. But in doing so, 
exporters have unwittingly procrastinated the inevitable demise of those producers who 
have not altered their business practices to meet the demands of the modern fresh produce 
industry. The knock-on effect is that production practices, business practices, volumes and 
varieties have remained in the system that should have been eliminated, and this is 
compromising the industry's competitiveness. 
Monies are 'advanced' by an exporter to a producer through loans, disbursements and 
MGPs. In the table grape export industry, money given to a producer in advance of fruit 
being delivered is categorized as a loan. Whilst this type of loan is ostensibly a 'production 
loan' and is normally used for picking, packing and packaging costs incurred by the 
producer, it can actually be used for any purpose. For the exporter though, it is a high-risk 
loan for several reasons: (1) inclement weather can damage the fruit's quality before its 
delivery; (2) a producer can unexpectedly give his grape crop to a competitor without 
warning and contrary to an established (normally verbal) agreement; and (3) a producer 
can be liquidated after being given the loan and before delivering the fruit. In all three 
cases, the exporter has loaned the producer money with the potential of not realizing some 
(or all) of the crop for export. In addition to this, even if the producer delivers the agreed 
volumes of fruit to the exporter, the market could still yield a poor return preventing the 
producer from paying back this loan timeously to the exporter. This loan is essentially 
therefore a relationship-based one, where the exporter is satisfied with the trust that exists 
between himself and his producer. However such a loan always carries a procurement 
hook. For as long as farmers insist on their businesses being funded up front by their 
exporters, so exporters insist that the fruit is guaranteed to them in return for the funding. 
Those exporters who have a strong cash flow are well positioned to finance needy 
producers, and can therefore compete very favourably for product, especially in financially 
difficult times. 
Only once the product has been delivered to the exporter do monies advanced to a 










circumstances. Firstly, the exporter often incurs costs in the chain from the farm to the 
overseas market, and such costs are classified as disbursements made in a consignment 
deal by the exporter on behalf of his cash-strapped principal. Such costs are typically 
encountered in transporting the fruit to the port, shipping the fruit overseas, and storing it in 
destination markets. The net return to the farmer is ultimately calculated as the income for 
the product minus all of the disbursements made by the exporter on his behalf. Such 
monies are recovered by the exporter only after the sales proceeds have been received 
from the overseas customer. 
Secondly, the exporter may agree to give his producer a portion of the anticipated selling 
price of the fruit in the market as an advance payment. This early payment usually assists 
the grape farmer with his essential post-harvest farming activities and their related 
expenditures. However, it is the refundability of such advance payments that causes 
consternation. This is partly because the conditions surrounding such payments are rarely 
documented in a written agreement between the two parties, and partly because of the 
complicating factors like MGPs and quality claims that often enter the financial equation of 
a consignment deal. In a fixed price deal, an advance payment is naturally not refundable. 
But in agency business (which is relevant here), an advance payment is refundable if the 
market price of the fruit does not realize the amount advanced to the producer. There is a 
mitigating factor though. If an advance payment forms part of a minimum guaranteed price 
(MGP) given to the producer by the exporter, the advance payment is not refundable if it is 
less than or equal to the MGP agreed upon - regardless of the return in the market for the 
product. However, the situation is made more complex when a quality claim is introduced. If 
a substantiated quality claim is tabled, advance payments are refundable, regardless of 
whether or not an MGP is in place - as long as the exporter has not been negligent with the 
product. But spurious claims and negligence on behalf of the exporter are often difficult to 
prove, so a grey area of the business is spawned. In practice, financial shortfalls arising in 
such circumstances are often carried over by the exporter into the following season, on the 
agreement that the same producer and exporter will attempt to rectify this shortfall in 
another joint export effort. However, if a similar incident recurs for two or more consecutive 
seasons, the producer's indebtedness to the exporter spirals into a type of debt-trap, and 
the farmer can find himself financially obligated to an exporter to an unhealthy degree, and 
for a seemingly indefinite period. 
The question that arises at this stage is whether exporters and producers are fully 
conscious of the implications of their dealings with one another; or whether the cocktail of 










excuse to secure deals unfairly and unethically from one another. The solution to this 
dilemma lies in both parties understanding exactly what their legal rights are in agency 
business, being streetwise around the pitfalls, and of course being principled in their 
business dealings. Two cases in the 2004/5 season highlight the risks attached to advance 
payments for exporters. 
(1) In the first case, a Berg River producer sold his crop four times to four different 
exporters (all GEF members) and took an advance payment from each exporter. 
When it came to the delivery of the product, each exporter - unbeknown to the 
other - only received 25% or less of the crop. The exporters eventually determined 
that there were four of them involved, and their joint legal advisor stepped in to try 
and recover the monies. In the meantime, the agents were left scrambling for 
product to placate their short-delivered customers. 
(2) In the second case, an exporter loaned a producer in the Orange River R650000 to 
secure his total crop for the season. There was a written agreement in place 
regarding the production loan including the delivery conditions of the crop to the 
exporter. Despite this, the producer delivered his entire crop to the exporter's 
competitor without notifying him. By the time the original exporter's delivery was due 
for expectant customers, there was no product left on the farm. This producer has 
since been liquidated, and the exporter not only has a disgruntled customer base, 
but also a R650 000 debt to try and recover. 
The FPEF, often expected by producer associations to investigate such alleged misconduct 
of its own members through mediations and arbitrations, brought both cases to the 
attention of the producer association, but no action could effectively be taken. 1og In this 
regard, Gaby Gess believes that the FPEF has, to date, played a greater role in the 
industry than the statutory organizations when it comes to dispute resolutions. 
With loans, disbursements and MGPs, the financial risks associated with exporting a 
perishable product like table grapes can be high for the exporters. Various forms of security 
need to be carefully considered by exporters when competing for product. The two tables 
109 The Deciduous Fruit Producers' Trust (DFPT) is the producer association to which the table grape producers pay their 
statutory levies. If the DFPT had a Code of Conduct and if it found the producer guilty of misconduct, what could the 
association do? It has no power to terminate the membership of the producer (where termination is a form of punishment) 
because by statute, the producer has to belong to the DFPT. 'Naming and shaming' is a possible remedy that has been used 
quite effectively in the past in the relatively small, but geographically concentrated export sector. But due to the geographical 
dispersion and the isolated existence in which many producers live, the practice of 'naming and shaming' is unlikely to have 










that follow, table 2.11 and table 2.12 (Gess, 2004) should be read in conjunction with one 
another. 
Table 2.11 
Loan Scenarios Disbursement Scenarios 
L1 Fruit on the tree 01 Fruit delivered to exporter at agreed 
point of intake 
L2 Fruit picked but not packed 02 Fruit physically delivered to 
importer. but payment not yet 
L3 Fruit picked and packed, but not received from importer 
yet delivered 03 Fruit partly sold, with some 
payment received from the 
importer, some disbursements made. 
Table 2.12 
Loan Scenarios Disbursement Scenarios 
Security 
L1 L2 L3 D1 D2 D3 
Mortgage bond Effective if Not applicable - fruit no Not applicable 
Immovable fruit stays longer attached to the 
Property on tree land 
Special Notarial Not applicable, as the fruit cannot be separately 
Not applicable 
Bond - Movables described and identified 
Not 
applicable, Applicable, 
the fruits creditor 
are not 




right and security unless in possession of the 
Bond - Movables the fruit taken into the 
property is 
creditor 
and in his 
separate 







Not Only effective if the fruit perfected Not applicable - no 
Pledge applicable is taken into the because longer in possession of 














The right of the debtor to receive 
Cession Not applicable payment can be ceded in security for 
the debt to the creditor 
Applicable 
in so far as 
it relates to 
Lien Not applicable - not in possession of expenses No longer applicable, not 





Suretyship Liability is that of surety for the debt of the principal debtor 
Bank Guarantee Liability is that of the guarantor of the debt 
Source: Gess (2004) 
These two tables illustrate the relationship between monies advanced and whether the 
advance forms part of a loan or a disbursement. They also show the different stages of fruit 
preparation and delivery, and what appropriate securities can be sought by table grape 
exporters to protect these advance payments. Without this knowledge, and therefore 
without the securities in place, exporters can incur enormous costs through the provision of 
finance to, or on behalf of, their producers. As has been stated earlier, not enough attention 
has been given by the exporters (and their producers) to the financial and legal aspects of 
this part of the business. The result is that unmanaged risk costs the exporter and his 
producer dearly, and it serves to undermine the relationship between the two parties and to 
destabilize the industry. 
Gess (2004) further advises that when determining the appropriate security to use, an 
exporter should also ensure that a conveyancer conducts an adequate research to 
determine whether or not an immovable property has been bonded in excess of its 
reasonable value. She further suggests that the exporter cannot work in isolation of certain 
Acts like the Insolvency Act in relation to preferences and security, the Agriculture Credit 










Destructive disputes are still prevalent over advance payments in the table grape export 
industry, largely where there is no written contract in place. They are time-consuming, and 
largely a combination of uninformed and devious behaviour. They have a number of 
consequences for the industry: (1) the industry is destabilized and the relationship between 
producers and exporters is undermined; (2) they erode the balance sheet of exporters who 
generally struggle on the current margins on which they operate; (3) the international 
buying community loses confidence in the supply side from South Africa where promised 
deliveries fail to materialize; and (4) the South African table grape export industry tends to 
be overly pre-occupied with internal (political) disputes where they should rather 
concentrate on developing mid- to long-term relationships with their customers in the 











The non-climacteric nature of table grapes and the erratic affects of climate on their quality 
and production volumes compel exporters to procure their wares from all production 
regions. This ensures that exporters spread their procurement risk, and capitalize on 
continuous supplies for their customers throughout the marketing windows on offer. Export 
table grapes need to be market-friendly, variety-friendly and quality-friendly, as these 
factors determine the product's consumer appeal and price capability in the marketplace. 
The inevitable consequence of the product's homogenous nature has meant that price 
discrimination is difficult to achieve, making SA suppliers predominantly price-takers in the 
market. Exporters have tried to avoid the commoditization of the product through attractive 
packaging, offering new and organic varieties, complying with fair trade requirements and 
pioneering carbon footprint declarations. 
Ten years on from deregulation, there is three times the number of exporters doing nearly 
three times the volume of business. According to the HHI Index, the export industry has de-
concentrated to such an extent that it can be regarded now as intensely competitive. 
Capespan, as a spin-off of the former monopoly, has continued to form a very important 
backbone of the South African grape exporting fraternity, albeit that its market share at the 
end of the 2006/07 season was at 17% of the industry's export volumes. The proliferation 
of exporters has divided into two camps over the deregulation era: the top 20 export 
companies that continuously retain over 80% of the export volumes; and the long tail of 120 
or more exporters that make up the balance of the export cartons. The early years of 
deregulation gave rise to disorderly and ill-disciplined behaviour amongst producers and 
exporters, some residue of which still pollutes the industry today. Those marketing agents 
that chose to accredit themselves with the FPEF have, despite their efforts to act 
responsibly in the industry, lost ground in export volume to the producer-exporters in the 
last five years of deregulation. The exporter fraternity is comprised of traders, brokers, 
marketing agents and producer-exporters, the last two of which have dominated the 
exporter landscape. 
The drivers on which the business models of export agents are based (especially the 
multinationals and the larger South African owned and based firms) demonstrate the 
degree to which these companies have been able to entrench their positions in the 
industry. However these traditional models are now being challenged by the rising tide of 
producers doing their own exporting. Marketing agents have retaliated by integrating 










forward into marketing companies to move away from a seasonal enterprise into an all year 
round business. Despite the apparent ideal model of the producer 'marketing cooperative', 
the demise of Capespan's Grape Trust and the recent break-up of the EXSA company has 
cast doubt on the sustainability of this model. 
2001 was 'ann us horribilis' for the South African table grape producer. The financial returns 
of most farmers for the 2000101 season were ruinous. It sparked a revolution across the 
country amongst the producers, resulting in the establishment of four producer associations 
in the various production regions. These associations started accrediting exporters on a 
regional basis, and forced exporters to sign draconian contracts. The FPEF's sub-chamber, 
the GEF, was formed to counter these measure taken by the highly organized producer 
fraternity. The GEF goals were to absorb and respond to the concerns of their suppliers, 
and to ensure the continued supply of product to their businesses. By the start of the 
2001/02 season, only FPEF-accredited agents (i.e. GEF members) could qualify for 
product, barring a few exceptions. These measures did beg the question as to whether the 
barrier for entry of new marketers - especially those BEE companies perhaps wanting to 
enter the industry - had been raised excessively high. Nonetheless, these measures did 
reintroduce the necessary discipline required to stop the industry from sliding down the 
slippery slope of deregulation. 
Marketing agents have resigned to the fact that the business of exporting table grapes is 
not an exact science; and that dealing with a product that suffers from the vagaries of 
Mother Nature will always have an unpredictable cost attached to it. Therefore financial risk 
management plays an important role in an exporter's procurement strategy. Part of this risk 
management is the issuing of MGPs, which can land up being a disproportionately 
expensive offer if inappropriately used. Only in circumstances where, for strategic reasons, 
it is vital for an exporter to offer his producer an MGP, will he do so. Producers have 
expressed interest in implementing floor prices across the whole industry; and exporters 
can't oblige, because insufficient confidence exists in a perishable product system where 
product quality varies for too many reasons beyond the control of the exporter. 
In order to secure product, exporters also choose to advance funds to producers through 
production loans and disbursements. As long as the exporter and his producer have 
understood the implications and grey areas affecting this aspect of the business (and 
always reduce their agreements to writing), then it can be a mutually beneficial exercise. 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is ignorance and unethical behaviour 










exporters should be well versed with the law in this regard. Finally, where producers and 
exporters indulge in practices that serve to undermine the relationship between each other, 











Chapter 3: Challenges in Competing Supply Chains 
3.1 The Recent Metamorphosis of the Logistics Chain 
Once the exporter has successfully procured product in South Africa for a supermarket 
programme in England, it is normally his responsibility to move the product from the South 
African farm gate to the UK importer's distribution centre. This perishable cargo has to 
arrive timeously and in the specified condition for a market that is more than 10 000 km 
from source. For this to happen, the exporter and his producer rely heavily on many service 
providers to execute their functions diligently in the chain. This chapter covers the all-
important, logistical aspects of successfully exporting table grapes mostly through the port 
of Cape Town to the United Kingdom. The evolution of the logistics chain, the gargantuan 
changes in the international shipping sector and the various restrictions on the flow of fruit 
through the South African ports are now discussed. Emphasis is placed on where the 
exporters need to address competitiveness issues, particularly surrounding the logistical 
activities in the Cape Town port environ, and on the innovation required in the South 
African leg of the chain. 
The traditional mechanics of a trade chain was that fruit was transferred through a 
sequential set of separate logistics 'operations' - like trucking, forwarding and clearing, 
warehousing, terminal operations, stevedoring and shipping - from the supply end of the 
chain to the demand end of the chain. The implication was that these separate functions 
were executed by separate organizations; that costs were accrued on a cost plus a margin 
basis; and that there was little or no integration of the individual logistics elements in this 
chain (Robinson, 2002). 
Diagram 3.1 is a simplistic view of the table grape export chain reflecting this set of logistics 
operations. Orders for South African table grape products start with the UK importers 
responding to consumer demand (6). These UK importers communicate their exact product 
specifications to their South African exporters (9) who are predominantly marketing agents 
and producer-exporters. The South African exporters, in turn, convey the UK importers' 
requirements to their producers (1). The exporter then sets about ordering the packaging 
(2) and having it delivered to the farm. He also books the container with the shipping line 
(4) and has it sent to the farm to be stuffed with the product. The exporter books the road 
transport (7) to fetch the product and have it delivered to the cold store or port terminal (3), 










loaded onto the appropriate vessel (4 or 5) and shipped to the UK market. These logistics 
activities and the mOvement of the product from South Afnca to the UK are recorded 
electronically at all times and communicated to all relevant parties via electronic data 
interchange (7) The product and transport equipment is also quality contrOlled repeatedJy 
along the chain by the PPECB (8) 
Diagram 3.1 A Simplist ic Sequentia l V iew of the Log istiCS Chain 
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Market forces have had to re-engineer the traditional trade chain, primariJy because there 
has been a shift In gears from suppliers in the Agricultural Board era proclaiming 'th ,s is 
what we offer' to the dominant reta il chains today demanding this IS what we want'. The 
fact that growers") and retailers are not experts in logistics has ensured that a plethora of 
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added logistics to their customers.111 In addition to this, 3PLs and other companies have 
clustered into a constellation of firms that form 'logistical pathways' or 'value chains' from 
the supplier to the buyer (Robinson, 2002).112 So what was once the domain of many types 
of smaller, individual companies plying their trade in the supply chain is now dominated by 
fewer, larger integrated companies offering a wider range of services that stretch further up 
and down the value chain than before. 
This approach to the fresh fruit logistics chain in the deregulated era has been driven by a 
number of major trends. Kaplinsky & Morris (2000) postulated that logistical service 
providers and their principals have been driven by just in time (JIT) production, total quality 
management (TOM) and continuous improvement (CI). In addition to this, the need of UK 
retailers to take greater control over the logistical aspect of the business will become 
evident in the following chapter. The UK retailers have demanded this not only to satisfy 
their customers, but also to save costs and to extract greater rents to their end of the chain. 
Other major drivers of the metamorphosis of the logistics chain include: 
• The emerging South African producer-exporters who are bypassing the 
services of the traditional marketing agents and contracting directly with the 
logistical companies themselves; 
• Strong and volatile exchange rates and deflationary product prices in the UK 
market that have forced growers to relentlessly scrutinize their costs in the 
chain (Meintjes, 2006). Growers have had to insist on a far greater element of 
transparency in the cost chain than has traditionally been the case; 
• The need for service providers to integrate forwards and backwards in the 
chain so as to have a greater degree of control over the product and to 
improve their profitability levels; 
• The growth of non-European destinations for South African fruit in general; 
III Well-known European companies that illustrate this integration in the chain (and which South African table grape shippers 
use) are Danzas, Schenker/BTL and Kuhne & Nagel. All of these companies have evolved from basic forwarders to full 
lo~istics service providers (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001). 
I L Today a number of these 'value chains' exist that compete with one another for the table grape export business to the UK. 











• The inexorable growth in containerized shipping at the expense of 
conventional (reefer) 113 shipping; and 
• The decay of productivity in, and the congestion of, the various South African 
ports. 
II, The industry uses the informal word "reefer"" to denote "refrigerated". Confusion arises when, for example, the phrases 
"reefer container" and "reefer vessel" are used. This is because the former refers to the container shipping industry whilst the 
latter refers to the conventional shipping industry - yet both have the word 'reefer' in them. "Reefer vessel" will from here on 










3.2 Sea Changes in the International Shipping Sector 
South African table grape exporters are witnessing a dramatic revolution in the shipping 
side of their business. The container liner sector has shown unprecedented growth, whilst 
its conventional cousin has been treading water in a bid to compete. Traditional 
conventional shipping clients have essentially shown a penchant to palletizing a 
refrigerated container rather than a refrigerated hold of a ship. In the remainder of this 
section we examine these developments, how they are influencing the evolution of the 
logistics chain, and the degree to which they are causing congestion in the port of Cape 
Town - the heart of the table grape export industry's logistics chain. 
3.2.1 The Container Liner Sector 
The expansion of the global container shipping industry is a result of intense, inter-
container liner competition, stemming from the industry's high level of fixed costs, the 
widespread practice of governments subsidizing their shipping and shipbuilding industries, 
the entrance of newly-established, low-cost Asian shipping lines, and the ease with which 
containers are able to be transhipped from one mode of transport to another (Trace, 2002: 
2). International shipping is moving away from the traditional port-to-port services towards 
door-to-door solutions (Paixao & Marlow, 2003). This has come about through the inter-
operability of transport modes, the interconnectivity of land networks with sea and the 
compatibility of information systems. And because these shipping lines hold such a key 
position in the chain and essentially operate most of the containers, the extension of their 
services from specialized shipping to trade chain logistics was a natural progression (Slack, 
1992).114 However the severe competition that has ensued amongst the container shipping 
lines has forced ship owners to adopt innovative, productivity-enhancing and cost-cutting 
strategies, which according to Slack et al. (2002) included: 
• Deploying larger vessels. Trace (2002) affirms that when vessel size 
increases, the capital cost per container slot 115 falls, the ratio of crew to 
II~ Notteboom (2004) confirms this by noting just how far Maersk Sealand has progressed with: (1) its door-to-door logistical 
service packages via Maersk Logistics; (2) its management of container terminals in European ports; (3) its inland transport 
joint venture with P & 0 Nedlloyd in European Rail Shuttle; and (4) its direct dealings with exporters in bypassing the 
forwarders. 










carrying capacity declines and the consumption of fuel per unit of cargo 
transported decreases; 116 
• Rationalizing their businesses by participating in strategic alliances and 
mergers. Slack et al. (2002) advocate that, while there was no clear 
consensus as to the economic justification of these alliances, economic 
literature tends towards internationalization theories (minimizing transaction 
costs) and strategic management theories (performance being shaped by a 
number of internal and external factors); 117 
• Reducing the number of port calls, hubs and mini-hub ports, and thereby 
increasing the volume of transhipment cargo; 
• Developing a network of feeder services linking hub and regional ports. 
However, Rademan (2007) observes that shipping lines do not have the ability 
to transfer containers quickly enough in these congested transhipment hubs, 
and that remote temperature monitoring capabilities (i.e. via the internet) are 
normally lost after the first transhipment; 
• Developing new types of shipping services. 
An example reflecting these initiatives that manifested on the South African shipping route 
was the introduction of the six new vessels on the South African European Conference 
Service (SAECS) during 2004 and 2005. According to Meintjes (2004d) this fleet not only 
created extra carrying capacity - up to a 1000 slots per vessel - for 40-foot integral reefer 
containers; it also benefitted exporters by reducing the 49-day voyage cycle (from SA to Le 
Havre, Rotterdam, Tilbury and back to SA) to 42 days. Meintjes further noted that other 
efficiency factors in this new service included vessel departures from Cape Town on 
Mondays (instead of the previous Sunday departure service), giving exporters an extra day 
in which to schedule their cargo onto the ship. In addition to this, the arrival days in the 
116 Vessel size is classified according to five generations of 20-foot equivalent unit (TEU) container-carrying capacities that 
have evolved since the 1960s. The most recent 5th generation vessels built in the late 1990s - known as the post-Panamax 
vessels (meaning they will be too wide now to pass through the original Panama canal) - have a carrying capacity of about 
6000 TEUs (Cullinae & Khanna, 1997). 
117 Whilst strategic alliances were the order of the day in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mergers and acquisitions dominated 
around the millennium. Three major alliances that have impacted on the South African shipping routes were the Grand 
Alliance (Hapag-Lloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCl, P & 0 Nedlloyd); the New World Alliance (Hyundai, MOL, NOLlAPl); and the 
Maersk/Sea land Group (Trace, 2002). More recently, the attempted Maersk-P&O Nedlloyd merger and the Lauritzen Cool-
NYK deal have raised discomfort levels in the industry with regard to increased concentration in shipping services and the 










market place were also scheduled for earlier in the week than previous services, giVing 
exporters an extended marketing period in the UK for the same arrival week. 
3.2.2 The Conventional Shipping Sector 
The rationale behind the ebbing conventional shipping sector is, according to Drewry 
Shipping Consultants (2002), fourfold: (1) the deregulation of export boards; (2) the 
mounting influence of retailers worldwide; (3) the 'drift' towards the use of containerization 
by exporters; and (4) the declining conventional shipping fleets. Gone are the days when a 
conventional vessel would come 'tramping' to your doorstep and service one client, with 
one shipload and one bill of lading. Today, a supermarket may require 5 or 50 pallets a 
week, and the same vessel now has 200 clients on board with 200 bills of lading. In 
addition to this, the vessel may now be carrying 100, 40-foot containers on deck (Oswald, 
2003), a sign of how adaptive the industry has had to become in order to compete. But the 
fundamental decline in this sector can be ascribed to no new conventional vessels being 
built in the sector for the last five years, the ageing of the existing fleet and older reefer 
vessels being scrapped (Meintjes, 2005b). In addition, the surplus tonnage that has been 
created in the container vessel sector has forced the container sector to dampen its freight 
rates to lure cargo away from the relatively more expensive conventional sector (Knowles, 
2005). 
Meintjes (2003b) proposes that issues favouring conventional shipping include: (1) the 
aforementioned combi-shipping of cargo below deck and containers on deck; (2) self-
serving vessels which have built-in cranes on the ship's deck, making them independent of 
shore crane equipment limitations; (3) high speed sailing capabilities; and (4) flexibility in 
terms of ports of loading and discharge. Meintjes (2006d) adds that transit times to certain 
markets are shorter with the conventional lines than they are with the container lines, and 
that cold sterilization techniques used in conventional ships are also more reliable than in 
container ships.118 This, according to Ortmann (2005), is because some industry 
stakeholders believe that the air circulation in the hold of a conventional vessel is superior 
to that of a 40-foot integral container. And break-bulk ship loading can continue in high 
winds whereas container loading has to stop at a certain wind speed, for safety reasons. 
What's more, Meintjes (2006d) questions the country's ability to manage the entire fruit 
export crop via containerization with the current infrastructural limitations being experienced 










in the country, particularly at the ports - including the shortage of container boxes to meet 
the rising tide of container shipping demand. In this regard, Meintjes (2003c) predicts that 
penetration of containers into the market will be retarded due to the investment costs of: (1) 
the post-Panamax ships introduced to carry the 40-foot containers; (2) the 40-foot tri- and 
tandem-trailers used by trucking companies to haul the longer containers; and (3) port 
equipment such as straddle carriers, 'bathtubs' and gantry cranes that are able to handle 
the bigger tonnages. 
3.2.3 Industry Preference of the Containerized Sector 
The above-mentioned issues refer to the strategic intents and the infrastructural capabilities 
of the container and conventional shipping sectors. The relative demise of the conventional 
sector can be seen more starkly when analyzing the advantages that table grape exporters, 
service providers and the product glean from using the containerized mode of shipping. 
These advantages are, according to Rademan (2007), as follows: 
(1) Pallets in containers are handled fewer times (up to seven times less) than 
the conventional methodology. Since there is an accepted correlation 
between reduced forklift usage and reduced pallet and fruit damage, this 
practice has to be advantageous for ultimate product quality (FPEF, 2003); 
(2) The product can be containerized at the pack house, and the cold chain is 
therefore unbroken from the pack house right up to the customer's premises 
overseas, offering what is essentially an uninterrupted, door-to-door119 cold 
chain service. Food safety issues, non-contamination of the product and the 
continuity of the cold chain are all enhanced by this mode of transport; 
(3) There are also fewer parties involved in the 'unbroken' process mentioned 
above, making accountability for product quality losses a much easier 
exercise; 
119 Meintjes (2002a) believes that the door-to-door debate is essentially one of comparing the merits of conventional shipping 
versus container shipping. Those advocating conventional door-to-door shipping claim that many containers do not go to the 
customer's door, but instead find their way into third party logistics providers' cold stores and depots - either for onward 
shipping or for de-stuffing and re-working. And this is no different to the way conventional shipments are made. Oswald 
(2003) concurs that most containers are de-stuffed at or near ports because most retail outlets cannot handle a 40-foot 
container load of perishable product, and container owners are reticent to have their refrigerated containers used for static 









(4) With the phasing out of the 20-foot porthole (conair) containers12o and the 
introduction of the 40-foot integral containers, twice the amount of product 
could be moved (in one lift) than previously, making the cost per carton of 
fruit being shipped cheaper. 121 Costs have been further trimmed by the 
introduction of high-cube containers. 122 With the introduction of these 
containers - and more recently the specialized integral containers 123 -
shippers have also had greater assurances on quality control than ever 
before; 
(5) For less established exporters, smaller lots of fruit can be moved more 
flexibly where one container is directed to one buyer. On the other hand, a 
conventional vessel needs between 2000 and 4000 pallets per sailing, which 
either favours the bigger exporters or puts the shipping agents under 
tremendous pressure to fill the vessels; 
(6) Lastly, the cost-effectiveness of shipping by container with its relatively 
cheaper freight rates than conventional shipping is a major attraction to 
shippers where cost savings are crucial for their international 
competitiveness. 
In general, smaller volumes of product exported tend to be moved in containers, while 
larger volumes are moved in break-bulk fashion (Ortmann, 2005). However the mode of 
shipping employed also depends on the market being served and the exporter involved 
(Meintjes, 2003b). Whilst congestion in ports can influence exporters' decisions, factors 
such as cost, transit time and overseas landside operations will also affect exporters' 
decisions on shipping modes used (Rademan, 2003). The international transport sector -
particularly the container shipping lines - has responded to an environment characterized 
by global corporations, outsourcing, deregulation and technological innovation in two ways. 
120 With the old porthole containers, the ship's refrigeration system ducted cold air in and out of the container via two 
'portholes' in the container's end wall (hence the name). When such a container was discharged at a port, it had to be 
disconnected from the ship's refrigeration system until such time that it could reach another land-based refrigeration system, 
and it was during this 'in between refrigeration systems' time that the cold chain could be 'broken'. With integral containers, as 
long as they have access to electrical power points (i.e. in ships, on trucks, in stacks), the generator set (hence the name 
'gensef) that is integrated into the container is always powered to deliver cold air from the integrated refrigeration unit into the 
container. 
121 20-foot containers hold 9 pallets, whereas standard 40-foot containers hold 20 pallets. 40-foot high-cube containers hold 
the equivalent of 23 pallets as three additional pallets can be 'broken down' and stacked on top of the underlying 20 pallets 
(van Walbeek, 1998). 
122 With the additional three-pallet capability of a high-cube container, a 15% cost saving was available (due to the fact that 










Firstly they are offering global logistics packages to shippers in order to achieve economies 
of scope. This amounts to vertical integration in the chain where the 'door-to-door' or 'one-
stop-shop' philosophies have revolutionized most shipping lines into intermodal logistics 
organizations. 124 Secondly, shipping lines are increasing the size of their operations 
through deploying larger vessels and engaging in mergers and alliances so as to achieve 
economies of sea/e. This amounts to horizontal integration in the chain in which the lines 
hope to achieve cost leadership and better service to their clients via advanced IT 
solutions, more frequent services, a wider global coverage and reduced transit times 
(Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2001). 
le3 This refers to the controlled atmosphere capabilities of such refrigerated containers, and it is the subtropical sector that is 
leading in its ability to capitalize on such technology. 
le~ The Capespan Group, as a major shipper of South African table grapes, exemplifies this type of vertical integration in the 
chain. It part-owns the conventional terminals in the Cape Town port; it leases conventional vessels (the 'snow' vessels) to 
transport its product abroad; and it now has an investment in the Groot Garieb cold stores in the Orange River production 
area. According to Meintjes (2004c) and Meintjes (2005e), this allows the company to manage the cargo information right 
from source and to streamline the scheduling of product into their terminals and onto their ships. As a result, it reduces 
conventional terminal congestion, optimizes ship loading and minimizes costs for growers. In 2006, Capes pan opened a 
subsidiary logistics company (The Fresh Chain) in a bid to offer other exporters a similar service. It will be interesting to see 










3.3 Flow of Fruit into the Cape Town Port 
Table grapes are exported to the UK market predominantly through the seaport of Cape 
Town.125 Export consignments are trucked from farm to port using either merchant haulage, 
which is the exporters' responsibility, or carrier haulage, which is the shipping lines' 
responsibility (Allen et ai, 2005). These consignments arrive in the port either in refrigerated 
road trucks or refrigerated containers. The railage of grapes to the port is no longer a viable 
form of transport,126 as the correct rolling stock is not readily available for transporting 
containers and because it is significantly slower than road transport (Ortmann, 2005). This 
is despite rail being a far more efficient mode of transport compared to road haulage. For 
example, a single train of table grape containers is the equivalent of using 32 road trucks 
doing the same job (Ortmann, 2005). 
If the fruit is being loaded onto a conventional vessel, it is delivered to the break-bulk 
terminals that unload and store the fruit until it needs to be stevedored onto the vessel. 127 
These terminals (as well as the inland storage facilities) provide cold sterilization functions 
and provide access for the DoA and the PPECB to inspect the fruit. More recently, the 
conventional terminals have started handling some containers that are loaded on top of 
reefer vessels for the increasingly popular form of combi-shipping. The break-bulk terminal 
facilities were monopolized by Fresh Produce Terminals (FPT) in the deregulated era, 
which is a subsidiary of one of the exporters, Capespan. Meintjes (2005) states that 
Capespan's ownership of the conventional shipping terminal has been contentious in the 
deregulated era. 128 There was a challenge to the dominant position of FPT by transient 
competitor South African Fruit Terminals (SAFT) that has now closed its doors for 
commercial reasons. 129 However Capespan has in recent years divested of its major 
shareholding in FPT to a Black Economic Empowerment consortium, and can therefore no 
125 Some of the early table grapes in the Orange River production region that were destined for the UK market used to be air-
freighted from Upington in the Northern Cape Province to England's Heathrow Airport. However these charter flights stopped 
in 2003, as this mode of transport cost up to 10 times that of sea-freight. 
126 In the 2007/8 season, SATI has investigated the use of rail from the Orange River to the Cape Town port (nicknamed the 
Grape Express initiative). 
127 Sometimes a break-bulk consignment bypasses the terminal and is delivered directly onto the quay alongside the berthed 
vessel. The conSignment is then loaded straight into the hold of the ship. Whilst this enables shippers to save on terminal 
costs, any deviation from temperature protocols during this 'cross-docking' can result in outright rejection of the entire 
shipment for export - making it a very costly exercise for the shipper. 
128 The controversy around Capespan owning FPT was because it was considered an asset that had been paid for by the 
growers in the regulated era, and because it had a dominant position in the ports through which most of Capespan's 
competitors had to ship their product (giving Capespan an advantage on pricing and an unencumbered insight to their 
competitors' shipments). 
129 According to Meintjes (2004a), SAFT was essentially established to provide producers and exporters with an alternative 
conventional terminal service to FPT. Meintjes (2004f) - Managing Director of SAFT at the time - claimed that SAFT was not 
just a port terminal operator, but a good example of an integrated service provider offering inland cold storage facilities (at the 
Cold Harvest premises in Paarl which it owned), road transport services from pack house to port, load scheduling onto ships 










longer be fingered as dominating the break-bulk terminal business. With the upsurge in 
container shipping at conventional shipping's expense, FPT's volumes have shrunk to such 
a degree that the company has been soaking up spare capacity by diversifying into 
alternative freight types. However the fact remains that FPT retains 90% of the current 
break-bulk terminal business countrywide with terminals in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, 
Durban and Maputo (Meintjes, 2006a). 
If the export consignment is being loaded onto a container vessel it is delivered to the Cape 
Town Container Terminal (CTCT) facility, which is located in a different - more wind-
ravaged - area of the port to that of the conventional terminal site. The consignment passes 
through an administrative checkpoint (A-check) to ensure that the paperwork identifying the 
driver, truck and booking reference number correspond with what the terminal facility's 
computer was expecting. Any deviation causes the truck to be held up, or sent away, until 
the exporter has rectified the problem. If approved, the consignment then progresses to the 
physical checkpoint (P-check) where the truck registration number and the container 
number are verified via a wireless, hand-held device also connected to the terminal's 
computer system. This is for security reasons. The seal on the container is also checked at 
this stage to ensure that it is intact. Any discrepancy means that the consignment is 
returned to the exporter. Once satisfied that all is in order, the personnel at P-check inform 
the truck driver where to meet the straddle carrier130 inside the port facility, from where it is 
placed in the stacks 131 and plugged into electrical power while awaiting loading onto the 
container vessel. The container terminal facilities are monopolized by the state-owned, 
Transnet Port Terminals (TPT), formerly known as the South African Port Operators 
(SAPO). It is important to note that in 1995, the share of container shipping was 24% of the 
fresh produce export business from South Africa (Meintjes, 2002a); but by 2006, the 
container share had escalated to 70% (Meintjes, 2006a). This growth in containerized 
shipping has had a deep impact on the effectiveness and efficiency levels of the logistics 
chain in the deregulated era of the South African table grape export industry. 
Generally speaking, conventional ships 'tramp' the market i.e. they provided flexible 
services as and when needed; whilst container liner services offer fixed-day calls on set 
routes (like a bus-stop service) on a year-round basis (Meintjes, 2006f). It is important to 
understand that distance is no longer the decisive factor of transit time or cost in shipping. 
UO A "straddle carrier" is essentially a crane on wheels that overrides a container truck, lifts the container off the truck and 
parks it in a stack. The driver's cab on the straddle carrier is hooked up to the CTCT computer system that tells the driver 
exactly where to park a particular container in a particular stack. 
131 A "stack" is a pile of containers (stacked up to four containers high in the Cape Town terminal) that is grouped together for 










A shipping line's capacity, its ability to use that capacity flexibly and quickly, and its network 
of paths that it can choose from all determine transit times and costs (Trace, 2002). This is 
endorsed by Meintjes (2006g), who states that exporters can no longer afford to be 
dependent on just one shipping line if they need to get their fruit to market on time. And 
Meintjes (2005) also asserts that logistical solutions today lie in multi-line and multi-modal 










3.4 Logistical Logjams in the Port of Cape Town 
Port terminal capacities - including the break-bulk and the container terminals - for the 
exporting of table grapes have been constrained by inclement weather, labour disruption, 
large traffic volumes, incorrect documentation, fruit out of temperature protocol and 
equipment break-down (Ortmann, 2005). These issues, combined with the effect of the 
increased demand for refrigerated container capacity by the grape exporters has meant 
that the logistics chain in the Cape Town port - particularly in the container terminal facility 
- has been increasingly overloaded in the deregulated era. Meintjes (2004a) states that 
whilst container shipping is generally accountable for most of the congestion challenges in 
South African ports in the new millennium, conventional shipping is not blameless. In this 
regard, Meintjes (2004b) retorts that it is often only 5% of the cargo volume that can double 
the loading time of a conventional ship due to exporter incompetence (i.e. insufficient 
planning and incorrect information).132 The port authorities - in their function as 'landlord' -
have been largely unsuccessful in using their monopolistic muscle to achieve the 
necessary coordination between the powerful shipping lines, unproductive state-owned 
enterprise organizations and disorganized table grape producers and exporters. Six critical 
aspects of the logistical chain in the port of Cape Town are now examined under the 
microscope to understand the affect that they have had on the competitiveness of the table 
grape export industry in the deregulated era. These key areas are underinvestment in port 
infrastructure, disorganized exporters, parastatal impotence, powerful shipping lines, peak 
week pressures and other erroneous factors. 
3.4.1 Underinvestment in Port Infrastructure 
Although considered too little too late by industry, the South African government in 2005 
decided to invest in capital expenditure in its ports over a 5-year period. 133 The 2005 
Budget Review (Bisseker, 2005) noted that South Africa's infrastructural network was 
characterized by escalating costs, bad service and a weak skills base, and that this had 
been aggravated by protracted underinvestment. Perkins et al (2005) stated that 
investment in (South African) ports in the late 1990s was running at 35% of the long-term 
Dc Meintjes (2004b) further intimates that many of the congestion problems result from too many (inept) shippers populating 
the fruit export industry in the deregulated era, and that delay costs caused by the disorganized few penalizes the orderly 
majority. 
m As Louw & Hoffman (2004) make clear, government or private institutions will attempt to delay large capital expenditures 
for as long as possible, not forgetting too that there is a significant time delay from eventual approval of these projects until 










capital requirement. The consequence has been high logistical costs 134 for the economy 
and eroded international competitiveness (Bisseker, 2005). The same Budget Review 
noted that the state-owned enterprises of Transnet Port Terminals (TPT) and the Transnet 
National Port Authority (TNPA) - formerly known as the National Port Authority (NPA) - had 
budgeted to spend R30 billion over five years on new railways and port infrastructure. 
Provision has been made for the purchase of additional gantry cranes, plug-in-points, 
straddle carriers and other equipment required by the Cape Town Container Terminal 
(CTCT). Even a new container quay for Cape Town port has been planned, 135 but can only 
be implemented once the environmental impact assessment (EIA) - that has taken 3 years 
so far to be reviewed - has been favourably endorsed by the public. 
On closer examination, it appears that virtually no upgrades have in fact taken place in 
South African ports for several decades (Hoffman & Louw, 2003). This begs the question 
as to why the TNPA, as landlord of the South African ports, is annually levying cargo dues 
on every pallet of fruit passing over the quayside, since such dues are 'taxes' paid by the 
industry for the improvement of quayside and super-structural facilities in the fruit terminals. 
Rademan (2007) notes that cargo dues are not payable in any of the country's destination 
ports; and when combining cargo dues with the terminal handling charges (THC), South 
Africa's port costs are 55% more expensive than any other European port. Haarmeyer and 
Yorke (2003) attest to revenue generated by some US port authorities being used to offset 
state debt outside of the ports. In South Africa's case, it can be surmised that such landlord 
revenue has been used to cross-subsidize the construction of Coega port (which may be 
used at a later stage by the fruit industry) and other loss-making activities in the Transnet 
Group (like South African Airways). 
An unpopular port authority revenue model was instituted in 2002 when the old 'wharfage 
costs' were replaced by the 'cargo dues' taxation system. 136 In 2007, the port authorities 
collected approximately R120 million in cargo dues from the whole fruit industry (FPEF, 
2007c). Flat cargo rates per container for lower value commodities such as fruit are now 
effectively subsidizing higher value commodities such as motor vehicles (CSIR, 2006). In a 
letter to the former NPA (Symington, 2004), the FPEF not only challenged this unfair 
revenue model of flat rate taxes as opposed to the original ad valorem tax, but also the 
13~ According to the CSIR, South Africa's logistical costs in 2004 were 14.7% of GDP. whereas in the USA they were 8.5% of 
GDP (Perkins et ai, 2005) 
135 The intended expansion is a 150-metre reclamation of the sea to double the existing container stacking space. Berths will 
be deepened and new port equipment will be installed to improve productivity (Meintjes, 2006a). 
1'6 One of the motivations for the TNPA shifting away from the ad valorem wharfage tax was that many exporters were 










illogical imposition of differentiated cargo dues per fruit kind and per mode of shipping. 137 
But no curative action has yet been taken by the port authorities; and the port authorities 
have claimed that no objections were received by industry at the time that cargo dues were 
put before industry for comment. The state could argue that cargo dues revenue generated 
over the deregulated era will be ploughed into the new container terminal planned for Cape 
Town; and this is undeniably a hefty investment. But for the industry - along with all other 
South African import and export industries - it has been an uphill struggle through most of 
the deregulated era to motivate a lethargic central government to prioritize and invest in 
national logistics infrastructure. And this has been to the chagrin of the country's 
international customers. 
3.4.2 Disorganized Exporter Community 
There is sufficient evidence to implicate industry as not toeing the line when it comes to 
alleviating port congestion. The degree of laxity that still prevails amongst producers and 
exporters continues to exacerbate congestion in the Cape Town port. The following 
exporter issues are affecting the performance of the table grape export business inside the 
port: 
(1) Shippers are notoriously unreliable on providing the port authorities and shipping-
related service providers with accurate crops estimates and intake estimates for 
port logistics planning (Louw & Hoffman, 2004).138 The industry has yet to provide a 
reliable and regular source of comprehensive table grape export volume information 
throughout the season that allows logistical service providers to plan properly for 
optimum port utilization. Meintjes (2005d) stated that it was still the PPECB's 
intention to work towards the provision of an electronic export certificate, but that it 
would only be a reality once there was sufficient and timely coordination of EDI 
between all service providers and shippers, and once the harmonization of industry 
computer system codes had been achieved. This industry function is particularly 
necessary over the peak weeks (week 5 to week 7) when Cape Town port 
1'7 For example, the cargo dues for roughly one metric tonne (1 pallet) of table grapes passing over the quayside at a 
conventional terminal are R28.50 per pallet, whereas for citrus they are only R13.75. Table grape producers are being 
unnecessarily penalized here. Furthermore, the cargo dues payable for the same metric tonne of fruit passing over the 
container quayside is R78.00. The industry concludes that with the rising popularity of container shipping evident back in 
2001, the port authorities capitalized on the opportunity of differentiating the charges between conventional and container 
shipping to substantially increase their future revenue streams. 
1,8 Louw & Hoffman (2004) are adamant that if producers are serious about remaining competitive, they should ensure that 
accurate crop estimates reach exporters, truckers, port authorities and shipping lines timeously; and that any deviations are 










congestion can and does become a costly affair, ultimately for the producer. Some 
producers are at fault for either not submitting crop estimates (or accurate crop 
estimates), or for not delivering close to what they promised to deliver into the 
logistical chain for a particular week. Some exporters are also at fault for tending to 
overbook shipping space as a precautionary measure against a shipping line 
defaulting on its commitment, or for fruit they think they may be able to procure for 
export (i.e. an over-optimistic export crop estimate). Exporters do this by booking 
shipping space with two different shipping lines (to cater for their best-case export 
volume scenario that often doesn't materialize), and then land up cancelling the 
booking at the last minute with the line they don't intend to support (Hoffman & 
Louw, 2004). 
(2) Exporters are also known to have insufficient or incorrectly completed 
documentation when their consignment enters the port facilities, and this can cause 
major truck congestion at the entrance to both the CTCT and the reefer terminal 
facilities. According to Rademan (2007), the average queuing time of trucks at a 
container terminal (including container depots and cold stores) is six hours. As 
Paixao & Marlow (2003) point out, port activities are made up of two flows: the 
physical flow (of goods) and the information flow - and the information flow should 
always be ahead of the physical flow. In some cases, containers are refused entry 
into the port. For example, if the exporters mis-declare the weight of their containers 
whether through negligence or intent, it can constitute not only a safety hazard 139 
but also a selfish act in prematurely shutting out cargo when the ship's tonnage 
capacity is reached (Hoffman & Louw, 2004).140 
(3) Pre-ordained container stacking windows for a particular vessel (usually opened by 
TPT for three days prior to a ship's arrival) are often not properly used by exporters. 
Errant exporters tend to either deliver their containers on the last day of the stacking 
period thereby causing congestion at the entrance to the port; or they deliver their 
containers after the stacking period has closed (Hoffman & Louw, 2004). According 
to Schuitmaker (2005), exporters are also delivering their containers to the stacks in 
daylight hours only (i.e. in normal business hours) and therefore not taking 
advantage of TPT's offering of stacks being open 24 hours a day for the stack 
1,9 On the South African trade routes, the majority of containers are stowed on deck (Allen et ai, 2005). Incorrect loading 
weights can cause the ship's calculated weight distribution to be uneven enough to possibly capsize the vessel. 
I~O A vessel has a maximum tonnage at which it is can safely sail. If, for example, exporters under-declare the weight of their 
containers, the ship's maximum tonnage is reached before the last containers are due to be loaded. This serves to penalize 










period concerned. Needless to say, myopic planning on the part of exporters leads 
to a catalogue of missed deadlines, the costs of which are ultimately borne by the 
producer. 
3.4.3 Parastatal Impotence 
The port of Cape Town has two parastatal institutions involved with its activities: the 
already-mentioned TNPA who is the landlord of the port, and the TPT who exclusively 
manages the container terminal facilities at the Cape Town Container Terminal (CTCT). 
The activities of TPT are dealt with here, particularly since the minimizing of a vessels' turn-
around time in port (i.e. its length of stay) is critical to the competitiveness of the table 
grape export industry. According to Henesey et al. (2003), the average container liner 
spends 60% of its time in port at a cost of $US1 000 per hour, and so terminal operators are 
obligated to provide a service to shippers that goes well beyond crane moves per hour. 
Congestion and the simultaneous increase in cargo dwell times in the terminal are costly to 
the industry. 
According to international experience, Henesey et al. (2003) state that the four sub-
components making up a container terminal system are: (1) the delivery and receipt system 
with other modes of transport; (2) the storage system; (3) the transfer from storage to berth; 
and (4) the shore to ship system. They confirm that it is the delivery and receipt system and 
the transfer from storage to berth that cause bottlenecks and congestion in ports. This 
aligns with the Cape Town port experience. As has previously been mentioned, shippers 
have aggravated the congestion situation by not submitting correct information timeously to 
the port authorities and by not fully using the 24-hour stack times available to them. 
Instead, truck arrivals concertina at the delivery and receipt gates of the CTCT facilities 
during the conventional eight-hour working day, causing unprecedented bottlenecks -
particularly in the peak shipping weeks. It has also been mentioned that the shortage of 
equipment in the terminals to move the increased volume of container traffic within protocol 
times has exacerbated the congestion inside the terminal. 
These challenges have contributed towards lowering the productivity levels of the Transnet 
Port Terminals (TPT), which by world standards, have been below average. One measure 
of port productivity is 'crane container moves per hour'. According to Hoffman & Louw 
(2004), in 1995, just prior to the deregulation of the fruit export industry, Cape Town's port 










20 container moves per crane per hour. The management of the container stacking system 
has also left room for improvement. The shipping lines and the PPECB staff have been 
known to use their own staff to double check containers in the stacks to prevent containers 
from being left off power, having the wrong temperature setting points and even being put 
in the wrong stack (Allen et ai, 2005). Poor use of stack availability forces direct truck 
deliveries that create bottlenecks at the gates. According to the CSIR (2006), TPT is not 
sufficiently flexible in varying the stacking window periods to suit the size of the vessel (i.e. 
the bigger the vessel, the longer the stacking window period should be to accommodate the 
delivery of more containers that can be loaded onto the ship). 141 Instead stacking windows 
tend to be for the same period regardless of the ship size. 
Meintjes (2002b) believed that improving the long-term prospects for the SA shipping 
industry would also involve addressing productivity and efficiency issues in the ports 
through the privatization of (monopolistic) conventional and container terminals. Rademan 
(2007) believes that if privatization of the terminals is not possible, then at least public-
private partnerships in these terminals should be encouraged by the state. Meintjes (2005c) 
concurs, adding that limited commercial choices in the logistical arena, especially in the 
ports, are a threat to the long-term competitiveness of the fruit export industry at large. The 
divestiture of state-owned assets (like those of the TNPA and TPT in the Transnet stable) 
has been a bone of contention within South African government circles for some time. Yet 
according to global trends, the privatization of ports as a whole entity is unequivocal as 
private companies face a fuller set of market disciplines making them more operationally 
efficient than publicly owned enterprises (Haarmeyer & Yorke, 1993). National security and 
regional economic development are two common arguments given by the state as to why 
ports such as Cape Town should remain public property. But as Haarmeyer & Yorke (1993: 
3) point out, 'no persuasive evidence is given for why efficiently run private ports are 
inconsistent with either of these concerns'. 
3.4.4 Powerful Shipping Lines 
The burgeoning shipping industry - especially the container shipping lines - wields an 
inordinate amount of market power in the logistics chain. With port congestion continually 
l~ I Some controversial proposals have been made to alleviate congestion in the CTCT. One of these is the introduction of a 
time slot system in which container truckers are allocated stacking times. But too many issues constrain the timeous delivery 
of product that depends on the vagaries of Mother Nature. Another is a preferential payment system whereby those 










flaring up at the South African supply end of the trade chain, shipping lines have had their 
shipping schedules repeatedly interrupted over the deregulated era, particularly in the new 
millennium. The shipping lines have attempted to increase their freight rates - partly to 
recover the costs of congestion - by resorting to the following tactics: 
(1) Imposing surcharges for port congestion delays. This surcharge, similar to 
demurrage, was known as the South African Port Additional, and was implemented 
in 2004 at US$100 per 20-foot TEU. It remained in place until the average vessel 
berthing delay in each port over a 2-month period had been reduced to below 16 
hours. An independent study calculated the lost revenue to shipping lines as a 
result of congestion to be R500 million per year (Hoffman & Louw, 2004). The fruit 
exporting community felt that such non-negotiable surcharges were a result of port 
inefficiencies - yet the shipping lines passed the surcharge on to the exporters who, 
in turn, had to pass it on to their producers. 
(2) Applying intransparent formulaic calculations to the bunker adjustment factor. The 
bunker adjustment factor (BAF) is an adjustment made by the shipping lines to the 
freight rates as a result of the rising or falling price of oil (that affects the price of 
ship fuel, alias bunkers). It is implemented to hedge against the weakening of freight 
earnings, and is contentious chiefly because the base of the calculation was 
developed at a time when ships were considerably less fuel-efficient than they are 
today. So shippers are in the dark as to the real formula that should apply (as it 
would no doubt be advantageous to shippers if they knew the facts), and carriers 
refuse to shed any light on the how the formula is compiled, leaving disparities 
between what some carriers charge for BAF versus what they should be charging 
(Boyes, 2005). 
(3) Attempting, from time to time, to unilaterally re-introduce a currency adjustment 
factor. In March 2005, the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) forwarded to its 
clients a notice from the European South African Conference (ESAC) secretariat in 
London announcing the re-introduction of a currency adjustment factor (Middleton, 
2005). The CAF of 8.02% was due to the weakening of the US$ (in which shipping 
rates are paid) and the consequential weakening of the freight earnings from which 
the shipping lines suffered. It could be argued that shipping lines should factor in 
exchange rate depreciations in their initial freight rate offerings and take the 










exporters could unilaterally readjust their invoices to their supermarket clients 
because the exchange rate went against them. 
(4) Attempting to make acquisitions that would have directly affected exporters' freight 
rates on the South Africa-European shipping route, without consulting the industry. 
The attempted acquisition of P&O Nedlloyd by Maersk-Sealand in 2005 sent a 
South African fruit industry delegation scrambling to the EU Competition 
Commission to stave off the acquisition and thereby preserve lower freight rates for 
South African fruit shippers; 142 
(5) Short-shipping cargo by skipping ports. If a vessel falls behind in its sailing 
schedule, it sometimes bypasses a port to make up for lost time. In doing so, it 
leaves cargo abandoned on the quayside of the bypassed port. Needless to say, 
short-shipped cargo can have dramatic consequences for perishable products in 
particular. In such cases, frustrated customers can land up cancelling their orders 
claiming inexcusable congestion delays at the South African end of the trade chain. 
All of the above have had a significant impact on the competitiveness levels of the South 
African producer of export table grapes, for it is the producer who ultimately pays for 
increased freight rates. However, the producer is not often directly involved with the 
shipping lines, and it is the responsibility of his exporter - or the assigned industry 
association - to challenge powerful service providers on his behalf. 
3.4.5 Peak Week Pressures 
Every year during the peak weeks of table grape exports, the Customs and Excise division 
of South African Revenue Services (SARS) is slow in processing the EUR1 forms. These 
forms need to be processed and forwarded ahead of the vessel so that importing agents 
can affect timeous clearance of the goods and avoid EU duties being unnecessarily paid. 143 
Interestingly, Rademan (2007) observes that voyage times between SA and Europe have 
reduced so significantly over the years that it is now a real challenge to ensure timeous 
delivery of papers ahead of the ship's arrival. This delay has meant that exporters have had 
1~1 If the AP Moller-Maersk group had been able to retain the P&O Nedlloyd share of the SA-Europe container service, its 
share of two-way container trade between SA and the UK/Northwest European continent would have been reliably 
'guesstimated' at 77% (Le. they would have had 1100 out of the 1420 weekly northbound slots of the northbound reefer 










to pay the higher EU customs duty (11.5% versus 2.8% on value of product) in advance, 
and then subsequently reclaim the balance of it via a ream of additional paperwork that is 
costly and time-consuming. As the CSIR Report (2006) suggests, the Customs & Excise 
division needs to be available around the clock during such periods to reduce these 
administrative delays, especially for high value perishable goods. Alternatively, the industry 
needs to negotiate the installation of an electronic certificate system under which the EUR1 
can be speedily processed and returned to shippers by Customs & Excise. 
3.4.6 Other Influential Factors 
There are other factors beyond the control of shippers and port authorities that playa role 
in congesting the Cape Town port, and that affect the timeous marketing of table grapes to 
the UK. They are as follows: 
(1) A weak South African rand in the past has made the Cape Town port environ a 
favoured destination for the refurbishment of containers. The arrival and cartage of 
these empty containers simply adds to space and traffic congestion in the port. 
(2) A weaker rand has also made South Africa a less attractive export destination from 
the perspective of other countries. This reduces the number of refrigerated 
containers being imported into the country, and therefore reduces the number of 
such containers available for re-export use in the table grape industry (Louw & 
Hoffman, 2004).144 This automatically affects freight rates, as shipping lines have to 
then bring in the required number of empty refrigerated containers to satisfy the 
demand for outbound cargo. 
(3) The growth of South African exports and imports - whose combined volume rose 
158% from 1979 to 2001 (Perkins et ai, 2005) - has exacerbated problems affecting 
port congestion. Fruit industry stakeholders need to understand that they share the 
port facilities with many other industries, and that coordinating their efforts with 
these other industries might alleviate logistical logjams. It is the responsibility of 
W Some exporters claim that accreditation with SARS affords the exporter the opportunity of managing the EUR1 forms via 
an electronic certification process. 
I~~ One has to bear in mind that shipping lines can only bring in refrigerated containers where doing so makes the venture 
profitable on both the inbound and outbound sailings in the long run. Cold chain shipping, regardless of the mode, is a one-
way business. Reefer ships on the return leg to South Africa have improved their financial returns in the past by offloading 










industry leadership to coordinate export volumes with other industries through the 
current mechanisms (such as the Port Liaison Forum), or through other 
mechanisms of their own initiative. The Cape Town port authority's revenue is being 
supplemented by interesting new-look accounts, like the oil rig industry (for African 
oil-producing countries like Angola), and the ship-repair industry. Louw & Hoffman 
(2004) stated that the CTCT experienced unprecedented growth in its volumes in 
2004 and found itself at the limit of its design capacity. 
(4) The Cape Town metropolitan area - as a feeder area to the port - has become 
choked with road traffic in the new millennium; and with rail rates being too 
expensive to be remotely competitive, the road congestion into ports remains 
unavoidable (Meintjes, 2004e). This is a result of the economic upswing and the 
lack of road infrastructure planning to accommodate the surge in motor vehicle 
usage on the Cape Town roads. Having all major fruit ports located inside the major 
cities in South Africa has not helped either (Rademan, 2007). Schuitmaker (2005) 
points out that roads in the docks have been used as rat-runs by scores of early 
morning and late afternoon rush-hour commuters taking shortcuts in and out of the 
city. Consequently, where it was formerly possible to do three truck deliveries into 
the port per day (of the same truck), such truckers are lucky if they can now do two 
loads on the same day as a result of city traffic interference (Johan Kruger, 2002). 
(5) Due to the changing configuration of global shipping routes, particularly the East-
West bound traffic, the Cape Town port has become an attractive transhipment 
centre where containers are offloaded, and then reloaded a few days later onto 
another ship for their onward voyage (Hoffman & Louw, 2003). This may generate 
revenue for the port authorities, but it adds to the congestion affecting South African 
export cargo. 
(6) The Cape Town port can never be seen in isolation of other South African ports. 
The congestion at South Africa's busiest port, Durban, has had a domino effect on 
other ports. For example, ships delayed in Durban will skip other ports of call 
(perhaps Port Elizabeth and/or Cape Town) to make up for lost sailing time. If the 
apple, pear and citrus sectors of the eastern Cape - whose exporting windows 
partially overlap with the tail end of the grape season - experience inefficiencies at 
the Port Elizabeth port, much of that product will be trucked to Cape Town further 











(7) Once wind has breached 90km/h, ship loading is stopped for safety reasons. 
Unfortunately in Cape Town, the windiest months are in summer during the loading 
of table grapes, and the port loading stoppages can be quite significant in a bad 
year. 
(8) Labour disputes and their accompanying strikes have had a deleterious effect on 
port productivity in the past. Although labour strikes have delayed vessel departures 
to the detriment of shippers, labour unions have instigated relatively few incidents of 
unrest in the deregulated era. It is important that strike warnings are relayed to the 
industry so that contingency plans can be made, especially for perishable cargo. 
There are many service providers supporting the SA table grape export sector at the South 
African end of the post-harvest logistics chain. This leg of the chain covers the movement 
and quality of product from the inland cold store through the port and onto the ships; and it 
is a crucial area in which many improvements can be made. As noted in this chapter so far, 
the service providers involved consist of South African state owned enterprises, large 
multinational corporations and South African owned companies. The final section of this 
chapter will now look at areas in which South African commercial service providers and 
industry organizations can improve the competitive performance of the industry by offering 










3.5 Innovation at the South African End of the Supply Chain 
87% of all research and innovation in the table grape industry has been focused on pre-
harvest disciplines such as new variety cultivation and evaluation, biotechnology, 
entomology, genetics, plant pathology, soil science and production (DFPT, 2006b). Post-
harvest research and innovation constitutes the remaining 13%. In order to be more 
internationally competitive, the FPEF is attempting to rectify this imbalance through the 
launch (in late 2007) of a post-harvest and cold chain innovation technologies programme. 
This is a 3-year, public-private partnership between the Department of Science & 
Technology (DST), the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and the FPEF. In the 
innovation programme's business plan (DST, 2006), a number of table grape project 
proposals were made. Post-harvest specialists in the industry were also interviewed by the 
DST, and their priority areas for innovation (not necessary solutions) were discussed along 
the following lines: 
(1) Container technology. With the strong growth in container shipping already 
outlined in this chapter, and the recent shift from porthole to integral container 
usage, innovation in this area of the business forms a strategic investment for the 
industry's competitive future. Most shipping containers were developed as multi-
purpose units 30 years ago, and whilst these containers have been fitted with 
refrigeration units, their internal airflow has not been re-designed to accommodate 
the larger containers, new knowledge about fruit ripening, disease control and 
insect sterilization (Dodd, 2006). For table grapes to reach the UK market in 
optimum condition, they need to be kept at the lowest possible temperatures and 
have the highest possible humidity levels that they can withstand during the 
container voyage (Dodd, 2006). Early research has shown that this can be more 
consistently achieved by changing the traditional flow of air in a container from a 
horizontal to a vertical direction. Otherwise, relative 'hot spots' occur inside the 
container, negatively affecting the quality of unfavourably located fruit. The table 
grape industry also needs to investigate the possibility of using controlled 
atmosphere in containers for the table grape sector, as the advantages gained by 
the subtropical sector in doing so appear to have been most beneficial. 
(2) Packaging design and component technologies. Packaging 'design' refers to the 
aesthetics, practicality and structural strength of the corrugated cardboard cartons 










packaging is made, namely low- and high-density polyethylene (plastics), 
polycarbonates and cardboard. The various configurations of cartons used for 
table grape exports are not designed to allow air to flow through them both 
horizontally and vertically (Le Roux, 2006). Yet this is what is required of them. 
Innovation in carton ventilation therefore needs to be investigated in tandem with 
vertically orientated airflow proposed in container technology in (1) above. The 
lack of standardization of internal 145 packaging design also affects the efficacy 
with which grape product can be cooled, and this creates superfluous costs. For 
example, polyethylene bags carry a whole permutation of ventilation holes that 
affect cooling rates. 146 The UK market is now particularly concerned about the 
carbon footprint147 of fruit to market, and this will necessitate the acceleration in 
innovation of more biodegradable 148 materials used in the packaging (Taylor, 
2006). 
(3) Disease and pest control technology. Poor post-harvest handling of fruit (i.e. 
roughly handled fruit and fruit whose cold chain is interrupted) and unhygienic 
conditions in the fruit chain are significant contributors to increased post-harvest 
decay of fruit (Korsten, 2006). The market place has also been particularly harsh 
on the industry's use of chemicals to combat disease on fruits in recent years. As 
Benic (2006) pointed out, the maximum residue level (MRL) issue is a 
complicated one that threatens to destroy South Africa's market share if not 
properly managed - not just in the UK, but also in the EU. The 2006 Riebeek-
Kasteel MRL case was one in which SA grape product to Ireland was stopped 
owing to unidentified chemical residues on the product. It was eventually 
determined that wind-swept chemicals being applied to an adjacent wheat field to 
the vineyards in Riebeek-Kasteel had contaminated the grapes concerned. Driven 
by health concerns, authorities have removed many formerly allowed chemicals 
from the EU-approved list and in addition to this, revised downwards the 
maximum residue levels permitted on fruits of those chemicals still allowed. 
W 'Internal' packaging refers to the packaging adjacent to the product such as polyethylene bags, sulphur pads and punnets. 
'External' packaging relates to cartons, pallets, strapping, angle-boards and containers that do not touch the product (directly) 
itself. 
1~6 It stands to reason that a grape polyethylene bag that has more holes of a bigger diameter will cool the product at a faster 
rate than one that has fewer, smaller holes. The faster you bring your product on temperature, the cheaper the cooling cost, 
and the longer the shelf life of the product. 
1~7 In the wake of global warming and AI Gore's Oscar-winning documentary "An Inconvenient Truth", EU (and other) 
consumers are now clearly concerned about how much energy is being expended (and fossil fuels burnt and released into the 
atmosphere) in order to import fruit products into the EU from around the globe. 
1~8 Biodegradable packaging will need to incorporate the use of polymer scientists. Innovation along these lines will be costly, 
and are unlikely to attract funding from the packaging companies producing traditional cardboard substrates that would be 











However the registration of a chemical in South Africa proving its acceptable use 
under South African conditions is an arduous and costly process, peppered with 
government legislation and bureaucracy according to Griesel (2006). There is 
concern in the industry that the capacity and expertise currently resident in the 
Department of Agriculture's chemical registration division is insufficient, and that 
unregistered chemicals are now being sold in the agricultural sector in South 
Africa. There is therefore an urgent need to establish an industry desk that: (1) 
identifies locally and internationally manufactured chemicals that the market 
accepts being used on South Africa's table grapes; (2) confirms whether these 
chemicals are suitable for local use; and (3) registers them speedily with 
government so as not to hamper the industry's access to the market place 
(Griesel, 2006). 
The Scandinavian countries launched a European-wide campaign in 2005 in an 
attempt to have the use of sulphur149 banned on imported grapes. Whilst the 
levels of S02 usage were considered higher and potentially more detrimental to 
human consumption than was actually proven to be the case, the whole concept 
of sulphur usage to stop botrytis rot was brought to the attention of health 
authorities in South Africa's major markets. The South African research fraternity 
needs to join the international community in finding a replacement technology to 
S02 (which will in all likelihood re-emerge under the international spotlight and 
eventually be banned in its entirety). Promising alternatives to sulphur dioxide 
include various chemical and biological control methods (Korsten, 2006), including 
ozone, yeasts and modified chlorine packaging (Huysamer, 2006). One should 
also consider that the litchi product requires similar S02 treatment and that 
collaboration between the subtropical and deciduous fruit industries might be 
beneficial in this regard. 
Currently very cold storage conditions have to be implemented for a lengthy 
period on the fruit to sterilize certain insects (like the Mediterranean fruit fly on 
grapes for the UK market). This is harsh on the fruit and detrimental to its quality. 
An alternative mitigation treatment to cold sterilization is irradiation technology 
that Benic (2006) believes is well worth investigating. Irradiation technology is 
currently used in the condiments and medical instrument industries. Like products 
from those industries, grapes too can be bombarded with gamma rays that would 










sterilize the fruit fly, preventing it from multiplying on arrival in the destination 
country (Labuschagne, 2006).150 Whilst some research is being done, there is 
scope for the Department of Science & Technology to work with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to further research in this field (Labuschagne, 
2006). 
(4) Information Technology. There is a need for the table grape industry to devise a 
far more comprehensive business intelligence system than what is currently on 
offer to stakeholders shipping product to the UK (and other markets). To this end 
Huysamer (2006) proposes that the industry establishes an IT-hub to deliver the 
following kind of information: (a) the industry's weekly vital statistics on intakes 
and shipped volumes to the UK (by variety and berry size); (b) securitized website 
access to weekly market prices; (c) competitors' weekly shipped volumes (by 
variety) to the UK market; (d) handling protocols and packing standards; (e) 
market access information like phytosanitary requirements and import tariffs, 
including new markets being targeted; (f) product tracking and tracing services; (g) 
teaching material for training of personnel in the industry's value chain; (h) weekly 
shipping schedules; (i) updates of new technology developed for the industry; U) 
collaborative efforts with competitors such as Chile; and (k) industry disputes 
between overseas buyers and South African suppliers, and between South 
African exporters and their suppliers, in an electronic pin-board format 
The role of the PPECB (custodian of the industry database for confidentiality 
reasons) is to ensure that data files are collected electronically every day from the 
many IT and logistical service providers at the South African end of the chain. The 
PPECB is then required to 'clean' and 'format' the data files in such a way as to 
make them user-friendly for industry associations to process into meaningful 
information for their constituencies. However, PPECB's difficulty in supplying data 
files to the industry is due to the industry's data collection system, which falls short 
in accuracy, timeousness and completeness. This negatively affects the 
competitiveness of those stakeholders - particularly the exporters - needing the 
right information to make the right marketing decisions at the right time 
(Huysamer, 2006). 
ISO Interestingly, fumigation (with methyl bromide) is another post-harvest technique used for the eradication of Mediterranean 
fruit fly to the USA market. Like cold sterilization, fumigation is tough on the fruit and weakens the cardboard packaging. So 
irradiation is an effective alternative technology that even the USA's Food & Drug Administration (FDA) accepts as a 










The accuracy of data is compromised because: 
(a) The barcode systems for cartons and pallets used at the source of fruit 
entering the IT chain are not standardized (Polderdijk et ai, 2002). This 
is due to the voluntary approach adopted by the industry in matters 
such as system standardization, and the costs involved for users in 
switching from their existing system to the recommended industry 
standard (Le Roux, 2006). It is anticipated that in order for the industry 
to adopt the universally accepted EAN.UCC barcode standard, for 
example, some form of government intervention will be required to 
make it mandatory and affordable. 
(b) The manual entry of data at the start of the IT chain contains too many 
human errors that, when and if discovered, take time to be corrected 
and re-entered into the system; and 
(c) The plethora of industry codes in IT and logistical service providers' 
companies that are not yet standardized (Polderdijk et ai, 2006). It has 
emerged that a pack code, for example, pertaining to a specific grape 
product might have several variations in the exporters' IT systems (e.g. 
four different codes could exist for the same product). Unless the code 
is standardized to one code for all users, a 'translation table' has to be 
built to convert all the different codes for the same product to one code 
(and then all the volumes attached to each of those codes have to be 
summated to one total volume belonging to that one code). 
The timeousness of data is compromised, firstly, because the electronic data 
interchange (EDI) technology inadequacies encountered are characteristic of the 
multitude of IT companies that have emerged to serve the 150 or more table 
grape export companies in the deregulated era. Secondly, it takes more time to 
manually rather than electronically capture data at the more remote intake points 
(which have not yet graduated to electronic data capturing methods) before being 
forwarded to the PPECB. Laggards land up having their data added weeks later to 
the industry system by the PPECB, making a mockery of decisions taken in 
previous weeks based on wrong information. According to Asif & Mandviwalla 










(RFIO) technology 151 could make current, electronic data collection systems 
partially redundant in the near future. 152 
Lastly, the completeness of the data (i.e. ensuring that the data received covers 
all product moving through the system for the period under consideration) is 
compromised because the 'system' sometimes misses fruit packed - particularly 
in containers that are sent directly from pack house to the quayside without 
consignment notes being electronically captured. The contents of containerized 
fruit is sometimes not known until the mate's receipt from the shipping line is 
received after the ship has sailed. 
151 RFID is 'an emerging technology that can either complement or replace traditional bar code technology to identify, track 
and trace items automatically. It claims to add intelligence to and minimize human intervention in the item identification 
process by using electronic tags. The tags are superior to printed bar codes in terms of their capacity to hold data, the range 
at which tags can be read and the absence of line of sight constraints' (Asif & Mandviwalla, 2005: 393). 
152 In 2004, large retailers and government organizations (particularly in the USA) started mandating certain of their suppliers 
to use RFID technology. Whilst there are barriers against its widespread adoption (like standards, interoperability, costs, 
forward compatibility, lack of familiarity by users and issues of attenuation and interference), it is a matter of time before it 
reaches the fresh produce industry (Asif & Mandviwalla, 2005: 393). The SA table grape industry would do well to position 











The logistics chain has been re-engineered to provide the seamless integration of 
traditionally standalone services into a one-stop-shop opportunity for shippers to contract 
with 3PLs. This has enabled the exporter, or his producer, to move the grape product from 
the producer to the customer through relatively few intermediaries. The major drivers of this 
service provision trend are: the need to reduce transactional costs for both the marketing 
agent and the self-exporting producer; greater transparency demanded by the producer on 
consignment business where cost savings and product quality management are paramount 
to his profitability; and more recently, UK supermarkets wishing to extract greater income 
from volume-based rebates available in the chain by taking the logistics function away from 
exporters and contracting directly with 3PLs themselves. 
Another influence on the development of 3PLs has been the revolutionary changes 
occurring in the international shipping sector. The rise to prominence of the container liner 
sector is a result of international shipping trends, including the interconnectivity of land 
networks, the interoperability of different transport modes and improved compatibility of ICT 
systems. Bigger and faster container vessels have come on stream, and provided spare 
capacity that has dampened freight rates. Sailing-time savings and reduced port calls have 
improved the SAECS service for UK table grape exporters in particular. Container shipping 
lines have also invested in subsidiary companies that carry out landside logistics functions, 
creating additional capacity in the 3PL environment. 
By the same token, the tramping of conventional vessels for single clients has morphed into 
a very flexible, multi-client and combi-shipping service. However, no new conventional 
ships are being built; older, specialized reefer vessels are being scrapped; and the demand 
for such vessels by commodity-hungry China is outstripping supply. Therefore the supply of 
conventional vessels is under pressure, resulting in higher freight rates in relation to the 
containerized sector. This suits the grape export industry, which has shown a strong 
migration towards the use of containers (now over 70% of the business). This container 
migration is due to greater quality assurances as the product is handled fewer times in an 
unbroken, door-to-door cold chain service. 
The congestion at the port of Cape Town through which all grape product flows to the UK 
has been significant in the deregulated era. There are five identified causes of congestion 
that compromise the industry's international competitiveness. Firstly, there is 










escalating costs. This is due to insufficient long-term capital expenditure by central 
government, and no short-term capital expenditure by the TNPA despite the significant 
annual taxes being levied on the industry via the TNPA cargo dues system. Secondly, a 
disorganized exporter community is not providing reliable estimates of product volumes 
moving from the farms through to CTCT, particularly in the peak weeks. This is 
symptomatic of a bigger electronic data collection problem across the fruit industry. 
Exporters are also selfishly overbooking shipping space and subsequently cancelling it at 
the last minute. The exporters' documentation is often not up to scratch, and proper use is 
not made of the 24-hour container stacking space available to them. Thirdly, bottlenecks in 
the container terminal have been ascribed to inferior management of "A" check and "P" 
check by TPT. Productivity levels in CTCT are also in question in terms of container moves 
per hour, and the management of container stacking space and container temperatures 
have been inadequate. Fourthly, powerful shipping lines have raised the cost of doing 
business for table grape exporters by unilaterally imposing demurrage charges (for port 
congestion), and by implementing bunker and currency adjustment surcharges without 
consultation. Fifthly, a timeous response by SARS on EUR1 forms would avoid the 
unnecessary payment and subsequent recovery of EU duties paid by exporters when 
clearing the grape cargo for the UK market. Other influential factors causing congestion in 
the port of Cape Town that are mentioned include Cape Town city's road traffic congestion 
problem, container loading delays due to wind, the refurbishment and transhipment of 
containers that exacerbate the congestion of the port, and the massive unplanned-for 
growth of trade through the port in the last 10 years of South Africa's democracy. 
Lastly, post-harvest innovation in the table grape export industry trade chain has been 
largely neglected when considering that the predominant expenditure of producers' 
statutory levies has been on pre-harvest matters in the deregulated era. The Department of 
Science & Technology's Post Harvest & Cold Chain Innovation Programme plans to 
unravel new technology in terms of revised airflow in containers, new designs and 
components for packaging, post-harvest disease management of the product, and the 
provision of timeous, accurate and complete information for all stakeholders in the value 










Chapter 4: Competing for UK Market Share 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the UK market is contextualized by understanding the growth of the retail 
sector over the last 30 years. The top five supermarkets have essentially usurped the 
traditional market of the wholesalers, which have had to metamorphose into regional 
markets that predominantly supply the catering sector now. The retail sector of the UK High 
Street - where supply volumes are carefully controlled by the supermarket buyers - is 
significantly more concentrated than the contiguous European Mainland market. As a 
result, the laws of supply and demand do not operate as fluently in the UK as on the 
European Mainland where an eclectic market is supplied through a maze of traders, 
wholesale markets and varying retail formats. 
Internal and external competitive forces are examined in the pre-Christmas and post-
Christmas windows of the falling price market of the UK. This chapter shows how the major 
UK supermarkets make use of importers to enhance their buying power with their suppliers. 
The mechanics of a UK supermarket programme are discussed in which it is shown how 
retailer behaviour gives rise to, amongst other things, late price indication, product over-
procurement and limited alternative outlets for suppliers. The buy-supply relationship is 
evaluated using actual examples emanating from the organizational theories of distributive, 
procedural and interactive injustice. 
Various retail and supplier price points are injected into a cost chain model, and this model 
demonstrates varying levels of profitability for South African producers under certain supply 
conditions. The controversial rebates and slotting fees (alias 'handing charges') are 
discussed, with the latter being addressed from the perspective of the efficiency and market 
power schools of thought. Aspects of South African exporter competitiveness are 
highlighted using game theoretical concepts. 
The content of the chapter is synthesized into six major UK supermarket trends. These 
trends indicate the degree to which supermarket power has concentrated over the 
deregulated era, and the impact that it is having - and will continue to have - on South 










4.2 Ascendancy of UK Retailer Power: 1970 to 2007 
Up until the 1970s, British retailers had passively displayed manufacturers' goods in a 
mass merchandizing approach towards consumers. Competition amongst retailers at a 
national level was weak, with only local and regional variations in consumer demand 
spurring on competition between these retailers. However the rising affluence of British 
consumers with their increasingly sophisticated purchasing decisions meant that more 
products, of a greater variety and of a superior quality were being demanded. Coupled with 
the economic difficulties of the 1970s, these same consumers became very cost conscious. 
Consequently, the British public started shopping around for better value, and it soon 
became apparent to the retailers that their old approach of passively displaying 
manufacturers' goods would no longer suffice with the gregarious and discerning nature of 
the 'new consumer'. Retailers would have to compete actively for customer patronage in 
different market segments, and would need to save costs in order to make their total retail 
offer more affordable to these customers, on a national scale. The structure of the UK retail 
sector was to change substantially throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Essentially, retailers 
were to extract more and more value over time from the manufacturers in the cost chain. 
They initially achieved this through strategies that centered around capitalizing on 
economies of scale and scope (Dawson, 2004). Retailers would need to reach critical 
business mass at a national level in order to take advantage of cost savings in the supply 
chains (scale), and of market share in precisely targeting consumers through various retail 
formats (scope). Gradually the larger retailers increasingly became the 'gatekeepers' for 
suppliers to access consumers (Dobson, 2002). 
In an attempt to become the national, dominant firm, retailers expanded organically and 
through mergers and acquisitions. The accrual of supermarket power began when retailers 
were able to change the cost structures between themselves and their suppliers. They also 
started to eliminate wholesalers by integrating backwards in the chain (Hollingsworth, 
2004). The dictates of scale that accrued power to the retailers were retail brand product 
development at the expense of manufacturer brand development, logistics control through 
outsourcing and distribution centres, product quality control, shelf-space management and 
its associated fee structure, and the determination of trading conditions (price, payment 
terms, rebates etc) with suppliers (Dawson, 2004). At the same time, retailers moved from 
mass merchandising to focused merchandising by introducing customized store formats 
through economies of scope. These formats were founded on marketing concepts like 
market segmentation, target marketing, range planning and behavioural research on 










formats that were required to attract their customers. These store formats were classified 
into superstores, supermarkets, convenience stores and the like. Each retailer developed 
its own formula within these formats and achieved economies of scope through 'tighter 
management of product lines, improved merchandising, the use of category management, 
offering a mix of services complementing product lines, and store level branding' (Dawson, 
2004: 9). The diversification of these store formats deepened further through changes in 
the store's 'images, internal design, opening and closing times, space allocation and store 
location' (Newman & Cullen, 2001: 46). 
In the late 1980s, managerial control of retail outlets migrated from store-level to corporate 
headquarters (Burt & Sparks, 2003). The following three major strategies of scale and 
scope adopted by corporate retail management have been highly influential in their 
ascendancy to power in the UK, particularly over their fresh produce suppliers. 
(1) The UK Food Safety Act of 1990 required supermarkets to take 'all reasonable 
steps' to ensure safe food for the British consumer (Fearne and Hughes, 1999). 
Retailers were conservative in their interpretation of the word 'reasonable' and 
insisted that their suppliers start delivering safe food in line with accreditation 
protocols. 153 In 1993, the European Union authorized governments to 'name and 
shame' retailers who sold, for example, fresh produce that had chemical residues 
on them superseding the maximum residue levels allowed (Dolan & Humphrey, 
2004). The plethora of standards that arose as a result of food safety pressures 
culminated in the supermarket-driven, sectoral standard called EurepGAP in 2001. 
This protocol of good agricultural practice covered not only food safety, but also 
worker welfare, chemical residue levels, wildlife protection and natural resource 
conservation for fresh produce suppliers (Freidberg, 2003). All the while the costs of 
being compliant with these safety standards (including the ever-escalating 
standards of product quality demanded by the supermarkets), were passed by the 
supermarkets onto their suppliers. 
IS, With the locus of quality control moving from 'product quality' to 'process quality', trade associations, NGOs, corporations 
and the public sector developed an array of standards or codes over the years such as: generic codes (e.g. ISO 9000 Quality 
Systems); social codes (e.g. Ethical Trading Initiative); manufacturing codes (e.g. HACCP); company codes (e.g. Tesco's 










(2) The implementation of efficient consumer response (ECR) 154 and category 
management (CM) 155 enabled retailers to scrutinize their suppliers extraordinarily 
closely (Fearne & Hughes, 1999). Category management essentially developed 
because supermarkets were starting to lose market share in certain product 
categories to warehouse clubs, supercentres and discount stores that had come to 
be known as 'category killers' for the supermarkets (Steiner, 2001). Through ECR 
and CM, supermarkets were able to change the nature of the business and stem 
the loss of certain categories to these category killers. The fact that fresh produce 
had become a 'destination category' was also of major importance to supermarkets, 
because this meant that consumers were prepared to switch stores based on the 
attractiveness, quality, variety and price of the store's fresh produce department 
(Fearne & Hughes, 1999). With almost all fresh produce carrying the private label of 
the retailer, it afforded the retailer the important opportunity of differentiating its 
product from its rivals' products (Dolan & Humphrey, 2004). 
(3) Supermarkets have converged to every day low pricing (EDLP) forcing suppliers to 
constantly scrutinize their costs at every junction in the chain. In order to squeeze 
costs out of the chain and thereby increase profitability and win market share, UK 
supermarkets have concentrated particularly on product and supplier rationalization. 
In preferring to deal with fewer and bigger suppliers, supermarkets can reduce 
transaction costs and lower their risk on the quality and food safety front (Fearne et 
aI., 2005). 
As a result of these major retailer strategies, the battle for market share between the 
supermarkets has continued unabated. Fearne and Hughes (1999) note that there is no 
more growth opportunity for new stores, as the market is physically saturated. They claim 
that growth lies in: (1) consumers spending more money on value-added produce (rather 
than consumers buying more produce), and (2) market steal, that is retailers attempting to 
acquire each others' market share through promotions, below-cost selling and any other 
predatory means available to them. Levels of concentration in the retail sector have 
therefore intensified considerably over the period discussed, as shown in Table 4.1. The 
15~ ECR is defined as 'a process whereby suppliers and retailers work together in order to reduce inefficiencies in the supply 
chain, particularly in logistics. The emphasis is on determining consumer needs and reacting to them rather than persuading 
consumers to buy what is available' (UK CC, 2000: 241). 
1<5 CM can be defined as the process between the retailer and supplier in which categories are managed as strategic 










chief casualties of this concentration were the small, family-owned retail stores that closed 
in large numbers (Dobson, 2002). 
Table 4.1 Levels of Concentration in the UK Retail Sector 156 (1971 - 2000) 
1971 1976 1980 1986 1990 1995 2000 
Retail 
Organization 368 261 256 244 241 209 215 
(OOO's) 
% sales of 
10 largest 13 15 19 27. 3 30.4 32. 3 38.1 
firms 
Gross 
margins as 29.2 27.2 26.9 28. 3 29.7 30.7 32.9 
% of sales 
Source: Dawson (2004) 
In 2000, the UK consumer's perception of higher grocery prices in the UK (compared to 
other EU countries and the USA), and the disparity between farm gate and retail prices 
caught the attention of the competition authorities (UK CC, 2000). An official investigation 
was launched into the business practices of supermarkets,157 their alleged abuse of 
dominance in the chain and the claims made regarding the ubiquitous abuse of their market 
power with their suppliers. Despite this investigation, the new millennium has witnessed a 
further set of cost economies that is being extracted by UK retailers in the chain, namely 
'the effect of convergence of information and communication technologies', enabling the 
retailers to internationalize their store operations and to offer complementary retail services 
like financial, health and leisure services to their customers (Dawson, 2004). With the 
introduction of loyalty cards and the use of sophisticated computer software, UK retailers 
are now mining their customer databases to plumb the intimate depths of individual 
consumer behaviour. An article on the "Tesca-isatian af Britain" states that 'Crucible' -
156 The phrase 'retail sector' is used generically throughout this dissertation to denote 'grocery sector', which incorporates the 
fresh produce category (see footnote below). 
157 The Competition Commission (UK CC, 2000) investigated the practices of those UK supermarkets that supplied groceries 
(which includes fresh produce) from 600 sq metres or more of grocery sales area, and which was one of 10 or more stores 
controlled by a single person. 24 such supermarkets qualified on this basis, but only five 'main parties' were assessed 
because they were potentially wielding excessive market power, namely Asda, Morrison, Safeway, Sainsbury and Tesco. This 










Tesco's massive customer database - stores information on the shopping preferences, 
travel habits and makeup of practically every British household through the Tesco club card 
system, or by trading information with certain consumer group companies (O'Grady, 2006). 
According to Terry Leahy, CEO of Tesco, their ability to use stored information to 
understand their customer is now limited only by their imaginations (Leahy, 2005). This IT 
capability is affording the retailers the opportunity of tailoring their product offerings more 
accurately not only in store, but also in new virtual formats via the internet (Dawson, 2004). 
It is this rising UK supermarket power with which South African table grape producers and 










4.3 Transformation of the UK Wholesale Markets 158 
Traditionally, the wholesale markets were a meeting place for buyers and sellers to make 
the daily prices for fresh produce in England. Covent Garden, the larder of London, sourced 
product and distributed it to all the retailers, secondary wholesale markets in London and 
the outlying wholesale markets of England. However, the procurement muscle of the major 
retailers (as outlined in the previous section) soon became apparent as they gradually 
bypassed the wholesale market system to source product directly from producers. Today it 
is the market power of these same retailers that enables them to encroach on the 
wholesalers' traditional markets by acquiring many of the independent retail chains and 
convenience stores, and by forcing small family-owned retail formats out of business. 
The wholesale sector has therefore had to rely heavily on the residual catering sector as a 
panacea for its ills. This nationwide sector consists of hotel chains, restaurants, gastro-
pubs and public institutions like hospitals and prisons. Face-to-face selling in the wholesale 
markets has been replaced with telesales, e-selling and distribution-led trading (whereby 
wholesale markets no longer receive business at their premises, but instead distribute 
ordered product to the customer's premises). This has resulted in wholesaling businesses 
having to invest in cold room facilities, warehousing, IT systems, distribution vehicles and 
sales staff. The term 'wholesaling' can largely be considered a misnomer now because the 
business has evolved into an amalgamation of services, namely the sourcing, importing, 
clearing, selling, re-packing and distribution of composite offerings (i.e. fruit, vegetables, 
flowers, meats and packaging products). This includes so-called 'keyhole services' which 
refers to the delivery of such a composite basket of products to a client just before opening 
for business. The current development unfolding in the catering sector is the rise of 
specialized, supplying companies that have broken away from the wholesale markets to 
source and supply the catering sector directly themselves. The buying power of these 
breakaway companies is gradually concentrating into the hands of a few. 
The net effect of these market changes is that many of the UK's wholesale markets are in 
the process of re-defining their futures, and the following trends are challenging the status 
quo: 
(1) The major retailers and discount chains have cornered the supply of fresh 
produce to most of the grocery stores beyond the reach of wholesalers; 











(2) The catering sector, currently the major market for the wholesalers, could also 
slip through the wholesalers' fingers into the retailer's hands; 
(3) An individual wholesaler's growth has been at the expense of its competitors 
where ageing owners of wholesaling companies with no succession planning for 
their businesses have either been involved in mergers and acquisitions, or been 
forced to close their businesses; 
(4) Staff recruitment has become problematic in an industry that has a stereotypical, 
barrow boy image with anti-social hours and an unglamorous future associated 
with it; 
(5) Most wholesale markets are in dire need of renovation and have become 
physically unattractive to traders and customers. With the emphasis now on 
food safety, many people believe that these markets are no longer appropriate 
as food handling sites; 
(6) The bureaucracy continues to strangle the business especially when it comes to 
the legislation of the sector (for reasons such as recycling, health and safety, 
vehicle registration, traceability, minimum residue levels, employment contracts 
and due diligence procedures); 
(7) The complex agendas of central and local government are unpredictable and 
far-reaching; and 
(8) Many industry leaders in this sector continue to react in an unresponsive manner 
to swift market changes. 
Despite the decline of this sector, such market dynamics bring with them some 'problem 
opportunities' for suppliers - including South African table grape suppliers. Independent 
retailers and smaller shops in the more remote parts of the UK are managing to stave off 
the creep of the big retailers to the benefit of the wholesaling trade. Some wholesale 
markets like Glasgow are thriving, though they are in the minority. In an attempt to survive, 
the various wholesale markets in greater London have metamorphosed by relocating, 
merging and modernizing their fresh produce offer to meet the challenges of a re-
engineered customer base. Public-private ownership models have been designed to revive 









areas is bound to improve the buying power for these new, one-stop-shop food distribution 
centres. Many cities in the UK will be undergoing regeneration programmes over the next 
10 years, and it is hoped that this will breathe life back into cities and provide a rejuvenated 
support base for the wholesale markets. The British public, backed by its consumer 
organizations and politicians, is revising its dietary habits to the benefit of fresh produce 
consumption as a whole. 159 
Apparently the resident Asian communities in the UK (in cities like Leicester) are tending to 
preserve the old-style shopping experiences of food markets rather than retail formats. And 
with the growing crossover of international eating styles that demand different types of fruit 
products, it provides some potential for the future of this sector. For example, the Asian 
communities are particularly partial to their grocery shops (non-retail format), and their 
eating preferences include exotic fruits (e.g. mangoes and avocados) and grapes that are 
more yellow and sweeter than those traditionally offered in the UK retail outlets. South 
African table grape suppliers should therefore be alive to the future possibilities of this 
metamorphosing sector. 










4.4 UK Market Versus the European Mainland Market 
The UK and European Mainland markets are briefly compared here because, firstly, about 
85% of South Africa's table grape shipments have landed in the EU market since 
deregulation - 25% to the UK, and 60% to the European Mainland. Secondly, both the UK 
and the European Mainland markets are inextricably linked due to their geographical 
proximity and the effects that the two markets have on each other. The UK market is a 
single country market where almost entirely seedless grape product is sold to consumers 
on the High Street. The retail sector has evolved into a decidedly structured, sophisticated 
and concentrated sector. Growth available to the supermarkets is sought by resorting to: 
(1) cannibalizing each other's market share through mergers and acquisitions; (2) stealing 
each other's market share through below-cost selling; and (3) expanding into new territory 
by internationalizing their businesses. Supply volumes to the UK market are essentially 
controlled by these supermarkets, and so the laws of supply and demand do not operate as 
fluently as a free-market system would suppose. 
On the other hand, the European mainland is a conglomeration of many countries and is 
therefore considered a heterogeneous market where the product is sold through a maze of 
traders, wholesale markets and a variety of retail formats. The market is more consumer-
driven where the laws of supply and demand are far more prevalent than in the UK. 
According to GEF members, South African table grape suppliers cannot be generic in their 
approach to Europe. Their supply strategy will depend on the country, 160 market 
segment,161 week and variety being targeted. Certain business cultures are flexible, 162 
others are not, and the culture of the country generally determines what will be sold in that 
country, and how it will be sold. 163 The scope of the EU market therefore offers far more 
varied selling opportunities for the South African grape offer than the UK. Whilst it may 
therefore be regarded as 'relatively easy' to supply Mainland Europe, avoiding the 
middlemen and maximizing returns in this market are still two of the major challenges 
160 Non-grape growing countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and Sweden can be considered very close in stature to 
the UK market. The colour green is considered 'ripe' and so green-coloured grapes are the preferred grape group. 
Conversely, grape-growing countries like France, Spain and Italy demand grapes that their consumers are used to eating 
during their own growing seasons, which are typically the yellow, red or black varieties. 
161 The wholesale markets in most countries on the European Mainland - particularly in the Mediterranean countries - playa 
dominant role in supplying grapes to the supermarkets and directly to the consumers. 
16:' Germany's market is particularly flexible on supply and is normally the first port of call for any South African supplier. 
There are the supermarkets (e.g. Edeka and Tengelmans), discounters (Aldi and Lidl), wholesale markets and traders in the 
port of Hamburg that provide a multitude of distribution channels for SA suppliers. Holland is similar, and the traders that 
congregate around the port of Rotterdam provide experienced and inexperienced SA suppliers significant penetration into EU 
market within a 24-hour trucking radius from Rotterdam. 
16, Countries like Spain and Italy are made up of geographical regions that operate entirely independently from one another. 
According to Leon van Biljon, Dole, for example, has four offices selling its product in Spain. Each office is run by different 
people, serving different market segments, that speak different Spanish dialects (for the region they serve) and that supply 










facing many South African table grape suppliers. Another major challenge today is catering 
for the rapid changeover on the European Mainland from seeded to seedless grapes 
(driven by convenience), particularly on the red seedless grape front. Whilst there is still a 
significant percentage of seeded grapes consumed on the Mainland, this is waning rapidly, 
and South African producers will need to accelerate the switch in their vineyards to become 
more market-driven. Whilst it can be dangerous to generalize, the main differences 
between the UK and European Mainland markets are summarized in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 Differences between the UK and European Mainland Markets 
Economic Factors 
UK Mainland Europe 
Considered 
% Business Through 
82% 49% 
Supermarkets (2005) 
Market size (of SA sales, 2005) 25% 60% 
Size of Wholesale Market Small Large 
Destination Market One country (homogeneous) 
Many countries 
(Heterogeneous) 
Nature of Market Predominantly retail Predominantly traded 
Supermarket Purchasing Directly from the Category Mostly from the Wholesale 
Channels Manager markets 
Packaging Type 
Very specialized Plain 
(packaging sells product) (product sells itself) 
Berry Size Large & Extra Large Regular to Extra Large 
Grape Type Seedless 
Mostly seeded, but seedless 
growing 
Branding House Brands Supplier Brands 










4.5 Distribution Channels. the British Consumer and the Product 
South Africa is one of 27 countries supplying table grapes to the UK retai lers in a calendar 
year. and these retailers sell 82% of all fresh produce consumed in the UK market 
(leighton. 2OO5aj The wholesale market also accounts for about 10% of the British spend. 
and the balance of the product (8%) is distributed directly to the hospitality industry 
(catering sector) . the national SChool feeding programme and government institutoons Four 
supermarkets now control most of the suppty into the mature retail market through carefully 
controlled supermarket ·supply·programmes' According to GEF members, the four major 
retailers and their cu rrent market shares are Tesco 29''\, Morrison 20%. Sa,nsbury 16% 
and Asda 12% Around 25% of South Africa's harvest (50 OOO tones) was exported to the 
British market in the 2OO4!5 season, and Wi th the growth of the UK market up by 12% on 
the previous year (leighton 2005a) South Africa 's deliveries are sct to mcrease to this 
market in the foreseeable future The supply channels of South African table grape product 
to the UK are illustrated In D.agram 4 3 
Diagram 4.3 Four Major Supply Channets for SA Table Grapes 
Source: FPEF. Exporter Activ ities (Book 9. 20041 · Adapted 
In diagram 4 3, channels one. two and th ree are the predominant distribution Channels for 
the fiow of product onto the European Mainland market. Export agents. import agents 
wholesalers retai lers and traders abound as product finds its way from the producer 
through a labyrinth of dist ri bution networks to the consumer Distribution channels th ree 










product is shipped directly from the producer to a supermarket client via his category 
manager. This relatively short route is an increasingly popular one due to its cost-
effectiveness. 164 Channel four exemplifies the traditional consolidation of a number of South 
African producers' fruit through a commissioned South African marketing agent to a 
supermarket's importer (category manager). 
The UK's senior citizens (particular women over 45) and children under the age of 10 are 
driving the consumer growth of table grapes, primarily for health reasons (Leighton, 2005a). 
The market has migrated to almost entirely seedless grape consumption, with green 
seedless varieties (Thompson, Sugraone and Prime) dominating, and red seedless 
varieties (Crimson and Flame) showing catch-up growth rates. As far as the more 
flavourful, black seedless varieties are concerned, only a few of the retailers service niche 
market segments for these new product lines since sufficient commercial volumes are not 
yet available from suppliers. 
According to the FPJ's Grape Supplements (Leighton, 2005a & 2006b), grapes are an 
impulse purchase for the British consumer. Price promotions tend to significantly influence 
the uptake of additional volumes, suggesting a high price elasticity of demand. UK 
consumers buy grapes for different reasons, so supermarkets merchandize the product in 
various packaging configurations to segment the market and thereby assist the consumer 
with his/her purchasing decision. In general, grapes are either presented 'loose' in open top 
cartons; or they are displayed in 'pre-packed' bags, stand-up pouches or punnets. 165 The 
pre-packed range has evolved specifically to address the expanding segmentation in the 
grape category, and consists of sealed bags with perforations in the bags, re-sealable zip-
lock bags, and stand up pouches for the snacking segment. The greatest growth though is 
being demonstrated in the 500g and 1 kg punnet range, but other smaller punnet 
configurations are now being introduced for the growing grape snack market as well. 
In general, the UK consumer is being encouraged by the High Street retailers to trade up 
from loose packs to pre-packs. According to the GEF members and the FPJ Grape 
supplements (Leighton, 2005a & 2006b), the reasons are as follows: 
16.1 In the 2006/7 season. New Vision Fruit (Karstens Boerdery) further shortened the distribution channel by delivering his 
table grape product directly into the supermarket's distribution centre (effectively bypassing both the SA marketing agent and 
the UK category manager). This channel would be indicated by an arrow in diagram 4.3 from Producer 4 straight into 
Supermarket 1 or 2. 
165 Punnets are increasing in popularity across the whole EU market. They give an unforgiving visual clarity to the product 










(1) Shoppers tend to rummage through loose grapes, fingering them and conducting 
informal taste testing as they go along. This unhygienic activity poses a food safety 
threat to consumers. It has resulted in broken berries falling to the floor causing 
customers to slip and injure themselves; 
(2) Loose grapes need more merchandizing, as they tend to look messy after being 
tampered with; 
(3) In-store consumption and spillage of product are responsible for shrinkage and wastage 
respectively, the costs of which the retailer is keen to eliminate; 
(5) Supermarket personnel that decant loose grape bunches from a carton onto a 
supermarket shelf often cause damage to the product; 
(6) Customers need to weigh the loose grapes at the checkout till to determine the cost of 
the purchase. This is not only a source of inconvenience for the customer, but also a 
source of embarrassment sometimes when she discovers that she has overspent her 
budget and needs to dump the purchase at the checkout point; and 











4.6 Suppliers Competing for UK Supermarket Programmes 
4.6.1 Accessing Strategic Marketing Windows 
The chief criterion about supplYing the British supermarkets is for supplying countries to 
capitalize on favourable marketing windows afforded to their exporters. In South Africa's 
case. the window of greatest financial opportunity In the UK marke! has traditional ly been 
the pre-Christmas period where prices have been relatively high and supplies relatively low 
This is essentially from week 46 at the end of November to week 51 which is the week 
leading up to Christmas Day South African deliveries continue after Christmas up until 
week 15 towards the end of April Figure 4 4 illustrates the shipment of South African table 
grape product into the UK (by grape category) for the 2006,17 season 
Figure 4.4 SA Table Grape Deliveries to the UK (200617 season) 
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Note that the South African early delivenes of grapes to the UK are predominantly white 










Diagram 45 shows Ihe various months in which other supplying countries compete with 
South Africa for the UK market (these competitors wil l be discussed later in this section) It 
IS important to understand that the lirst and last arrivals of a country·s harvest are 
dependent on the vagaries 01 Mother Nature, and Can differ Irom season to season· 
sometimes by up to two weeks, This unpredictable lact alone can substant lalty change the 
annual opportunities presented to those countries competing in thei r particular timeslots 
For example, the star1 to the South Alrican 200718 season was delayed by two weeks, The 
Implications were that (1) some of the product had to be ai r-freighted to the UK 
supermarkets to fu llill promised programmes making the product more costly for the 
consumer (which is detrimental to sa les). and (2) many producers missed landing their 
product in the UK prior to Christmss. with the suppl iers' price points changing from £28 per 
9kg carton before Christmas to £15 per 9kg carton straight after Christmas This aspect is 
covered on section 4 7, 
Diagram 4,5 The Marketing Windows of Supplying Countries to the UK. 
Source : GEF m emb ers (2005) 
In order to appreciate the degree to wh ich competition in this market has increased in the 
deregulated period, Figu re 4 ,8 demonstrates the volume growth (or decline in one case) 01 
the various countries' table grape deliveries to the UK market for the last 10 years A 










new millennium, wIth Chile surpassing South Africa 's volumes in 2005 fo r the first time 
since 1997. Brazil and Namibia have shown vel)' Impressive growth rates for the same 
period , although these growth rates are off a much lower base compared to Chile and 
South Africa Only the US shipments have been in steady decline since 2(){JO, whilst both 
Argentina and Peru continue to play minor - though growing - ro les in supplying this market 
Figure 4.6 South Africa's Competing Suppliers to the UK (1995 - 2005) 
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(a) The Pre-Christmas Market 
South Afr ICa has been challenged with internal and 'external comptltition for the UKs pre-
Christmas market In looking at the internal - competition first. it was historically the OralJge 
River producers that enjoyed the relatively empty pre-Christmas marketing Window to 
themselves They were able to airfreight product from Upington to Heathrow and fetch vel)' 
high prices despite the expensive airfreight rates. Accordmg to Sarel Joubert, In the tate 
1980s, producers g rossed R25019kg carton in the pre-Christmas UK market. However that 
situation changed when the northem region growers in South Africa started capitalizing on 
the same market opportunity By harvesting their grapes two weeks earlier than the Orange 
River producers, the northern growers afforded themselves the opportunity of sea-freighting 
their product to the UK market in time for pre-Christmas sales. ThiS then forced the Orange 










price-competitive. As a result, some of the Orange River producers now miss that 
marketing window. Hanno Scholtz observes that some Orange River grape producers, 
desperate to try and fetch the earlier (higher) UK prices, are tempted to pick their grapes 
earlier than they should. In so doing, these over-eager producers compromise the brix 
(sugar) levels of their grapes, and the quality suffers. This negatively affects consumer 
expectations and prices invariably suffer, bringing the image of South African product 
amongst the supermarket buyers into disrepute. 
One could question why the two South African regions seem to compete 'unnecessarily' 
with each other for this early marketing window in the UK, and in so doing erode the price 
points. 166 Hubert Leclercq, whose company has traditionally procured substantial volumes 
from the early-producing northern region, points out that it was simply a question of the 
northern growers being calculatingly opportunistic with their favourable climate and their 
early ripening varieties. These northern producers have managed to capitalize on the early 
prices that are higher in relation to those that follow in the falling price market of the UK.167 
Hubert Leclercq further adds that the Orange River growers with their higher production 
costs and naturally later harvesting period are simply unable to compete with this scenario. 
With regard to 'external' competition, South Africa has encroaching competition from two 
major supplying countries - Namibia and Brazil. Some stored Californian product still finds 
its way to the UK market in the pre-Christmas marketing window, but UK buyers prefer to 
put fresh arrivals on their shelves rather than stored product, which is to South Africa's 
competitive advantage, and America's competitive disadvantage. As the Namibians have 
planted westward down the Orange River, so their marketing window in the UK has 
preceded the earliest pickings of South Africa's northern region - sometimes by up to 10 
days. This time difference has allowed the Namibians to send their product to the UK by 
sea freight as well. Namibia's early harvesting window and concomitant sea-freight 
opportunity yields a competitive advantage that has - with the South African growers from 
the north - put paid to the entire Orange River air-freight programme. Unlike South Africa, 
the Namibian Desert production areas are not affected by rain and therefore do not suffer 
from problems allied to packing after rain. Nor are the Namibian vineyards plagued by 
166 It is not fair to label price deterioration only on this issue. With the availability of more product into the same marketing 
window, this pre-Christmas window started to yield a dilemma on pricing for the supermarket buyers. Whilst prices should be 
kept buoyant with the consumption growth of the market and the higher volumes demanded at Christmas time, supermarkets 
are tempted to promote the product at discounted prices in order to sell more volume and to try and capture greater market 
share from one another. According to Mike Grobbelaar, UK supermarket lore has it that if you win a customer over Christmas, 
you win him for the rest of the season; but if you lose him over Christmas, you will not see him again for the rest of the 
season. 










insects, so production areas do not have to contend with chemical applications and their 
associated minimum residue level requirements for the UK market. As a relatively new 
grape growing and exporting country, most pack houses in Namibia are state-of-the-art 
establishments. Yet despite these advantages, the product quality of the relatively 
inexperienced Namibian farmer in recent years has left a lot to be desired. And by 
preceding South Africa's grape deliveries in the market, prices and sales of South African 
product are sometimes compromised by supermarket buyers making unfair and 
unfavourable comparisons with inferior Namibian stock. Buyers use quality-related, 
discounted prices on the Namibian product as an excuse to start South African prices at a 
lower level than they deserve. South Africans can nevertheless expect increasing volumes 
to emerge from Namibia in future seasons, with Namibian quality problems becoming a 
thing of the past. 
Brazil's unique climate of similar day temperatures throughout the year (its proximity to the 
equator provides no real winter or summer) allows its producers to manipulate their vines to 
yield two harvests from the same vineyard each year. This has yielded a shorter payback 
period for investments made by the Brazilian producers compared to their South African 
counterparts. The Brazilians can use these climatic advantages and vine manipulation 
techniques - in months when it doesn't rain - to harvest and target the relatively empty, 
profitable UK market. Brazil is geographically closer to the UK market than South Africa 
and therefore has a relatively lower freight cost than South African shipments. 168 Brazilian 
production is strong in white seedless (from the middle of November to the end of 
December), and competes more intensively with South Africa's white seedless production 
to the UK market. Chris Conradie, who has visited the Petrolina grape-growing region of 
Brazil to investigate business opportunities there, notes that in the last six years, the 
Brazilians have gone from grape production being a hobby to it being a serious business. 
Whilst ironing out their logistics and quality problems will continue to challenge the 
Brazilians, most GEF exporters opine that the Brazilians will soon master these issues. 
Sarel Joubert is concerned that with Brazil creeping into the UK market with additional and 
improved quality product year on year, the pre-Christmas prices in the UK will eventually 
approximate the much lower, pre-Christmas prices of the European Mainland. This 
oversupply will continue to erode the competitive advantage that South Africans once 










(b) Post-Christmas Marketing Window 
As can be deduced from Diagram 4.5, the major contender to South African supplies in the 
post-Christmas marketing window in the UK is Chile. To a much lesser extent, Peru and 
Argentina have been gaining a foothold in the early months of the New Year; while India, 
Mexico and a few other smaller countries have been showing strong growth at the tail end 
of the South African season in the UK. 
Chile, South Africa's major competitor to the UK market after Christmas,169 warrants 
comprehensive coverage. Appendix A of this dissertation is dedicated to examining how 
Chile has attained stellar status as the major Southern Hemisphere supplier of table grapes 
to not only the UK market, but also to world markets. The writer believes that the South 
African table grape export industry has much to learn from Chile's competitiveness 
strategy. Argentina does not deliver much product to the UK market, mainly because their 
farmers are not yet accredited with the necessary UK supermarkets' quality assurance 
programmes like Nature's Choice. Fortunately for South Africa, Argentina at this stage is 
seen as a small, unreliable and inconsistent quality supplier to the EU market, and its 
product prices generally reflect this fact. However, Leon van Biljon cautions that the South 
African industry should not be complacent about Argentina's rising star, since her 
production volumes are expanding rapidly, and it will just be a matter of time before she too 
sees to her quality and accreditation issues. Peru suffers from similar quality perception 
problems to that of Argentina. Its growing conditions are not favourable, and with winds and 
sandstorms plaguing their production regions, their grapes are often dirty. But like the other 
countries, as their producers gain the expertise, so their quality standards will lift, and 
significant entry to the UK market will become a reality. 
Leon Van Biljon states that the big challenge with most of South Africa's competitors is 
actually at the tail end of the season. Countries like India, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Mexico 
and Brazil (with their second crop) all enter the European market at the end of the South 
African season. Many of them are new-producing countries and have sensibly planted 
seedless varieties according to market demand. 170 To counter the threat of rising 
competitive volumes in the UK and other markets, Samuel Pieterse believes that the South 
African table grape industry should have a desk dedicated to researching and studying 
16R This discrepancy is exaggerated with a higher dollar price of oil. 
169 Having stated this, there is a perceived Chilean threat to South Africa's unique, pre-Christmas marketing window. 
Production in the Copiapo region of Chile is theoretically able to supply volumes into the UK market at the same time as 
South African sendings (Promar, 2001). 











developments in competing countries. Samuel Pieterse further believes that South African 
producers and exporters simply don't have the time or the resources to analyze each 
competing country, apart from the fact that it would be an unnecessary duplication of 
resources, and therefore costs, for them to do so. He proposes that industry associations 
should determine the details about competing countries' shipments to South Africa's 
markets during the season, since such information affects the timing - and therefore the 
profitability - of South Africa's deliveries. 
4.6.2 UK Supermarket Buy-Supply Structures 
Most UK supermarkets are supplied with their produce requirements by their own-
appointed, UK-based 'category managers,171 (sometimes also referred to as 'importers' or 
'receivers'). These receivers or 'category managers' are separately owned entities that 
have been established in the value chain between South African table grape suppliers and 
the British supermarkets. They essentially procure, prepare and deliver on demand to the 
retailer certain categories of fruit to their retail customers' depots or stores. According to 
Sarel Joubert, this structure is in place because most of the retailers (except for Morrison) 
do not have the facilities, manpower or infrastructure to fulfill the functions necessary for 
importing and preparing fresh produce for sale. These category management companies 
carry out functions that include customs clearing, quality control, re-packing of the product 
into bags or punnets, labelling of the packaging with sell-by-dates and distributing full and 
half pallets to the depots and retail outlets. An important function of these category 
managers is to source continuous grape suppliers 172 for their supermarket clients, 365 days 
a year. They do so by targeting the produce from countries around the world, in both 
northern and southern hemispheres, across the seasons. White (2000) observes that from 
a retailer's point of view, it ensures continuity of supply and spreads its risk amongst a 
number of supplying countries, preventing an over-reliance on anyone particular country. 
Category management, which started in the mid-1990s, has become a dominant form of 
buy-supply structure between suppliers and the UK supermarkets today.173 What was 
171 The name 'category manager' is derived from the 'category' of fruit that such a company supplies to its retail customer 
(where, for example, grapes, apples and citrus are considered different fruit categories). In cases where more than one 
category manager supplies a supermarket, a 'category captain' is the term used to describe the leading category manager to 
that supermarket 
17c The term "suppliers" is used collectively here (in the case of South African suppliers) to mean 'marketing agents' and 
'producer-exporters'. Distinction will only be made where it is important to differentiate between the two different types of 
suppliers. 
173 The 'supermarket' and his 'category manager' are, for convenience, used interchangeably from here on as the 'buyer' to 










formerly a conflictual relationship 174 between retailers and their suppliers prior to the onset 
of category management has supposedly evolved into a close, long-term partnership based 
on trust, cooperation and mutual benefit (White, 2000). Steiner (2001) stated that the 
original objective of category management was for both the category manager and his first-
tier suppliers (i.e. producer-exporters and marketing agents from production-based 
countries) to share confidential information that would eliminate costs from the chain. In 
scrutinizing each other's businesses, the parties could identify procedural problems, 
eliminate redundancies and calculate more efficient ways of doing the business. Steiner 
(2001) further noted that for retailers, the most important aspect of category management 
was the role that it played in contributing towards reducing its overhead costs and positively 
affecting its profitability; whilst for category managers, it enabled them to influence 
decisions regarding a category. Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran (1997) recognized that a good 
partnership could be regarded as a corporate asset and a competitive advantage, and the 
benefits of category management that they identified for the retailer, supplier and consumer 
are listed in Table 4.7. Whilst there are clear benefits to be had from such a buy-supply 
structure - especially for an appointed category manager - this very same structure brings 
about cost efficiencies, but also potential anti-competitive concerns. If cooperation between 
a retailer and his category manager reduces competition, margins could be raised and 
consumers would suffer. This arrangement can exclude smaller producers, give market 
power to the category captain, be welfare reducing for the UK consumers and facilitate 
price-fixing (Steiner, 2001). 
Clarke (2001) notes that supermarket chains are big sellers downstream and big buyers 
upstream. Both activities can give rise to potential economic benefits or the potential 
misallocation of resources (welfare losses), depending on whether the supermarket uses or 
abuses its market power. Downstream, supermarkets can abuse their market power by 
charging excessive prices at retail level, thereby earning monopolistic profits from 
consumers. They can also practice predatory behaviour by selling products at below cost 
price, which, while benefitting consumers in the short-term, also serves to force smaller 
retailers to exit the market, as they are unable to match such subsidized prices. In the 
longer term, this has the effect of reducing competition at the retail level, leading eventually 
to monopolistic prices and reduced product offerings to consumers. Upstream, 
supermarkets can abuse their market power to earn monopsonistic profits. They do so by 
threatening to de-list suppliers' products - particularly the more vulnerable, smaller 
suppliers - if they do not comply with their requests for lower supply prices. By the same 
J7~ This relationship was formerly characterized by buyers and sellers haggling on price with little priority being given to the 










token supermarkets can use their market power against large suppliers to reduce retail 
prices for consumers - as long as the full benefit of reduced supply prices is passed on to 
consumers downstream (Burt & Sparks, 2003). 
Table 4.7 The Benefits of Category Management 
Supplier Increased profitability & business knowledge and improved relationships 
with retailers. 
Retailer (Financial) Increased sales, increased margins, reduced costs, improved efficiency 
and increased market share. 
(Non-Financial) Organizational learning, more effective strategy implementation, better 
customer service, better understanding of cost structures, more open 
communication with suppliers, improved personal relationships and 
stability of business practice. 
Consumer Reduced consumer confusion, product ranges reflecting customer 
desires, greater product variety, increased product availability, product 
information, new facilities, and lower prices. 
Source: Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran (1997) 
Diagram 4.8 is a summary of the structural relationships between the biggest UK retailers, 
their respective category managers and their most important fist-tier suppliers. The 
dynamic and somewhat brittle nature of these relationships affects the stability and 
competitiveness of the first-tier suppliers in particular. The following important points can be 
interpreted from Table 4.8: 
(1) The bigger supermarkets (Tesco and Sainsbury) tend to have several category 
managers in place to service their needs. If a supermarket de-lists a category 
manager, it can have severe implications for those first-tier suppliers who were 
accessing the supermarket through the de-listed eM; 
(2) Asda has reduced its category management over the years down to only one 
company, namely International Produce (IP). For suppliers wishing to access Asda, 
there is only one channel of entry now. If a first-tier supplier is unsuccessful with IP, 










Table 4.8 The Major Structural Elements of Category Management (2004/5 season 
only) 
Major Category First-Tier 





Green Marketing Int. 
Southern Farms 
Tesco Capes pan Exports SA 
29% Capespan (PLC) New Vision 
River Fruit 
Delecta 
Prima Fruits Afrifresh 
Hochfeld The Grape Company 
Dole SA 
Fruits Unlimited 
Grapes Direct Green Marketing Int. 
Sainsbury 
Afrifresh 
16% Southern Farms 
Mack Multiples EXSA 
Capespan PLC Capespan Exports SA 
EXSA 
Asda Colors 





The Grape Company 
20% Afrifresh 
Capespan (PLC) 
Source: GEF members. Note that this template is for illustrative purposes 
only. It was accurate as at November 2005, but will have likely 
changed by the time this dissertation is complete. 
\75 Morrison also has a very small percentage of 'indirect deliveries': Delecta supplies them through the importers Alfred 










(3) Morrison buys directly from its suppliers and has not traditionally made use of 
category management companies. 176 This cost-effective model is predicted to put 
increasing pressure on the CM-based business models. In order to stay price-
competitive, CM-based models may continually need to put price pressures on their 
first-tier suppliers. 
(4) First-tier South African suppliers are a mixture of marketing agents and producer-
exporters. Competitiveness between these two types of sellers from South Africa -
according to the application of game theory later in this chapter - forces them to 
ruinously compete with each other on price. 
(5) The Capespan Group enjoys the benefit of being a category manager (Capespan 
PLC) and a first-tier supplier (Capespan Exports SA). This does beg the question 
whether the Capespan Group is advantaged in being able to exercise any vertical 
restrictive practices by securing this position. Capespan's first-tier supplier status is 
now being bypassed by several South African producers who insist on going 
directly to Capespan PLC (so as to avoid paying a double commission to Capespan 
Exports SA as well as Capespan PLC). 
(6) As category managers, Grapes Direct and Capespan PLC both supply more than 
one of the major UK supermarkets. One school of thought might regard this as too 
much market power vested in the hands of a single CM. But suppliers do have 
other points of entry to Tesco and Sainsbury. Another school of thought might 
argue that it is better to increase the market power of suppliers with this model than 
to succumb to structures that further concentrate supermarket power (i.e. through 
continually fragmenting supply structures). 
The UK buy-supply structures can be very destabilizing if one of the following two incidents 
disturb the supply chain: 
• Firstly - if a supermarket, for some reason known only to itself, de-lists its category 
manager, then all those South African export companies supplying that category 
manager are, by implication, de-listed from supplying the corresponding 
supermarket. In 2004, Asda de-listed Malet Azoulay, and replaced it with 
176 However, Morrison acquired Safeway in 2003, through which it inherited a category management system. So Morrison is 










International Produce (IP), and in this case Katope as a marketing agent and its 
South African producers 'lost' their access to Asda. In 2005, Sainsbury de-listed its 
CM Chingford, and in this case, The Grape Company and its South African 
producers 'lost' their access to Sainsbury. Those SA companies that are affected by 
the restructuring of the category management companies need to immediately 
establish with the buying director of the retailer whether or not they are still 
important as suppliers to that retailer. If it is established that they are still important, 
they need to fight for re-entry to the supermarket programme through the remaining 
category managers. Contesting a programme is usually done on price, and on the 
track record of the supplier, which is based on his consistently good service and 
problem-free product that he has given to his supermarket (via the category 
manager). This is, in essence, how South African growers can compete with one 
another through their marketing agents to retain the much-needed, volume-based 
programmes of the UK supermarkets. An ousted South African marketing agent and 
his producers may, for example, find themselves contesting a supermarket 
programme, which another South African marketing agent and his producers are 
already supplying. 
• Secondly - if a category manager de-lists its first-tier supplier (e.g. a South African 
supplier), then that supplier has no choice but to fight for its access to that same 
supermarket via another category manager; or to fight for a new programme 
altogether with another supermarket via its corresponding category manager(s). In 
both cases, the notice can be short, and unless SA exporters can react swiftly and 
successfully, it can have dire consequences for their businesses. 
There is no rule that disallows a South African supplier from supplying more than one UK 
retailer via more than one category manager. But Mike Grobbelaar believes that if the 
category manager feels there is a conflict of interest in his supplier delivering product to his 
supermarket's competitor as well, that supplier will, soon enough, see a diminishing order 
book from his category manager. GEF members state that to avoid this conflict of interest, 
suppliers can serve more than one supermarket by packing different product specifications 
for different retailers that ultimately target different segments of the consumer market. For 
example, the packing specifications for Marks & Spencer at the high-end of the market are 
quite different to the packing specifications for Asda at the volume-end of the market. The 
market seems to be shifting though, in that more supermarkets are starting to offer 









Spencer. In fact, individual supermarkets are managing to draw a larger customer base by 
offering more diverse product ranges under different brand names. As a result of this, 
South African exporters can supply 'competing' UK retailers without creating a conflict of 
interest - but the category managers will have the final say in the matter. 
4.6.3 Mechanics of a Supermarket 'Programme' 
A supermarket 'programme' is a written notice given to a first-tier supplier confirming the 
category manager's intention to purchase a certain volume of a specific variety of product, 
over a certain number of weeks. It also states the quality specifications of the fruit and the 
designated packaging format in which it must be delivered. Importantly, there is no 
indication of price on that written notice. The only consolation about this last point - which 
appears to be unusual business practice - is that it is the same for all first-tier supplying 
countries. The UK retailers argue that the grape category is one of the listed commodities 
on the retailers' commodities index. Due to the price sensitivity of the grape product, the 
retailers cannot afford to commit to a price with their suppliers, because if their competitors' 
prices are keener than theirs, they are saddled with a perishable product and its associated 
potential wastage cost. Nevertheless, in analyzing certain elements of such a 'programme', 
the following points are observed: 
• A programme is an intention only - it can be cancelled at short notice 
regardless of where the product is in the chain. Hubert Leclercq maintains 
that, despite programmes being an intention only, they are mostly honoured 
by the British retail fraternity. 
• When referring to product quality, the class, variety, berry size, colour and 
sugar levels are all specified by the supermarket for the supplier. However, 
moving a perishable product successfully through a cold chain is dependent 
on many variables, and sometimes the condition of the product does not 
meet the specification when it arrives in the marketplace. According to 
Hanno Scholtz, South African producers and exporters are unfortunately 
sometimes tempted to sneak non-specification product into the market. The 
problem can originate at source where pack house managers pack 










the system as an 'extra large' berry.177 The problem can also manifest in the 
marketplace where South African suppliers sometimes sneak unwanted 
varieties into the supermarkets' distribution centres. For example, the red 
grapes that the UK consumers really demand are Crimson seedless - not 
Sun red seedless. By the time it is picked up in the system, it is too late, and 
the less preferred product is already on the supermarket shelf. This is a 
short-term ploy, because the slow Sunred seedless sales rates cause stocks 
to build up. When the preferred Crimson seedless variety eventually arrives 
in the market after the Sunred seedless overstocked situation has 
developed, prices have to be discounted to move the Sunred stock. 
Consequently, Crimson does not achieve its deserved premium price 
because it is very difficult to revert to normal price bands after the consumer 
has developed an expectation of discounted prices for red grapes. 
• The packaging of the product is usually in the supermarket's branded 
colours and the unique 9kg carton format of the British retailers. Jan Ie Roux 
notes that, in demanding this, the supermarket has not only de-branded the 
supplier's product brand of its former identity and thereby usurped what 
premium the product brand may have brought the supplier. The supermarket 
has also in fact re-branded the product by putting its own 'no name' brand 
on it, and it serves to disempower the supplier if he is forced, for some 
reason, to find an alternative outlet for the product. According to Sarel 
Joubert, if the product is not re-packed but simply moved to another buyer in 
the original supermarket's packaging, it is very apparent to the new buyer 
what situation the seller is in - and the new price suffers. 178 It is expensive to 
re-pack product for another client, and the added handling could further 
compromise its quality. 
• Without a price commitment, a supplier to the UK becomes vulnerable to the 
whims of the buyer. Price is only given to the supplier, on average, a week 
before delivery is due. Some exporters in the GEF maintain that they find out 
the price that their retailer is prepared to give them only after the product has 
177 South African pack house managers are incentivized unwisely sometimes, in this case on an extra-large berry pack-out 
(because better prices can be achieved with bigger berries). Samuel Pieterse maintains that packing borderline quality is a 
major problem in South Africa where up to 10% of that which is packed may fall outside of the market specification. One 
solution to this may be incentivizing pack house managers on the number of product claims - the fewer the claims, the 
greater the bonus incentive. 
178 If product has to be moved from the UK market for sale on the European Mainland, it is instantly recognizable by its 










actually been sold. This effectively means that the product has already 
landed in the UK in the branded colours of the targeted supermarket, and is 
awaiting delivery to the supermarket from one of its distribution centres -
without the price being known. The buyer is therefore fully conscious of the 
situation that he has put the seller in, and it is not uncommon for a buyer to 
assign blame on some nebulous issue for insisting on a reduced price at the 
last minute. It is at this point that the euphemistic requests come from the 
category managers in a last ditch attempt to get first-tier suppliers to 
capitulate further on the expected price. For example, a category manager 
might tell a South African exporter that his (the SA exporter's) aspirations 
are, say, 40 pence per carton higher than his fellow exporters' aspirations, 
and immediately enquires what the exporter intends to do about it. This 
encourages South African exporters to liaise with one another to determine 
whether the category manager is in fact conducting a misinformation 
exercise in an attempt to play one supplier off against another on price. 
According to GEF members, they often discover that this is indeed the case. 
One of the hallmarks of the UK supermarket programme is the sequential over-
procurement of product that occurs in the chain. Mike Grobbelaar maintains that category 
managers tend to secure a buffer of stock for themselves from South African suppliers to 
make sure that they have their shelves covered. This is understandable because lost sales 
in a week due to lack of product cannot be recovered - they are lost forever. Also, product 
rejected on quality grounds needs to be replaced immediately (with buffer stock). Weekly 
sales rates in the UK are sometimes difficult for retailers to forecast because unpredictable 
weather patterns influence consumer behaviour. South African exporters in turn over-
procure from their producers: firstly, because they cannot afford to be caught short on their 
UK supermarket programmes; and secondly, because many of their South African 
producers are notorious for overstating their crop sizes. Many South African producers 
often exaggerate their crop estimates, chiefly to mollify their bank managers, but also to 
maintain the interest of several exporters from whom they will select one or two to export 
their product. Inaccurate estimates can also be the result of producers not factoring a 
percentage loss of product due to the vagaries of Mother Nature (like rain), or incorrectly 
calculating their vine yields. 
Good quality fruit sells, and a marketing agent's commission increases for every extra 
carton of grapes that he can procure and sell. This also explains why an exporter might 










that the category managers will have too much fruit for their supermarket programmes, and 
it is really not difficult for them to find a reason for rejecting unwanted grapes. This scenario 
exacerbates the price pressure already placed on the product, and the marketeers' skills 
are truly tested in trying to find alternative outlets for rejected product in a somewhat limited 
UK wholesale market. 
It is standard business practice for category managers to complain to their suppliers about 
product quality deviations and fruit condition problems during the season. This could be a 
ploy to seek a lower price or to mask over-procurement. It could also be a genuine quality 
or condition problem. Whatever the reason, when the category managers reject product,179 
it is prudent - in Mike Grobbelaar's opinion - for suppliers to plan having the back door open 
to the UK wholesale market. This is because re-routing the product from the UK to the 
European Mainland is a costly last resort. If a supplier can correctly time his rejected 
product onto the volume-sensitive UK wholesale market (usually near the beginning and 
end of the season), it can sometimes return a better price than even the retail sector. But 
for most exporters this route is not really an option because the wholesale market is simply 
too small to absorb additional supermarket product. 
The quintessential challenge that an exporter faces with a UK supermarket programme is 
that if he resists too strongly on price, the category manager can always source the product 
from an alternative supplier - either from another country, or from a South African 
comforted at being able to put in more volume at the expense of his competing compatriot. 
If the grape supply price is not right, the UK retailer could even substitute the grape product 
on his shelf with another fruit kind altogether. In most cases, the UK retailer honours a 
programme in full - but with price always being the wild card. 
4.6.4 Organizational Theory: Justice in the Buy-Supply Relationship 
According to Fearne et al (2005), organizational and inter-organizational theory examine 
two aspects of fairness in a relationship: 'distributive justice' and 'procedural justice'. The 
former looks at how the economic burdens and benefits (i.e. costs and profits) are shared 
between trading partners at the behest of the more powerful18o of the partners (Kumar 
1
7
9 There is a three-strike quality system operating amongst some of the category managers in the UK. For each product 
quality defect picked up from the same supplier, that supplier receives a strike. After a third strike, the supplier may lose his 
programme altogether. 
180 Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran (1997) state that "power" can be defined operationally as the ability of one marketing channel 










1996). Procedural justice deals with the process of decision-making, and the degree to 
which individuals in the relationship have a chance to offer input, or influence decisions 
(Gilliland, 1993). Kumar (1996) lists the six factors of procedural justice as being 
refutability, explanation, communication, impartiality, familiarity and courtesy. A third type of 
justice, introduced by Lupfer et al (2000), is 'interactional justice', in which fairness is 
perceived to have increased when decisions are explained in the relationship. 
Duffy et al (2003) use procedural and distributive justice to categorize the behaviour of the 
category managers' fresh produce buyers; and their conclusions tie up closely with the 
experiences of those South African table grape exporters interviewed on the subject. The 
relationships between South African suppliers and their category managers are very 
complex. Both parties operate portfolios of relationships, where different relationships are in 
different stages between different entities at the same time (White, 2000). From a supplier's 
viewpoint, it avoids him being over-reliant on one supermarket; and from a retailer's 
viewpoint, it ensures continuity of supply and the spreading of risk (White, 2000). 
Using empirical research, Duffy et al (2003) conclude from their suppliers interviewed that: 
(1) procedural justice was more important than distributive justice because prices are 
acknowledged to be largely set by market forces and are beyond the control of both 
partners. Kumar (1996: 104) puts it quite succinctly when he says that 'opportunities for 
attractive returns are usually the magnet in a relationship, but procedural fairness is the 
glue that holds the relationship together'; (2) not all supermarkets were bad, but practices 
do vary significantly within and between supermarkets; (3) supermarket strategy based on 
EDLP (every day low prices) is not an automatic recipe for supplier suffering; and (4) the 
'code of practice' introduced in 2002 by the UK Competition Commission had not made a 
difference to supermarket behaviour towards its suppliers. 181 
If a South African table grape supplier cannot access a supermarket programme via a 
category manager, he essentially has no meaningful access to the British consumer for his 
product. Not surprisingly, South African exporters therefore value relationship marketing 
(with their category managers) as one of the major tools by which sustained access to a 
programme can be achieved. However, partnership building is fast becoming superfluous in 
a retail environment where commodity 182 purchasing demands mostly transactional 
encounters. In addition, suppliers interviewed by Fearne & Hughes (1999) were skeptical 
181 The investigation by the UK Competition Commission of the identified UK retailers will be examined later in this chapter. 
182 White (2000: 7) essentially describes a fresh produce commodity as being characterized by a 'large volume throughput of 











about some of the supermarkets' commitment to partnership, especially due to the 
regularity with which fresh produce buyers are rotated in some of the supermarkets. To 
illustrate how certain types of injustices are meted out in the buy-supply relationships, three 
examples cited by South African suppliers are now considered. 
Example 1 
Sometimes a retailer decides that it is going to dispose of one of its category managers. 
One of the retailing trends is supplier rationalization, whereby supermarkets prefer to deal 
with fewer and bigger suppliers because such suppliers: (1) can reduce transaction costs 
through economies of scale; and (2) are considered a lower risk in terms of quality and food 
safety (Fearne et ai, 2005). In 2005, Sainsbury auctioned its shelf-space to four category 
managers: Chingford, Mack Multiples, Capespan (PLC) and Grapes Direct. All of them had 
to re-bid for the business, where only two of them would be successful. These category 
managers immediately turned to their first-tier suppliers for financial assistance. In this 
case, Mack Multiples and Grapes Direct won the bid with the lowest supply price and the 
highest rebate (6%) to Sainsbury. This rebate is a deduction on the category manager's 
sales account back to the South African exporter and amounts to a 6% reduction calculated 
on the selling price by the category manager to the retailer. 
In effect, when the CM wins the business with Sainsbury, it means that the South African 
exporter has had to offer the most competitive (lowest) price, and the South African grower 
has had to accept the lower price and pay the rebate. This rebate constitutes a payment 
for, essentially, the right to do business with the supermarket concerned. This controversial 
payment is often referred to as a "slotting fee" whereby a supplier 'buys' a slot on the 
supermarket shelf to enable him to display his goods. Unfortunately, this is where 
exploitative category managers force first-tier suppliers to offset losses by returning lower 
prices to the primary producers (Fearne et ai, 2005). In Jan Ie Roux's opinion, it is an 
indirect way of producers having to pay for the right of importers (category managers) to do 
business with these supermarkets. And buying the business is equivalent to buying the UK 
supermarket 'shelf space', considered to be the most expensive 'real estate' in the world. 
Jan Le Roux further believes that, in the case of a marketing agent, such a decision 
belongs to the producer, not the exporter; but this is rarely practical in agency business. 
Interestingly, the UK's Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has declared that no lump sum payment 










challengeable (Leighton, 2005b).183 However, the CM argues that it is not a once off, lump 
sum payment because it is a cost reflected on each and every invoice as and when the 
product fulfills ongoing orders. This is classically a distributive injustice where the burdens 
(or costs) are not shared evenly. Here the supermarket and his CM have passed all the 
cost on to the first-tier supplier who in turn has passed it on to the second-tier supplier 
(namely the grower). In essence, the entire 6% benefit has been hijacked by the retailer. 
The only benefit gained by the first-tier supplier is the potential increase in sales volumes 
that may result from the consolidation of the supermarket's volumes from three to two 
category managers. 
Example 2 
There is a surfeit of literature on the various distributive injustices practised by category 
managers on suppliers. Examples of distributive injustices noted by Fearne et al (2005: 
574) include 'payment terms, costs, imposed charges, requested contributions, discounts, 
retrospective discounts, lump sum payments, over-riders, contributions towards marketing 
costs, payments for wastage, funding of promotions and undue delays in payments'. 
However there is a cost to suppliers that GEF members have discovered that the UK's 
Office of Fair Trading and the UK's Competition Commission authorities appear to have 
overlooked. There is evidence to suggest that certain category managers are moving South 
African product unnecessarily from the port to their own inland facilities instead of directly to 
the supermarket distribution centres. By levying a charge for conducting what amounts to 
an unnecessary or superfluous business activity, the ethics of the category management 
company are put into question. A number of South African exporting companies that have 
set up offices in the UK to monitor this kind of problem have been penalized for querying 
this type of business practice. The exporters are punished by having their volumes reduced 
by their CMs at the expense of their non-complaining competitors. Again, this emphasizes 
a distributive injustice where unjustifiable costs have been passed on to the supply side of 
the chain. 
18, Suppliers rarely express controversial opinion about supermarkets and their category managers for fear of commercial 
reprisals. However, the OFT claims that it cannot investigate any potential wrongdoings unless it receives official complaints 











In cases where SA exporters - according to GEF members - have voluntarily refrained from 
continuing to do business with a UK-based category manager, they have done so for two 
main reasons: 
Firstly, decisions regarding prices and rebates to the supermarkets were, according 
to Hanno Scholtz, being taken unilaterally by the category manager without 
consulting the supplier. Often a supplier would be asked by his category manager 
whether he is prepared to 'support' his supermarket - a euphemistic way of the 
category manager packaging a price cut to his supplier if he wants to retain the 
business. Again, there is a fine line between a category manager continually 
requesting 'support' from his supplier to survive a retail price war, for example, 
versus a category manager abusing a supplier's engineered price vulnerability for 
ulterior motives. 
Secondly, some SA exporters have refrained from doing business with category 
managers because excessive and erroneous charges were being levied without 
explanation by the category manager - no matter how many times the supplier 
asked for a logical explanation. This gives the South African marketing agent the 
embarrassing task of trying to account transparently to his growers. Two of the six 
principles underpinning procedural justice are relevant here (Kumar, 1996): 
'refutability', where the supplier feels he cannot raise concerns about the buyer's 
decisions or policies without fear of reprisals; and 'explanation', where the more 
powerful party should provide its partner with a plausible rationale behind his 
decisions so as to balance the power in the relationship. 
In understanding (1) the size and importance of this market to South African suppliers, (2) 
its growth potential, (3) the breadth of competitors (both South African and foreign) and (4) 
the tight access criteria to these supermarkets, the stage is now set to understand the crux 
of supplier behaviour when vying for this business. The next section looks deeply at supply 











4.7 Competitive Dynamics Amongst SA Suppliers 
47.1 Cost Chain Analysis into the UK Supermarket 
Cost chains have many variables on which their outcomes are dependent. Table 49 
demonstrates all the different variables involved that ultimately determine the profitability 
levels of a producer delivering table grapes to the UK market 
Table 4.9 Pre· and Post·Christmas Cost Chain of the UK Supermarket for an 
Orange River Producer, Considering Various Retail Price Points (200415 Season) 
c~ Voit Pre·Christmas Post·Chn5lmos 
A B C D 
, 4.49 2.49 2.1 B 1.99 , , 40.01 22 01 19.62 17.91 
0 , 30 .71 W~ 23.55 2741 
, , 2800 WOO 1 5.00 '"00 , SA Supp~ l"r>Oe (Hmkg Mn) " 33600 216.00 160.00 156.00 
C 4.8 '/, Impoll Duty " 16.13 10.37 8.64 749 , 8"/, Importer', Com", ,,,," , 26.88 17.28 1440 1248 , UK Hand ltog Charge" , "00 14 00 '"00 '"00 , FOT Coots " ,00 '" ,~ ,m w For~ign Costs Isub_tota l) " 59.5' 4 •. 15 39,~4 36.47 
" " 2," .• ~ nu! "0.00 1'i.53 
" Sea Freight linel BAF and CAFi " '"00 '"00 '"00 14 .00 
" " 26249 157.85 126.45 ·0553 '" foe " 1~U~ 7U~ 01.23 5:1.77 , e',;, Expor\ers' Con~l1i.S<on " 10.50 "" ~.OO '" e pon Charge' , 'W n, 2.30 2.30 
" Other Ghorge, , 0.82 eo, 0.82 0.82 
" 
SUb_total SA logistics Costs , 1352 .43 '" , ~ 
'" , 117.ij] 69.5(} 55 O! 4~.03 
N On-F",,,, Co.t; , 52.00 52.00 "00 "00 
" On-Farm Income , 6563 1750 3,05 -6,57 
Source GEF Memb~rs Nolo. Tho exch . nge rat. is assumed to b<l R12.oo to 1he GBP 
Note: Th e indust"! st.n~ . r~ dea ls in •. ~kg carton equivalents. 










Whilst the individual costs will differ (marginally in many cases) from one supplier's cost 
chain to another, there are four factors that can deeply impact on the producer's bottom line 
in a business like this: 
(1) The SA supply price to the supermarket - the cost chain in Table 4.9 shows four 
supply price scenarios (row 4, A to O) to illustrate the impact that it has on the 
producer's profitability (row 21, A to O). The retailers' and suppliers' price points, 
summarized in Table 4.10 below have been configured over the years around the 
following influencing factors: 
(a) In which week the fruit is being delivered, especially before or after 
Christmas; 
(b) What gross margin the supermarkets are prepared to work on; 
(c) The sales rates being experienced which are chiefly dependent on the 
weather and the availability, popularity and price of other fruit products; 
(d) How much competitive product is normally in the market; and, 
(e) Whether or not a promotion is being conducted. 
These price points are not static, and have been declining over the years. Sarel 
Joubert states that there has been a consistent erosion in the suppliers' price points 
from 1998 when product sold pre-Christmas for £39/9kg carton to the 2004 pre-
Christmas prices of £22/9kg carton. Sarel Joubert also maintains that the UK 
retailers have increased their gross margins from 15% to as much as 35% over the 
same time period. This could partly be attributed to the supermarket adding value to 
the product (i.e. packaging the grapes in punnets as opposed to loose formats). 
Table 4.10 Retail and Supplier Price Points (pre- and post-Christmas) 
Retail Price Points Retailers' Suppliers' Sales Weeks 
Gross Margins Price Points 
£ / kg £ lib (%) (£/Skg ctn) 
4.49 1.99 30.71 28.00 
Pre-Christmas 
2.49 1.13 19.68 18.00 
2.18 0.99 23.55 15.00 
Post-Christmas 
1.99 0.90 27.41 13.00 










(2) A volatile and strong rand - th iS cost ch~in bases the exchange rille on R12.00 to 
the GBP In the new millennium the rand has ranged from its low point in 
December 2001 of circa R20 00 to the pound to Its March 2006 high pomt of R1 OSO 
to the pound Such a variation in one's currency .s beyond the control of individual 
compilnies and the industry in which they operate, but has il profound influence on 
a producer's profitability The volatile rand makes busiroess unpredictable. risky and 
therefore more expensive The demoralizing influence of a strengthening currency 
is partiCularly prevalent where all role-players are continuously making cost-cuts in 
their part of the chain on ly to see a marching rand expunge all hard-earned 
efficiency gains Table 41 1 shows a matrix of an Orange River producers 
profitability leve l (for the 200415 season) thilt depends on the exchange r~te and the 
on-farm cost at the time of his sale 
Table 4.11 Producer Profitability - Exchange Rate vs On-Farm Cost 
Rand per Pound exchange rate 
10.5 11.0 11 .5 12 .0 12.5 13.0 13.5 14.0 
38 
40 .. , ... ... to." 1321 
On farm 42 on ,., ... ... 1121 
cost 
P" 44 4,5 kg .. , ... . .. ". 
Carton 
46 , .. . .. ". 
48 ... , .. . ..
50 , .. ." 
52 "-----____ . _IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~===~ 
Source ; GEF memb e r5 120(4) 
Table 4 11 is lor product beirlg sold in the pre-Christmas Wlrldow st a projected 
promotiorl price of90p per pound (for the 200415 season) equating to a £13,0019kg 
carton SA supply price The supermarkets gross margm IS calculated at 27.41%. 










producer concerned. The producer is faced with two extremes under these 
conditions: a maximum profit of R17.85 per carton or a maximum loss of R14.40 per 
carton - for the same carton of fruit. According to Ferrandi & Van der Merwe (2005), 
the on-farm cost of the Orange River producer over the 2004/5 season was, on 
average, R44.56 per 4.5kg carton. The average exchange rate over the pre-
Christmas delivery period of 2004 was R11.50 per GBP. It can therefore be 
deduced from Table 4.11 that if the exporters were to accept the retail promotion 
price, then the average farmer in the Orange River would have run at a loss of 
roughly R1.18/4.5kg carton produced. The most profitable producers would have 
been at R4.82/4.5kg carton, the least profitable at a loss of R9.18/4.5kg carton. 
(3) The rebates - an area of the business that the cost chain in Table 4.9 does not 
account for is the income from rebates on offer to the exporter (and his producers) 
by the various service providers in the value chain. These rebates, usually paid in 
arrears of the season, are volume-related discounts offered by service providers to 
the exporters in the value chain. In South African law, rebates collected in agency 
business are for the producer's account, unless contracted out between the 
exporter and his producer. 184 Rebates are traditionally paid by trucking companies, 
packaging firms and shipping lines regardless of whether the service or product is 
being rendered on the South African side or the overseas side of the chain. With the 
deflationary prices and diminishing returns experienced in the industry during 
deregulation, the rebate proceeds are currently a valuable source of income. In fact, 
today this is so much so that it is often said that the money to be made in this 
industry is no longer in the fruit but in the chain. However there is clear evidence to 
suggest that the UK category managers in particular are now usurping much of the 
rebate value in the chain. The following cases demonstrates how the UK 
supermarkets are taking the value chain rebates from the South African suppliers 
for themselves: 
• Samuel Pieterse states that certain South African grape exporters have 
been instructed by their UK supermarkets 1 category managers to procure 
their packaging (plastic bags) from Chinese manufacturers. Since the 
supermarket/category manager has put the deal together with the Chinese 
manufacturers, the supermarket 1 category manager claims the rebate 
directly from the Chinese manufacturers. 











• Mike Grobbelaar confirms that the UK supermarkets are determining for 
their category managers which inland hauliers should be used to move 
South African product from the UK ports to the inland cold stores and 
depots. Again the rebates for putting this deal together would be for the 
supermarket's benefit. 
• In the case of shipping the product overseas, Asda is already buying fruit 
from supplying countries, including South Africa, on an FOB basis. As soon 
as the product passes over the ship's rail in the South African port, the risk 
passes to Asda - but so do the shipping rebates. According to GEF 
members, shipping rebates can be in the order of $700 per 40ft container, 
underscoring the financial loss of this income from the South African 
suppliers to the UK retailer. It is quite probable that if Asda decided to 
subsidize its retail price by using these rebates to do so, the other UK 
retailers would be under pressure to follow suit. And in this manner, all 
rebates could eventually be removed from the chain by competing 
supermarkets. 
(4) The 'handling charges' - this is a cost-accounting term used to describe what the 
industry calls 'slotting fees'. The term originally arose from the physical 'slot' in a 
warehouse that was given to new products that would gain access to retail shelves 
(Wilkie et ai, 2002). It is certainly questionable as to whether fresh produce can be 
considered a 'new product', but the term has more recently been broadened to 
cover a genre of fees and incentives for old and new products. In the cost chain, 
slotting fees are the single biggest cost per carton (in rand terms) for the producer -
along with the sea-freight cost. These fees were introduced in the late 1980s, and 
are incurred by suppliers at the behest of their importers. They are characterized by 
outlandish sobriquets that seem to lend little credence to their validity.185 The reason 
for their development is cited by Wilkie et al (2002) as being a result of greater 
retailer influence. Economic theory puts forward two schools of thought on the 
validity of slotting fees: the efficiency school and the market power school. 
185 These 'fees' have a lot of latitude attached to their imaginative names but include the likes of: 'display fees' for 
merchandising the product; 'pay-to-stay fees' for continuing to stock the product; 'failure fees' or 'kill fees' for a product that 
does not do as well as originally envisaged, and has to be removed from the shelves; 'facing money' for prime shelf 
positioning; 'street money' for displays at the American ends or gondola ends; 'presentation fees' or 'hello money' for the 
privilege of making sales presentations to supermarkets; and 'wedding anniversary money' for celebrating the annual date on 










The efficiency school of thought proposes that slotting fees are an automatic 
market response to an excess of product trying to access a shortage of shelf space. 
From a predominantly retailer's perspective, Bloom et al (2000) state that slotting 
fees: 
(a) Allocate shelf space efficiently; 
(b) Indicate the degree of confidence that a supplier has in the staying power of 
his product, especially where there is a degree of uncertainty by the retailer 
(Sudhir & Rao, 2004); 
(c) Help the retailers share - more equitably with their suppliers - the increasing 
costs of managing suppliers' products in the retailing environment. Slotting 
allowances compensate retailers for costs associated with warehousing, 
transporting, stocking, changing scan files, realigning shelf stocks, 
merchandizing the product, discounting discontinued items, personnel hours 
and computer time (Buzard, 2002). The opportunity cost of foregoing more 
profitable products should also be considered (Bloom et ai, 2000). However, 
critics claim that such fees simply do not reflect the actual cost that retailers 
say they incur, and are plainly being used to increase the retailers' profits 
(Buzard, 2002); 
(d) Fairly allocate more of the new product risk onto the supplier, though fresh 
produce can hardly be termed a 'new product'. According to Sudhir and Rao 
(2004), these fees provide a form of insurance for the retailers indemnifying 
them from a loss of profit if the new product should fail (and if the smaller 
supplier should not be around to clean up the residue); and 
(e) Facilitate the lowering of retail prices. 
From a predominantly supplier's perspective, the market power school of thought 
proposes that slotting allowances are used by retailers who have market power. 
The controversy of slotting fees has, according to Bloom et al (2000), led to: 
(a) Dysfunctional relationships in the channel between supplier and buyer; 
(b) Price discrimination between suppliers and retailers based on the size of the 










larger retailer; they also hurt the smaller retailer by raising its marginal costs 
(Hao, 2001); 
(c) Foreclosure of smaller firms by bigger firms; 
(d) Reduced welfare for consumers as a result of reduced retail competition, 
higher prices and less innovation (Hao, 2001). One of the suppliers 
interviewed by Wilkie et al (2002: 284) maintained that 'slotting fees are 
anti-competitive graft used by large retailers to thin out competition for both 
brand recognition and shelf space. The sufferer is the consumer who pays 
more for less selection'. Balto (2002) concurs, stating that consumers are 
harmed by slotting allowances because they result in wealth transfer from 
supplier to retailer. 
Whilst there is no clear evidence of market failure or legal wrongdoing in the findings of 
Bloom et al (2002) with respect to slotting allowances in the US, the controversy has 
elicited the need for public policy to be scrutinized the world over. According to Buzard 
(2002), anti-trust authorities in the US are continuing to challenge slotting allowances from 
an anti-trust perspective. If supplying firms are purchasing more shelf space than they need 
in an attempt to foreclose on their competitors accessing the same shelf space, such fees 
could be construed as illegal under anti-trust law. Balto (2002) affirms that US law is 
watching closely that dominant firms are not demanding shelf space beyond their market 
share. A precedent was set in 1995 when the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
prohibited the use of slotting fees for alcoholic beverages (Sudhir & Rao, 2004).186 
From a legal perspective, Buzard (2002) puts forward three arguments that could be used 
against the use of slotting fees: firstly, the essential facility doctrine, where smaller 
suppliers are denied access to shelf space (an essential facility to compete) through 
monopolistic competitors; secondly, predatory promotion whereby bigger suppliers force 
smaller suppliers to raise their costs through the payment of slotting fees (especially where 
smaller suppliers' payments are larger than bigger suppliers' payments); and thirdly, price 
discrimination, where a (bigger) supplier sells the same product to two different retailers at 
different prices that do not reflect a differential in the costs of supply (penalizing the smaller 
supplier and the smaller retailer in the process). 
186 Sudhir & Rao (2004) felt that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was correct in not banning slotting fees outright, as 










From a suppliers' point of view in particular, progress needs to be made in resolving the 
fairness of slotting allowances in the market place. When contracting parties do not put 
their agreements in writing regarding slotting fees, information is concealed and the case is 
difficult to prove in a court of law. With retailers tending to support the efficiency theory, and 
suppliers the market power theory, an integrated approach towards detente will need to be 
adopted by both schools of thought. South African suppliers have an ideal opportunity to 
use the current investigation into UK supermarket power by the UK competition authorities 
to address this matter. 
4.7.2 Game Theory: Exporters Trapped in a Prisoners' Dilemma 
South African table grape exporters acknowledge their commercial interdependence in the 
UK market. Yet they are often unable to cooperate with one another to achieve the desired 
outcome for themselves and their producers, and anti-trust law certainly doesn't aid their 
cause. Can the exporters therefore remedy this situation, or are they doomed by some 
economic premise to consistently under-achieve in price terms in the UK market? 
'Game theory examines oligopolistic 187 behaviour as a series of strategic moves and 
countermoves among rival companies. It analyzes the behaviour of decision-makers where 
choices affect one another' (McEachern, 2003: 230). Various types of strategy games exist 
(e.g. sequential games, simultaneous games and coordination games), and the strategies 
adopted by the players will depend on the circumstances with which they are faced. There 
is one type of game that epitomizes the predicaments faced by South African table grape 
exporters to the UK, and it is called a prisoners' dilemma. 
The prisoners' dilemma game is based on the well-known strategic approach that police 
officers take in separating and interrogating two criminals (the 'players') suspected of 
committing the same crime together. Depending on whether the criminals 'remain tight-
lipped' or 'confess', three outcomes are possible depending on the strategies the criminals 
adopt individually. 
187 Diagram 4.8 shows how many South African first tier suppliers of table grapes to the UK supermarkets are in fact involved 
in mini-oligopolistic markets. Two examples will suffice: only four South African suppliers sell to International Produce as 











• Firstly, if the criminals both desist from confessing to the police, they receive a 
minimal, one-year sentence (for example, for being illegally in possession of a 
hand gun). 
• Secondly, if the police manage to encourage an early confession from one of the 
criminals - thereby implicating the other criminal - the confessor is rewarded and 
allowed to walk free, whilst the uncooperative criminal is punished with a hefty 10-
year sentence. 
• Thirdly, if the police get both criminals to confess, they both serve 5-year 
sentences. 
Criminals cornered under such circumstances invariably 'spill the beans' to the police, 
despite them having agreed beforehand not to do so in the event that they are caught. As a 
result of crafty police work, the criminal realizes the following. By confessing, the criminal 
would either get zero years (if the partner remained tight-lipped), or five years (if the partner 
also confesses). However, if he remains tight-lipped and his partner remains tight-lipped, 
he gets one year; but if he remains tight-lipped and his partner confesses, he gets ten 
years. The criminal is left to conclude that walking free is better than one year in jail, and 
that five years is better than ten years in jail. Thus confessing is the criminal's dominant 
strategy. Neither of the criminals ever knows what the other is thinking or saying to his 
interrogators. Both suspect each other of going back on his word and confessing in an 
attempt to get the most lenient sentence possible. And with both criminals capitulating to 
the police, they land up in a worse position than if they had cooperated with one another by 
remaining 'tight-lipped'. If the criminals were 'regulars' on the job and had learnt to trust one 
another over time, they could theoretically cooperate with one another for their own benefit. 
But this is unlikely to happen, and the police are delighted because justice has prevailed 
and society is better off for having fewer crooks on the streets. 
The characteristics underpinning such a prisoners' dilemma game are as follows. The 
players want to maximize their payoffs or minimize their losses; the players would be better 
off cooperating with one another in order to do so; one player can only guess what strategy 
the other player is adopting; the game involves punishments and rewards; there are 
incentives to cheat, so players are often dishonest with one another; players land up trying 
to maximize their own payoffs by taking cognizance of other player's strategies; in a once-
off game, players land up adopting strategies that guarantee an inferior outcome for 










the players to produce a more favourable outcome. According to Miller (2003), no mercy or 
compassion exists amongst players in the world of game theory: only self-interest. And this 
is all the more economically frustrating for players because they have the opportunity to 
cooperate right from the start to maximize their payoffs, yet they seem destined - due to 
situational circumstances - not to be able to capitalize on the opportunity. 
How does game theory - and the prisoners' dilemma in particular - play itself out in the UK 
marketplace between South African table grape suppliers? With grapes being an impulse 
purchase and having a high price elasticity of demand, the UK retailers are keen to sell big 
volumes to attract customers and acquire market share. The retailers are particularly keen 
to do this in the pre-Christmas market, and are tempted to run promotions to achieve this. 
However, SA suppliers consider any promotional activities before Christmas unnecessary, 
since insufficient product of the right quality is not normally available to meet the already 
high consumer demand that prevails at this time of the year. Besides, suppliers are keen to 
preserve the traditional price points so that their profit margins can be protected. So the 
motivation for exporters wanting to maximize their payoffs by not succumbing to the price-
cutting promotions of the supermarket buyers already exists. 
Every year, the UK supermarket buyers are naturally keen to test the new (potentially 
lower) price levels at which some South African exporters may be prepared to supply the 
product. 188 Using a simultaneous move game, Figure 4.12 shows how price competition 
often pushes exporters into a prisoners' dilemma. Player 1 is a marketing agent (MA) and 
player 2 a producer-exporter (PE), both competing on price and volume for the retailer's 
business. 
If both exporters agreed to cooperate and charge the highest possible price - in keeping 
with the aforementioned price points - then they could maximize their payoff on a per carton 
basis, namely £22 per carton. Both the MA and the PE would achieve total revenue each of 
£22 x 5000 cartons = £110 000. This assumes that the MA and the PE are satisfied with 
the volume take-off of 5000 cartons each by the retailer; and that the retailer is happy to 
split the business between the MA and the PE on an equal basis. The retailer would have 
to pay that price if all SA suppliers - without exception - agreed not to sell below that price. 
188 Leclercq believes that it has been every UK grape buyer's ambition to retail the product before Christmas at 99p a pound 
















Low Prices High Prices 
£75 000, £75 000 £0, £150 000 
(£15 x 5000) (£15 x 5000) (£15 x 10000) 
£150 000, £0 £110 000, £110 000 
(£15 x 10000) (£22 x 5000) (£22 x 5000) 
However, as indicated in the prisoners' dilemma characteristics cited above, this is unlikely 
to happen. This is because the supermarket buyer - like the police in the prisoners' 
dilemma example described earlier - are going to be tactical in forcing the two players (MA 
and PE) to compete with one another on price by pushing them into a prisoners' dilemma. 
Self-interest will then take hold of the MA and the PE to the detriment of one another. Why 
does this happen? 
From the MA's point of view, he would like to be rewarded with as much product volume as 
possible by the buyer, because a marketing agent's income is based on a percentage of his 
total revenue generated. The MA can achieve a greater turnover under slightly different 
conditions. He could sell more volume at a lower price to essentially capitalize on the 
maximum revenue available to him in the sale. In other words, the MA would prefer to sell 
all 10 000 cartons required by the retailer at £15 per carton and thereby achieve a turnover 
of £150000 (i.e. £40000 more than the previous option). He would also prefer to do this 
even if it meant that the retailer bought all 10 000 cartons from the MA and gave nothing to 
the PE. In other words, the MA will be unwilling to cooperate with the PE because he can 
make more money than the PE if he looked after his own and his producers' interests 
entirely. 
In fact, given half a chance, the MA might even trick the PE into believing that they should 
both stay at £22 per carton; yet, unbeknown to the PE, the MA could be quietly planning to 
curry favour with the buyer by offering him the product at £15 per carton. Neither of the 










the other is strategizing, since this lower price option is available to them both. The 
following justifications would go some way towards appeasing the conscience of the 
devious MA: 
(1) The MA may have a substantial supply history with the retailer and supply the 
retailer all year round with all fruit kinds - perhaps even on a multinational basis 
with product sourced globally from countries other than South Africa. Why should 
this MA have his programme jeopardized by a relative neophyte attempting to 
muscle his way in on an established programme? 
(2) Why should the MA lose its hard-earned business with the retailer over a price drop, 
which could be a temporary support measure anyway? If the retailer called for the 
MA's loyalty, the MA should heed the call to protect his businesses, even if it was at 
the expense of a few of his producers 189 (which the MA could subsidize with his 
own commission anyway). 
(3) A large MA might be conscious of the fact that the retailer could not, for example, 
go for a table grape promotion in his stores without his volumes. This large MA is in 
a powerful position to negotiate incremental volumes - along with reduced prices -
with the retailer. 
From the PE's point of view, he may want to discount his price as well for slightly different 
reasons. If he is one of the larger PEs, he has the concern of being left out in the cold with 
a large volume of perishable product if he does not stay closely competitive on price with 
the MA. If he is one of the smaller PEs, his marketing window will be fairly tight (small), and 
it will be important to capitalize on this once-off opportunity when it presents itself. 
Fortunately for the PE, he has some leeway with his price because as owner and marketer 
of the product, he does not incur the total cost of an agent's commission. So he does have 
some room to move downward on price. However, the PE will not want to heavily discount 
his price at the retailer's request because, unlike many of the MAs, he does not have other 
fruits that he sells throughout the year into other markets with which he could spread his 
income risk and afford himself cross-subsidizing opportunities. But the PE also realizes that 
if he sneaks in at a lower price, the supermarket buyer has already indicated to him that he 
189 When MAs sell at a lower price, their supplying producers are proportionately taking a greater financial loss than the MA 










will give him all of the business. This appeals to the PE who is desirous of offloading his 
entire product as soon as he can. 
However, the profit motive of the supermarket buyer encourages the buyer to push the MA 
and the PE as far as possible into this pricing dilemma. The buyer has a number of tactics 
available to him to achieve this. He could: (1) quite clearly buy from both MA and PE, 
allocating more volume to the one who was prepared to supply at the lower price; (2) 
examine each supplier's history in terms of loyalty, volume and track record, and thereby 
determine which suppliers would stay, and which would be 'released from the programme'; 
(3) threaten that he will not buy from one or both of them again in the future if they do not 
reduce their price aspirations in line with his expectations; and (4) threaten to purchase 
product from competitors instead (e.g. the Chileans) by asking them to airfreight product in 
as a substitute product. This last option may be an excessive one, and it would probably be 
a loss leader for the retailer; but it would be a show of strength to a potentially intransigent 
bevy of South African suppliers. In addition to this, the MA and the PE also have to be 
constantly mindful of the constraints that they face in supplying the UK market (as 
discussed earlier in this chapter). 
The retailer has to be competitive on the High Street, and to ensure that he is in fact getting 
the very best (lowest) price from his suppliers, he uses the power of chaos to keep his 
suppliers in check. Miller (2003) suggests that in order to multiply suppliers' mistrust of one 
another, a buyer can adopt such a tactic by randomly giving all of his business to the PE 
only - for no apparent reason - so that the MA might suspect treachery on the part of the 
PE. Once that ploy is used, the ostracized MA becomes immediately suspicious of the 
chosen PE, and a price war ensues between the suppliers to get the business. As is often 
experienced by producers, self-interest leads their exporters into a form of ruinous 
competition where suppliers' selling prices frequently equate to their cost prices; and they 
are often no better off having traded (Dixit & Skeath, 2004). 
Once the buyer has created an environment of distrust amongst its suppliers, both the MA 
and the PE have by this stage gravitated to the top left quadrant of Figure 4.12 in which the 
lowest possible prices are offered to the supermarket buyer. It illustrates once again that an 
MA and a PE will normally have two dichotomous interests, and cooperation is nigh 
impossible to foster where interests are so diametrically opposed. Interestingly, where 
society was the beneficiary of the classic prisoners' dilemma in which two crooks were 
removed from the street, in this case the consumer is the beneficiary with the lowest 










consumer. It is also somewhat ironical that 'the invisible hand guides markets to allocate 
resources efficiently only when markets are competitive, and markets are competitive only 
when firms in the market fail to cooperate with one another' (Mankiv & Taylor, 2006: 335). 
In such cases, suppliers ultimately can't regret the outcome of their decisions. They can 











4.8 UK Supermarket Trends and their Effects on Suppliers 
UK supermarket trends are undoubtedly having a significant impact on the South African 
exporters' competitiveness, their profitability and ultimately their raison d'etre in the value 
chain. Being market leaders within the European context, the UK supermarkets' actions 
need to be watched closely by all those South African suppliers intent on sustaining this 
business and adding value in the chain. The major supermarket trends that have been 
identified are the following: 
(1) UK supermarkets have to be able to compete with one another on price; otherwise 
they would be forced to exit the business. In order to stay price-competitive, they 
have to achieve the kinds of growth that allow them to offer 'every day low prices' 
(EDLP). According to Hollingsworth (2004), this growth is hard to come by as the 
UK market is now saturated with its various retail formats. 19D Organic growth and 
acquisitions appear to be the last two avenues of growth opportunity left for these 
UK supermarkets (Dobson, 2002). Retailers are able to cannibalize each other's 
market shares by acquiring one another, and the most notable acquisition was that 
of Safeway by Morrison in 2003. Burt & Sparks (2003) talk of the 'spiral of growth' or 
'virtuous circle' in which dominant retailers are able through scale, investment and 
efficient asset usage, to increase this growth through sales density (where sales 
density is defined as the sales per square foot in the store). This increased sales 
density yields lower unit costs and higher net margins, and is in fact a self-
perpetuating circle of growth. 
Burt & Sparks (2003) go on to suggest that there is a dual-option outcome of this 
spiral of growth for surplus income generated by surviving retailers. The retailer can 
generate greater sales by: (a) investing in new facilities by upgrading existing ones 
or acquiring new ones; 191 or (b) investing in price reductions by taking even lower 
margins and continually creating an environment of every day low prices (EDLP). 
Wal-Mart's Asda can perhaps be characterized by this sort of trading environment 
considering the lower gross margins taken on product (or subsidization of price) 
compared to the other supermarkets. According to Sarel Joubert, South African 
exporters are no longer able to assist UK retailers on price, contrary to what has 
happened in the last four to five years. With no price manoeuvrability available any 
19D Hollingsworth (2004) states that evidence in the USA retail sector suggests that competition between retailers intensifies 










longer, South African suppliers can only deliver to other markets, or simply not 
supply the UK retailer. 
(2) The consolidation of category managers by their supermarket clients continues 
apace. It has been demonstrated earlier how this affects the way in which (South 
African) suppliers have had to re-establish their access to a supermarket via 
another category manager in an aggressive manner - or lose the business. There 
has also been a rationalization of first-tier suppliers delivering product to the 
retained category managers, putting constant pressure on the remaining suppliers 
to try and preserve the business. The reasons for this are threefold: (a) it reduces 
transaction costs for the retailers; (b) it reduces the risk of problems associated with 
food safety and food quality; and (c) the supply base is a source of competitive 
advantage that requires strategic investment (Fearne et ai, 2004). 
(3) There is a considerable amount of vertical integration being implemented in the 
chain by some of the supermarkets. Asda, for example, has appointed International 
Produce (IP) as its sole category manager. 192 IP has been opening procurement 
offices in supplying countries, including an office in South Africa. It therefore 
appears that IP is attempting to bypass the South African marketing agent to 
procure directly from South African producers. In 2009, Asda plans a share swap 
with IP in which IP will no longer be an independently owned entity in the chain, but 
instead a procurement division of Asda (Pike, 2006). The net effect of this will be 
that Asda, as the supermarket, will control the entire supply chain of South African 
table grapes - from 'farm to fork'. In successfully implementing this model, Asda will 
have significantly shortened the chain. However, certain GEF members are 
circumspect about Asda's controversial business model believing it to be 
unsustainable due to the UK supermarket having underestimated the cultural, 
financial and logistical complexities at the South African end of the chain. 
(4) The rebates in the value chain are being usurped by the supermarkets, slowly but 
surely, from the supply side to the demand side of the chain. The consequences of 
this trend are significant for the South African table grape export industry. Suffice to 
say that the profitability of the marketing agent and his producer are both 
191 Tesco's portfolio of future property developments cited in the UK CC (2000) suggested that this is the predominant route 
that this retailer has decided to follow. 
19::' For a UK supermarket of Asda's size to have only one category manager is considered a controversial strategy in South 
African supplier circles. SA Suppliers are not optimistic that one company can successfully run the entire importing business 










endangered by this new development in the business. Whether the supermarkets 
decide to pocket these rebates or to pass some or all of their value into a reduced 
retail price tag remains to be seen. To remain profitable in this business without the 
supply chain rebates, suppliers (producers and marketing agents) could be forced 
to rely on fruit profits only. To achieve this, farming units will have to become super-
efficient: no gearing, big economies of scale and highly effective and efficient 
production systems. This would certainly level the 'ploughing fields' between the 
producers in that only the very best farmers would survive under such 
circumstances. 
(5) Some of the UK supermarkets like Asda and Tesco are multinationals with 
significant global expansion strategies. According to Leahy (2005), the CEO of 
Tesco, 30 million people shop weekly at Tesco's more than 2000 stores in 13 
countries around the world. For suppliers, this makes these supermarkets a force to 
be reckoned with, especially if their international growth strategies are characterized 
by international buyer groups and cross-border alliances (Dobson, 2002; Burt & 
Sparks, 2003). Mike Grobbelaar is adamant that with the growing consolidation of 
supermarket business worldwide and the strict quality specifications demanded by 
these supermarkets, all roads lead to the future upgrade of South African product 
quality to secure its shelf space with these globalizing, retail behemoths. South 
African exporters therefore have to be strategic in their outlook not to alienate 
themselves from these internationalizing retail chains. However, Wrigley & Currah 
(2003) write of the complexities and stresses involved in retailers internationalizing 
their businesses, citing more failures than successes. Burt et al. (2002) confirm that 
UK retailers have struggled with internationalization because they have 
underestimated the need to adapt their store formats to the competitive realities of 
their offshore markets; their strategies have been serendipitous or misguided; and 
they have lacked experience in decentralized control of a business. 
(6) Each of the top ten UK retailers has a unique approach to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), and all maintain that CSR is tightly integrated within their core 
business (Jones et ai, 2005). However, all the UK-based supermarkets are 
demanding that their suppliers integrate the basic tenets of CSR into their products 










trading principles. 193 Furthermore, the supermarkets are insisting that these value-
additions are incorporated into the product offering totally at the supplier's expense. 
Frustratingly for suppliers, double standards are sometimes created by 
supermarkets that normally insist that only accredited suppliers may do business 
with them. Yet business is conducted with non-accredited suppliers if cheaper 
prices can be obtained, or more understandably where a shortage of product from 
accredited suppliers encourages the supermarket to look to non-accredited sources 
of supply. 
19~ Each supermarket has its own accreditation standard. Without some form of harmonization between all of the UK 











From the early 1980s, the British retail sector started revolutionizing its offerings to the UK 
consumer through a combination of cost-economies of scale and scope. The issues of food 
safety, efficient consumer response, category management and every day low prices 
enabled the top four UK supermarkets to concentrate their retailing power at the expense of 
the smaller, family-owned retail stores. This retailer concentration was compounded by the 
ailing wholesale sector which had its traditional markets usurped by these retailers. By 
2000, the UK competition authorities had been requested to investigate the levels of 
dominance being practiced by these top four British supermarkets, particularly with their 
suppliers. 
82% of fresh produce is sold to the UK consumer through its supermarkets, with the 
homogeneous UK market showing very different characteristics to its contiguous, 
heterogeneous European Mainland market. 25% of South Africa's table grape export 
production supplies the UK market that is showing a year-on-year growth of 12% - primarily 
for health reasons. Green and red seedless grapes that are merchandized in loose and 
pre-packed formats, help segment the grape category for consumers. However, 
supermarkets are encouraging consumers to trade up from loose-packs to pre-packs for 
food safety, shrinkage, wastage and profitability reasons. 
Competition for the lucrative, pre-Christmas marketing window of the UK has been 
characterized by forces that are both 'internal' (South Africans from different production 
regions competing with one another), and 'external' (South Africans competing with other 
countries like Brazil and Namibia). South African table grape suppliers are challenged in 
the post-Christmas UK market mostly by Chile. Other smaller competitors like Argentina 
and Peru are on the rise, whilst Israel, Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Mexico and Brazil (second 
harvest) all compete for the tail end of the season. 
Category management is justified as a 365-day a year supply structure as a result of UK 
supermarkets needing services such as customs clearing, quality control, the re-packing of 
product into bags or punnets, the labelling of packaging with sell-by-dates and the 
distribution of full and half pallets to depots and retail outlets. This same structure that was 
introduced to bring about cost efficiencies has, however, also led to anti-competitive 
concerns by suppliers. These concerns surround category management companies 
excluding smaller suppliers, giving category captains disproportionate market power, 










structures, supermarkets can exert their market power by earning monopolistic profits from 
consumers, and monopsonistic profits from suppliers. The stability of the whole category 
management structure for suppliers is under threat when supermarkets de-list their 
category managers, and where category managers de-list their first-tier suppliers. 
UK supermarket programmes appear to favour the buyers in that prices for product are 
given to their suppliers at the last minute, suppliers' products are de-branded in favour of 
supermarkets' house brands, and buyers tend to over-procure product to suit their own 
ends. These issues, amongst others, give rise to 'procedural' and 'distributive' injustices 
where the balance of power in the buy-supply relationship is shifted in favour of the buyers. 
Partnership building between buyers and suppliers is now being considered superfluous in 
a retail environment where buyers are being regularly rotated through the buying chair, and 
where commodity-purchasing demands largely transactional encounters only. 
The cost chain demonstrates how suppliers delivering grape product to the UK market have 
their returns affected by three major factors: the SA supply price to the supermarket (which 
is largely dependent on sales rates, supermarkets' gross margins, the amount of competing 
product, promotional activities and whether deliveries are pre- or post-Christmas); a volatile 
exchange rate which makes business unpredictable, risky and more expensive; and the 
handling charges or slotting fees levied by retailers on their suppliers. The unquantifiable 
rebates that exporters glean on behalf of their suppliers from various service providers in 
the chain also have an affect on the profitability of exporters and their producers. 
The various scenarios of suppliers optimizing their sales volumes and prices are 
demonstrated via game theory. The sales strategies available to both the marketing agent 
(MA) and the producer-exporter (PE) produce a dominant strategy in which both the MA 
and PE are doomed to zero profits. The provision of accurate, real-time information is 
considered important in fostering cooperation between marketing agents and producer-
exporters to optimize returns for producers in the UK marketplace. 
Finally, the major UK supermarket trends which South African exporters have to contend 
with are as follows: the relentless pursuit of growth by the major UK supermarkets through 
organic growth, acquisitions and EDLP strategies; the consolidation by supermarkets of 
their category managers, and the rationalization by category managers of their first-tier 
suppliers; the vertical integration by some supermarkets in an attempt to bypass 
intermediaries in the chain; the usurping of the rebates in the chain by the supermarkets 










opportunities that it may bring to some suppliers; and, finally, the prioritization by 
supermarkets of corporate social responsibility issues like food safety, traceability, ethical 










Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations to Industry 
This final chapter draws conclusions around the three Porter determinants being evaluated 
in this discourse, namely: (1) market demand in which exporters need to consider how they 
can improve their services to, and commercial relationships with, the major UK 
supermarkets; (2) supporting industries and how service providers in these industries 
should interact with producers and exporters to innovate products and services that provide 
a competitive edge to their businesses; and (3) the strategy, structure and rivalry of the 
table grape export sector, with particular reference to how industry leadership can take the 
sector forward in the foreseeable future. The recommendations made to the table grape 
industry's leadership in line with the three determinants are not exhaustive. Hopefully they 
cover the main issues that would make a substantial difference to the competitiveness of 
the South African table grape export sector, if applied. 
5.1 Supermarket Demands: Developing Countervailing Supplier Power 
It is evident that the UK supermarkets dominate SA table grape suppliers - and all fresh 
fruit suppliers to the UK supermarkets for that matter. This is partly due to the abundance of 
suppliers (there are approximately 2000 suppliers of fresh produce to the UK 
supermarkets), and partly due to the opportunistic behaviour of certain supermarket buyers. 
Ascertaining just how South African suppliers can counteract this situation is no easy task. 
And if, as Sarel Joubert suggests, the UK supermarkets are the example from which the 
European Mainland supermarkets are already taking their cue for the future, then the South 
African table grape export fraternity needs to develop a sense of urgency on how it 
addresses its competitive position in the EU market at large. The following considerations 
are offered in the context of what has been covered. 
5.1.1 Improving supplier performance 
(1) Increasing product penetration into the UK market is crucial, considering that 
there is still household penetration potential, with only 77% of UK homes 
purchasing grapes as opposed to 90% purchasing bananas (Leighton, 
2005a). South African suppliers therefore need to take note of the factors 
behind the growth of the UK grape category outlined in the FPJ Grape 










market; (b) the extension of the season for the more popular varieties; and 
(c) increased storage opportunities. Storage of the product can be improved 
by looking at the various techniques of storing product on the vine, in the SA 
cold rooms, under controlled atmosphere conditions, in the market, 
according to variety and whilst applying the correct post-harvest treatments; 
and (d) the consistent quality and range of new and existing varieties from 
suppliers. 
Conradie (2007) claims that consumer marketing has been neglected by 
South Africa in the years after deregulation. In order to achieve greater UK 
market penetration, and to create a pull for SA fruit, he proposes that the 
industry considers marketing a South African lifestyle. To achieve this, SA 
fruits (including grapes) should be used as a platform to conduct a national 
marketing campaign, which would expose the typical attributes of the South 
African lifestyle, namely wildlife, golf courses, beaches and holidays. In-store 
theatre and travel competitions should provide the UK consumer with the 
opportunity to experience this lifestyle. The International Marketing Council 
should be broached to consider supporting the concept using the national 
branding of 'South Africa - Alive with Possibilities'. 
(2) Abiding by the five key performance indicators that separate the 'best from 
the rest' of the suppliers, as noted on the supermarkets' scorecards of their 
suppliers (Fearne & Hughes, 1999), namely: (a) the strategic orientation of 
the supplier; (b) the organizational structure and its business culture; (c) its 
ability to mine market information efficiently and effectively; (d) its cost-
consciousness around serving customers; and (e) its ability to innovate. With 
shorter product life cycles, shorter lead times, limited first-mover advantages 
and constantly advancing technology, commodity suppliers are under 
pressure to fund the innovation required to stay ahead of the pack (Fearne & 
Hughes, 1999). This commodity remains a poverty trap unless suppliers are 
able to innovate their way out of it. However, innovation around the product 
remains a relentless challenge, and it will need to come primarily in the form 
of new varieties, new packaging formats and extended shelf life for the 
product (Fearne & Hughes, 1999). 
(3) Oelivering more carefully targeted product volumes, more evenly across the 










week 52 to week 4. If the ships bunch during the season, they put pressure 
on stocks and ultimately on prices. In order to truncate these peak week 
volumes, exporters need to be given accurate, real-time information 
pertaining to the weekly shipments of product to the UK market. Hubert 
Leclercq points out that once South African suppliers have collectively 
consulted the vital statistics, and are made aware of the volumes that 
supermarkets have historically been able to sell during these weeks, 
suppliers cannot be hoodwinked into delivering more to these supermarkets 
that can be sold by them. Hubert Leclercq further maintains that this is why 
the Chileans annually publish all their grape export volumes, by week, by 
exporter to the named receivers in the UK. It prevents any UK receiver from 
inflating its volumes to over-procure from over-zealous suppliers and thereby 
disadvantage uninformed producers. 194 In addition, Hubert Leclercq 
maintains that this requires collaboration - not collusion - on volumes 
between the South African exporting companies. 
(4) Increasing penetration into other existing and new markets. A strategic 
imperative for any country dealing in a fast-commoditizing product like table 
grapes is that there should be numerous other markets to which its product 
can be sent. As soon as a country has this choice, it alerts buyers to the fact 
that suppliers have other market outlets. In supplying only the volumes and 
varieties that the UK market can absorb during the season, South African 
grape suppliers will need to divert superfluous volumes (especially those in 
the peak weeks) away from this market. Manning (2004), former 
representative of the Chilean fruit industry in Europe, suggests that South 
Africans should be looking to penetrate the Spanish and Italian markets to a 
much greater extent than they currently do. He also insists that there are still 
untapped supermarket opportunities in Europe where South African product 
is under-represented. Of course, these opportunities may not yield the same 
price benefits as the UK market, but they do serve to absorb volume and 
diversify risk for the exporter and his producer. 
It should also be borne in mind that in taking volume pressure off a market, 
prices in that market should, in theory, be more buoyant if demand remains 
19~ The only exception to predictable volumes sold by supermarkets is when a supermarket conducts a promotion. But even 










unchanged. However, if the South African suppliers should remove what is 
considered to be 'excess volumes' from the UK market, one or more of their 
competitors could fill that 'volume gap' created by South Africa. This would 
entirely defeat the purpose of the exercise. Sarel Joubert points out that a 
relatively small amount of South Africa's citrus goes to the UK market 
because the South African citrus industry has gained access to considerably 
more markets than the table grape industry. 
It seems apparent, therefore, that the South African table grape industry 
should have gained access to more countries than it has in the deregulated 
period - including exploiting a burgeoning local market. Meintjes (2004g) 
maintained that with the production volume growths expected in South 
Africa, the industry could not afford to continue selling more than 80% of its 
product into the European Mainland and the UK. Yet the industry is still 
grappling with access to new markets, especially the markets in the east like 
Japan and South Korea. (In fact, whilst completing the closing chapter of this 
discourse, the industry had just lost its market access to Thailand for table 
grapes). Israel and China are the only two newly acquired markets for South 
African table grapes in the last 10 years (FPEF, 2006a). With official market 
access to China very recently acquired,195 Samuel Pieterse cautions the 
industry against believing that this market will be the panacea of its market 
access ills. He claims that for as long as the dollar remains weak against the 
rand, the industry will not be able to profitably capitalize on the official 
opening of the Chinese market. All of South Africa's dollar-based markets 
have been putting volume pressure on the pound and euro markets due to 
the strength of these latter currencies in relation to the dollar. 
5.1.2 Approaching Retailers Over their Market Power 
In April 1999, the UK Competition Commission launched an investigation as a result of a 
complaint laid by the Director General of the UK Office of Fair Trading. The origin of the 
complaint revolved around three issues: (1) the public perception that the price of groceries 
in the UK was higher than in comparable EU countries; (2) the disparity between farm-gate 
195 South Africa has had unofficial access in the past to China via Hong Kong (through the grey channel). Official access is 
preferable in the long run, even though there may be no short-term financial gain by having it (due to the import duties which 










and retail prices; and (3) the disappearance of competing high street retailers due to the 
ubiquitous presence of large out-of-town supermarkets (UK CC, 2000). The UK 
Competition Commission (CC) Report unusually - though not unprecedentedly -
recommended no remedies other than the application of a Code of Practice (CoP) to 
identified retailers. However, the UK CC Report did find that 27 of the supermarkets' 30 
identified business practices in relation to their suppliers were against the public interest. 
The CoP was finally implemented in March 2002. But by February 2004, the UK OFT's 
Review on the CoP found it to be ineffective in its original intentions. In February 2006, the 
UK CC decided to proceed with a new investigation into the market power being exerted by 
the UK retailers. 
In order for South African suppliers to address those 27 business practices found not be in 
the public's interest, it is proposed here that formal dialogue be opened between the South 
African table grape exporting industry and the UK's OFT. It paves the way for some 
countervailing supplier power to be developed indirectly with the retailers, but in a non-
confrontational way. The South Africans can also do this in collaboration with supplying 
countries via the Southern Hemisphere Association of Fresh Fruit Exporters (SHAFFE), all 
of whom are in very similar supply positions to the UK retailers. The voices of directly 
affected groups like the UK's National Farmers' Union (NFU) 196 and the European 
importers' association, FRESHFEL, can also be party to the dialogue with the OFT. Due to 
potential commercial reprisals, industry officials accompanied by government officials 
should represent each of the grape-supplying countries at the OFT - not professionals from 
the commercial side of the production and export sectors. 
The aim of opening this channel of communication would be to redress vertical and 
horizontal restrictive practices being adopted by certain supermarkets and their receivers. 
The objective of the exercise would be twofold: firstly, to have more palatable buy-supply 
models implemented for both parties; and secondly, to develop policy against economic 
exploitation of dependency relationships due to the long-term damage that it causes 
(Dobson, 2002). The writer therefore proposes the following considerations: 
(1) Supermarkets should give a timeous price to their suppliers according to an agreed 
industry standard. This would allow suppliers to take their product elsewhere if they 
were not satisfied with the price. Supermarkets should also be guided as to what 
196 British suppliers have also been squeezed on price by their own supermarkets (about which there has been ongoing 
public condemnation in the UK press. One of the rationales behind the very low supply prices is that UK supermarkets are 










constitutes a 'fair price' in relation to suppliers' cost chains, which some 
supermarket buyers insist on scrutinizing. 197 
(2) A standardized sales account format should be published which stipulates 
maximum charges allowed on identified items of expenditure, which are agreed to, 
in writing, on an original order. The unethical issues surrounding unexpected, 
unexplained and unnecessary costs - including handling charges - that appear on 
receivers' sales accounts would be largely eliminated. South African table grape 
exporters have long suspected (and proven) that certain category managers incur 
superfluous costs at the expense of their suppliers - possibly without the knowledge 
of their supermarket clients as well. 
(3) The character profiles, incentive schemes, career development paths and training 
regimes offered to UK buyers in the current retail purchasing environment need to 
be overhauled. Suppliers will continue to be disadvantaged if: (a) buyers' bonuses 
depend on how much they can extract from suppliers; (b) buyers' careers are built 
on courses teaching them how to do so; (c) the rotation of buyers' jobs gives them 
no relationship-building ability to speak of; and (d) very young professionals are 
assigned to these national buying positions. The conduct of some of these buyers 
does little to uplift the commercial image of British supermarkets, the values of 
British society and the virtues of capitalism at large. 
(4) All supermarkets should be disallowed from selling product at below cost price. Cost 
price here refers to the cost at which the retailer is getting the fruit from the supplier. 
Legislation in other European countries (like Ireland, France and Germany) has 
barred below-cost selling to curb retail-buying power over their suppliers (UK CC 
Report, 2000). Whilst economics suggests that selling a product as a loss-leader is 
legitimate, forcing relatively tiny suppliers to sell at or below cost to assist 
internationalized retailers into financially harrying smaller (competing) convenience 
stores into liquidation seems indefensible. Eliminating competition to the degree that 
has occurred in the UK retail sector is an unhealthy development for suppliers and 
consumers, and some form of government intervention (regulation) is required to 
stabilize what is becoming an unstable form of capitalism. 
19
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Some consider it unethical that supermarkets demand to see suppliers· cost chains. However supermarkets argue that 










(5) Retail buyers should factor in a country's exchange rate in its supply-price 
calculation. It is in their long-term interests to do so if they wish to continue buying 
on a sustainable basis from all their supplying countries (and their established 
supplying companies) across all the marketing windows throughout the year. 
Although Mike Grobbelaar believes that there can be no such thing as a 
'compassionate purchase' and that forward cover is available at a cost, a 
developing country's commodity competitiveness - perhaps even survival - hinges 
very heavily on its country's exchange rate. Supermarkets that intend to build long-
term relationships with their suppliers should therefore factor in the supplying 
country's exchange rate into their buying price. 
(6) A category management company should be prohibited from servicing more than 
one supermarket client, otherwise too much vertical and horizontal market power is 
vested in that one CM company. Whilst the economic counter-argument could be 
that economies of scale justify this configuration, the CM's interest lies with the 
supermarkets he serves - not the first-tier suppliers he uses - and the power is 
again skewed in favour of the supermarket. 
(7) Whilst UK competition law exists to deal with horizontal and vertical restrictive 
practices, and mergers and acquisitions, the lack of a universally accepted definition 
of buying power,198 ambiguous policy guidelines,199 and vested national interests200 
are all causing variations in legal interpretations of anti-competitive situations, 
leading to inconsistent decision-making (Dobson, 2002). The UK policy makers 
need to tidy this up by applying structural and behavioural remedies (Dobson, 
2002). 
(8) Social responsibility should be emphasized by insisting that supermarkets subscribe 
to a Code of Conduct centred on 'ethical trade' that is monitored by a British 
government authority that has 'teeth' to implement effective punitive measures. One 
of the recommendations has been the appointment of an independent regulator to 
oversee supermarket conduct with their suppliers (Sell, 2003). 
198 Where market share statistics are seen as a proxy measure of market power (Burt & Sparks, 2003), according to Dobson 
(2002) the UK CC suggested that 8% of market share of a supermarket could afford buying power, whereas the OECD 
suggested 15% and the European Commission 22%. 
199 Whilst seller power is well covered in UK policy guidelines, the corresponding guidelines on buyer power seems totally 
under-developed (Dobson, 2002). 
coo Burt & Sparks (2003) suggest that it is in the UK's national interests to develop a "national champion" (like Tesco) - as 
encouraged by France with the merger between Carrefour and Pomodes - to be able to take on the Wal-Mart juggernaut. An 
additional national interest that could be mooted is the ability of Tesco to assist the British central bank with its inflation 










(9) Non-governmental organizations like Oxfam, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and 
ActionAid should be included in a "Buy-Supply Forum" together with the supplier, 
supermarket and OFT representatives so that a more balanced, 'societal' 
perspective can be brought to the commercial table. Besides, retailers are sensitive 
to the demands of NGOs, especially those adroit at attracting negative media 
attention to apparent abusive practices in their supply chains (Freidberg, 2003). 
Much has been written regarding UK supermarkets keeping their suppliers' labour 
forces trapped on the edge of poverty - particularly in developing countries. In a 
similar vein, the supermarkets are considered to be keeping South African 
producers and exporters trapped on the edge of profitability. In a recent article, 
ActionAid (2005) appealed to transnational companies (TNCs) regarding the way 
they are handling their suppliers. They called for an adoption of new standards at 
the United Nations - the UN Human Rights Norms for Business - to establish legal 
requirements for TNCs to respect and secure the human rights of all workers within 
a company's area of interest. TNCs have largely outgrown the reach of national law. 
However, rights violations committed by TNCs are not effectively addressed by 
international law, allowing them to operate in what is effectively a regulatory void. 
In 2006, the UK Competition Commission launched another investigation into market power 
being exercised by supermarkets. However, the perception is that with the UK CC's benign 
attitude it adopted towards the 2000 investigation, no effective remedies are expected to 
emanate from this new investigation. For this reason, suppliers should be masters of their 
own destiny and continue to approach the OFT in England. In fact a UK NGO has already 
suggested to the OFT that it should strengthen the Code of Practice by, firstly, bringing it in 
line with the original recommendations of the UK CC, as it was watered down by round-
table discussions between the UK CC and the affected retailers before its implementation; 
and secondly, including definitions for what was meant by 'reasonable' in the Code of 
Practice document. Bell (2003) further suggested that the Code of Practice should be 
imposed on retailers instead of negotiating with them what was tenable or not. Finally, 
Dobson (2002) proposed that the Code of Practice should be rigorously worded to avoid 
legal loopholes, and should be determined unilaterally by the UK CC authority and be 
accompanied by an appropriate dispute resolution procedure. 
As a last resort, the matter can be taken up with the EU Competition Commission in 










internationalization of UK retailers and their foray onto the European Mainland. 201 If this is 
not attended to, South African suppliers will have their competitiveness compromised on an 
even larger scale in their single biggest market. 
cOl An example of a successful intervention by the South African industry involved an industry delegation to the Competition 
Commission in Brussels. This delegation forced Maersk to abandon its proposed merger with P&O Nedlloyd in South Africa. 
The Competition Commission based its decision on the additional concentration that the merger would have brought to the 
already limited number of containerized shipping lines operating out of South Africa, and the concomitant effect that it would 










5.2 Service Providers' Mantra: Innovate or Evaporate 
The second determinant being covered by this discourse is the degree to which supporting 
industries could essentially improve their logistics services in the post-harvest leg of the 
chain - especially from an innovative point of view. The following recommendations are 
made based on the recently launched innovation programme for the whole fruit industry 
and the inhibitors that, according to industry specialists, need to be dissolved in order for 
competitive progress to be made in the table grape export industry. 
5.2.1 Capitalizing on the New Post-Harvest Innovation Programme 
Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007: 121) state that innovation requires institutions - in this case 
service provision institutions - to 'come up with better ideas, look outside the company for 
concepts and partners, establish different funding mechanisms, protect new and radically 
different businesses from the old and sharpen the execution'. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) 
emphasize that innovation in itself is not a guarantee of staying competitive. If your rate of 
innovation is lower than that of your competitors, then your value-added component - and 
subsequently your market share - will still be in relative decline. And with technology 
changing faster than economic theory, new solutions will have to be found from a different 
platform of thinking from that which has been experienced in the past. 
Fortunately, the FPEF has just launched a three-year Post Harvest Innovation Programme 
partnered by the Department of Science & Technology and the Agricultural Research 
Council. It represents an ideal opportunity for the table grape export industry - and all 
service providers in the chain - 'to network for the generation of new knowledge for a 
sustainable future, to assimilate new technologies in the cold chain and to develop 
collective leadership with a vision that will propel the industry to the next level of global 
competitiveness' (FPEF, 2007b: 1). There is little comfort in knowing that South Africa's 
table grape competitors have taken the lead in the fields of post-harvest research and 
development, innovation and infrastructural developments (OST, 2006). As the business 
plan for this innovation programme states, 'a centrally capacitated facility needs to be 
instituted that tracks global trends and disseminates information to producers and exporters 
on benchmarked, best-practice trends and case studies, industry threats, industry 
vulnerabilities and government support. Such a facility needs to target, implement and 
monitor research, development and innovations that would provide cutting-edge technical, 










The South African deciduous fruit sector has compromised its global competitiveness in the 
deregulated era by continuing to prioritize pre-harvest R&0202 issues at the expense of 
post-harvest innovation and technology development. A gap analysis conducted by the 
OST (2006) concluded that service providers in the table grape export value chain urgently 
needed to concentrate their attention on the following: 
(1) Container technology for the improvement of airflow, gas, temperature and 
humidity controls; 
(2) Integrated packaging solutions for the development of new internal and external 
packaging and pallet platforms; 
(3) Alternative treatments for disease and pest control by, for example, substituting 
the controversial use of sulphur dioxide with an alternative product; 
(4) Non-destructive techniques for assessing fruit quality using, for example, 
infrared devices that measure the ripeness and readiness of fruit; 
(5) The instigation of an information hub that provides a much wider provision of 
business intelligence than is currently the case; and 
(6) New cultivar development including an assessment process of new cultivars that 
are being imported from overseas plant breeders. Interestingly, the capped 
production volumes of new cultivars, the exclusive allocation of their 
production and sales rights and the restriction on which markets these 
cultivars can be sold into, should provide some form of countervailing price 
power for South African suppliers to British supermarkets in the near future. 
The South African table grape industry's ability to innovate - particularly at post-harvest 
level - will depend largely on its ability to remove obstacles that block the industry from 
carrying out such innovation. The following section deals with what has to be done to 
remove such innovation inhibitors. 
202 Despite the prioritization on pre-harvest matters, it has been noted that there is already an under-investment in pre-











5.2.2 Bolstering the Drivers of Innovation 
According to Taylor (2006), the major drivers for research and innovation are the reduction 
of operating costs, changing consumer needs, health and safety issues, carbon footprint 
issues, improved fruit quality at the packing stage and improved fruit condition on arrival in 
the market place. Post-harvest research and innovation drivers that should therefore be 
amplified to improve the table grape industry's international competitiveness are as follows: 
(1) Synergistic use of resources. It is widely felt that most stakeholders in the 
South African table grape export value chain prioritize their self-preservation 
ahead of group-collaboration. Perhaps it is instinctive for commercial 
survival and a characteristic of a highly competitive free-market system. Or 
perhaps it is simply an indictment on the independent culture prevailing in 
the industry. Whatever the cause, insufficient resource clustering manifests 
itself amongst various government departments, universities, industry 
associations, export houses, service providers and growers. The following 
serve as examples. 
(a) Alleviating congestion in Cape Town port, for example, is a matter 
of many public and private sector institutions coming together in an 
unprecedented form of cooperation. It requires industry association 
leadership to motivate, coordinate and fast-track (i) planned 
infrastructural investments by central government and state owned 
enterprises in the port of Cape Town; (ii) service level agreements 
between TPT and the shipping lines which would incorporate 
revised productivity levels and improved operation systems within 
TPT; (iii) the formation of an effective port steering committee that 
encompasses all port stakeholders to evaluate port performance 
and to suggest improvements; and (iv) the commissioning of fruit 
industry research studies that pinpoint information and 
communication deficiencies connected with the supply chain into 
the port. 
(b) Taylor (2006) believes that commercial packaging companies are 
still tinkering with smaller innovations - like structural strength and 
carton ventilation - and not addressing the strategic, long-term 










for biodegradability purposes (as this could jeopardize the future of 
such commercial packaging companies). In order to achieve this, 
Taylor (2006) suggests that a consortium outside of the traditional 
domain of industry-connected institutions should join forces that 
could, for example, involve the CSIR and polymer science 
departments from various universities 203 
(c) Le Roux & Coetzee (2006) maintain that the South African table 
grape industry and its stakeholders should be cooperating more 
closely with their competitors. Nortje and Craftert (2006) allude to 
the ongoing successful collaboration between the South African 
avocado sector and its competitors (Mexico, Spain, Kenya and 
Israel). Each country makes marketing intelligence available to the 
other, and all countries contribute financially to generic avocado 
promotions in the UK. Chile, like South Africa, has similar climatic 
conditions and exports similar fruits at the same time of the year to 
similar markets - like the UK market. Chileans allegedly embrace 
technology more readily than South Africans as indicated by their 
adoption of modified, controlled atmosphere packaging for 
exporting nectarines (whilst most South African nectarine growers 
are still in the embryonic stage of conducting trials on this same 
packaging). Samuel Pieterse also notes that industry associations 
should be regularly researching and providing information on 
competitors for the SA exporters as these exporters do not have 
the time or the resources to do this. 
(d) In noting the lack of strategic alliances between the various fruit 
sectors - and industry associations - Benic (2006) suggests that an 
advisory committee should be established that shares detailed 
information pertaining to the important areas of market access and 
phytosanitary matters between the fruit sectors. For example, the 
two leading multinational export companies, Dole and Capespan, 
have for some time, been conducting research on the browning of 
table grapes knowingly - but independently - of one another. This 
co3 Griesel (2006) and Huysamer (2006) concur that there needs to be a much greater multi-disciplinary approach to cold 
chain innovation. For example, cold chain technology is chiefly an engineering discipline and so engineering sciences need to 










seems an unnecessary duplication of resources, and the GEF 
leadership needs to bring together its members with research 
institutions and the DST Innovation Programme to create the 
necessary synergies for quicker breakthroughs to be made - for the 
benefit of all. 
(e) Perhaps the biggest culprits of non-collaboration are the various 
government departments that interact with the industry. Karaan 
(2006) writes in his review of the Agricultural Marketing Act that the 
DoA and the dti in particular are the two major departments where 
much greater cooperation and clearer definitions of portfolios need 
to be fostered so as not to handicap the industry. In the few cases 
where synergistic relationships have been formed, the benefits are 
clearly being harnessed. 204 
(2) Effective transfer of new technology.205 Labuschagne (2006) questions the 
validity of cold chain innovation if the table grape industry is unable to 
ensure that new technology is transferred to the beneficiaries' knowledge 
base; and if the technology is not applied appropriately or correctly in the 
chain by the intended beneficiaries. Hansen & Birkinshaw (2007) extrapolate 
Labuschagne's statement by bluntly stating that diffusion-poor industries 
have trouble monetizing good ideas. Labuschagne (2006) further maintains 
that despite the existence of thoroughly researched and well-maintained 
protocols for the post-harvest handling and treatment of table grapes, many 
people in the cold chain still pay scant attention to applying the established 
protocols. Examples of this are the lack of adherence to hazardous access 
control point (HACCP) systems by exporters, and producers not packing and 
stacking pallets in containers correctly. For this reason, Labuschagne 
believes that the industry should accelerate the implementation of the 
product quality management system (POMS) via the PPECB so that quality 
systems can be audited throughout the cold chain, which is currently not the 
case. 
C04 Benic (2006) noted the success of the South African Pesticide Initiative Programme between the South Africa fruit industry 
and the European Union, which was facilitated by the National Department of Agriculture. 
cos This refers to the dissemination of technology developed in the deciduous fruit industry for the grape sector; and 
technology developed by other SA industries that are adopted by the grape sector (for example the automotive industry's 










What technology transfer is taking place at production level is now being 
conducted by the thinly staffed DFPT Research institution, and by those few 
export houses that can afford this function via their technical specialists. 
According to Huysamer (2006) it is not just a question of the affordability of 
technical specialists by every producer and exporter; there are simply not 
enough experienced and qualified technical specialists to populate the table 
grape industry today. Campbell & Hurndall (2006) acknowledge that 
technology transfer under the current regime has not wholly succeeded, and 
that alternative initiatives need to be sought. Le Roux & Coetzee (2006) do 
not believe that the solution for technology transfer lies in deploying 
extension officers (as in the regulated era) or technology transfer 
consultants (as in the deregulated era). 
A technology diffusion programme in the industry could incorporate the 
following ideas. Du Toit (2006) states that prior to deregulation, the pome 
industry had 'workgroups' in which producers discussed cooling, pack house 
and storage issues on a quarterly basis. This was an extremely effective 
way of disseminating information where the opportunity was provided to 
learn from someone else's experience without the cost of having to 
experience it oneself. Korsten (2006) advocates that a virtual, post-harvest 
technology centre is the answer, where the primary objective would be 
technology transfer. Alternatively, a 'hot-bed' for technological development 
for the industry could be established where producers, exporters and service 
providers could 'fetch' newly developed technology from a 'one-stop-shop' 
(physical) demonstration facility (Van Vuuren, 2006). 
Perhaps a clue to this technology diffusion challenge lies in Gladwell's 
Tipping Point (2000) in which he proposes his three techniques used to 
spread an idea like an epidemic. Gladwell's three rules of epidemic creation 
are: (a) the 'law of the few' where the industry needs to identify those few, 
well-connected people who have a rare set of social gifts that when they 
speak, everyone listens; (b) the 'stickiness factor' that says the way in 
which you package something can take on an irresistibility that really sticks 
to the target audience; and (c) the 'power of context' in which the 
messenger understands how a small change in the circumstances of the 
message delivery (like through the medium of a video rather than a chalk 










(3) Revised research model. Historically, the deciduous fruit industry relied 
heavily on the government to help it fund basic, innovative research via the 
ARC. However, due to the political re-prioritization of government spending 
and the ARC's degenerative management since 1994, the institutional 
memory of the ARC has been severely compromised over the deregulated 
era. DFPT Research (on behalf of the table grape industry) has ended up 
funding basic research at the ARC and Stellenbosch University, and applied 
research at Experico. Campbell and Hurndall (2006) confess that this 
approach is not without its dilemmas. For example, should DFPT Research 
only be supporting these three institutions? And when DFPT Research 
successfully funds applied research using growers' money, who owns the 
intellectual property, and how does the royalty income stream get split - if at 
all? 
Le Roux & Coetzee (2006) challenge the current model believing that 
research project funding should be appropriated on a cost-benefit basis, and 
that all projects should go out to tender. They maintain that this would 
ensure that research funding is productive, is not consumed by institutional 
bureaucracy, lures niche-based research firms into tendering and harnesses 
research capacity on a countrywide scale. Le Roux & Coetzee (2006) further 
believe that a revised research model for the industry should not rely too 
heavily financially on one institution, or too heavily on one individual in an 
institution. If a holistic research model is not established for the industry's 
competitive future, then the research system is driven by commercial entities 
that fear a loss of industry competitiveness; and this system defaults to a 
non-cooperative race to see who can access new technology ahead of their 
competitors. 
(4) The recruitment of experienced research staff. According to Griesel (2006), 
there are almost no NRF-rated researchers in South Africa that enjoy 
international recognition in the area of post-harvest technology. Dodd (2006) 
adds that it is a global phenomenon that young people are no longer making 
career choices in health and horticultural sciences, but are shifting rather to 
business science and engineering related degrees. This is exacerbating the 
already insufficient research capacity that exists. The large disparity in 










South African fruit industry might go some way towards explaining this 
phenomenon (Le Roux & Coetzee, 2006). 
What is more concerning is that the industry is not doing anything to attract a 
sufficient number of graduates for the long-term stability of this area of the 
business (Huysamer, 2006)206 It is apparent then that industry leadership 
needs to prioritize the retention of its experienced staff and the attraction of 
(young) new blood to its research ranks. In order to stem and reverse the 
tide of research staff losses, the public sector could consider co-investing 
with the industry in this area of the business. This could include public 
relations campaigns at school level, bursary schemes at universities and 
mentoring programmes that normally accompany such bursary students (Le 
Roux, 2006). 
(5) Continuous research and innovation. Le Roux (2006), Griesel (2006) and 
Alexander (2006) lament the fact that innovation is driven by net farm 
income, which in turn drives research and development. When companies 
move into survival mode, investment in research becomes a low priority. 
This is a myopic approach to competitiveness, since the industry needs to 
build sUbstantial financial reserves that can sustain the momentum of 
research and innovation over the long-term. A solution could lie in an 
annual, voluntary (or statutory) levy per carton. Karaan (2006), in his review 
of the Agricultural Marketing Act, recommended to the Minister of Agriculture 
that she incentivize industry in this type of situation by promoting cost-
sharing arrangements with the industry. 
Service providers in the value chain reap considerable profits from the table 
grape export sector. Industry association executives would therefore do well 
to ensure that these service providers make greater financial contributions to 
industry research and innovation than is currently the case. Finally, it should 
be remembered that only 13% of the table grape statutory levies are 
currently being used for post harvest research. If the growers decided to 
make the levy contribution more equitable between pre- and post-harvest 
co6 Huysamer (2006) further notes that in the last five years, there have been fewer than 10 people in each of the final years 
of the SSc Agriculture course at the University of Stelienbosch (the only South African university specializing in post-harvest 
technology in the deciduous fruit industry). He maintains that if the industry does not address this. then the real crisis will 










innovation and research, this would boost post-harvest innovation funding 
that would ultimately accelerate the international competitiveness of the 
industry. If industry leadership was to actively seek these available 
resources, a substantial reserve fund could be built up over the long-term for 
post-harvest innovation in the table grape industry; and this would effectively 
make the state of the industry's financial returns irrelevant to the intensity of 
innovation carried out every year in the future. 
Any innovation that affords the SA producer and his supermarket client a degree of 
differentiation from their competitors will be rewarded. It is therefore the task of industry 
leadership to take up the reigns on research and innovation, and to ensure that it is 
proactive rather than reactive (Dodd, 2006; Huysamer, 2006); that the bigger companies 
with their in-house capabilities collaborate rather than compete, and then share that 
knowledge with the rest of the industry (Du Toit, 2006); that matters of confidentiality 
around technology formation are not abused so that newly-developed, South African 
technology lands up in the hands of foreign companies (Taylor, 2006); that more South 
African post-harvest researchers publish their work in peer-reviewed journals (Griesel, 
2006); and that research scientists work under less pressurized circumstances - with a 
greater amount of discretionary funding - so as to more readily reach the cutting edge of 










5.3 The Table Grape Export Sector: Quo Vadis? 
5.3.1 Quality Products and Services: The Ultimate Differentiators 
Maintaining superior product and service quality along the value chain and in the 
marketplace could probably be considered the ultimate differentiator between the South 
African table grape export sector and its competitors. As has been noted in this discourse, 
South Africa's product quality has arguably slipped in the deregulated period due to: inferior 
quality product being hidden in the system by ill-disciplined suppliers; PPECB quality 
inspection systems being weakened by labour, time and cost constraints; and producers 
and marketing agents being tempted to pack volume with secondary considerations being 
given to quality. 
The following recommendations for improving the product quality of the South African 
table grape performance were offered by the GEF members at the 2004 and 2005 SATI 
strategic planning sessions: 
(1) Eliminating unwanted varieties in the market; 
(2) Enforcing marketing cut-off dates after which certain varieties should not be 
sent to the market; 
(3) Raising the minimum export standards and regulating revised berry size, 
sunburn and blush export standards for certain varieties; 
(4) Prioritizing post-harvest research and innovation; 
(5) Enforcing revised handling protocols, especially for packing after rain; 
(6) Implementing 'quality spot checks' in Cape Town port to improve quality 
control systems;207 and 
(7) Putting in place an independent South African quality control presence in the 
UK ports (via the PPECB). The purpose would be to not only feed back to 
"07 The further inland the inspections have been located over time in this industry. the worse the condition of fruit that has 
landed in South Africa's export markets (Symington, 2005). Hence the need to check table grapes in the ports - at least five 










industry arrival quality problems, but also to eliminate spurious quality claims 
that negatively affect South Africa's image and unnecessarily erode financial 
returns to producers. 
Understandably, vested interests among individual producers have made the first three 
recommendations tough to implement. One of the functions of the market is to make 
difficult or unpopular decisions for suppliers. If a producer, contrary to his exporter's advice, 
insists on sending a variety into the market that is unpopular, then the market rightfully 
punishes the product with poor financial returns. Eventually it becomes no longer viable to 
send that product to the market, and the market's decision is often more palatable to the 
producer than the exporter's request. However, the difficulty is that the market sometimes 
takes too long to penalize ill-disciplined suppliers, and as a result, other suppliers cannot 
avoid being polluted in the protracted process of price deterioration. Alternatively, the 
National Department of Agriculture - as a neutral third party - could, after a consultative 
process, legislate standards with which the industry would have to comply. This would 
effectively bypass the vested interests of producers and exporters that interfere when trying 
to come to joint decisions on such quality standard recommendations. 
In terms of service quality, the FPEF (2006a) made a number of recommendations in a 
paper submitted to the NAMC in the revision of the Marketing Act. These and additional 
recommendations are proposed below. 
(1) The quality control services of the PPECB should be revised in keeping with 
changing market requirements. With many exporters now employing their own 
quality inspectors to ensure compliance with the array of British supermarket 
standards being demanded, it is recommended that the PPECB entirely deregulate 
its product inspection services in favour of an auditing system. This will prevent the 
double cost that an exporter currently pays for his own inspector and the mandatory 
PPECB inspector. It will also ensure a superior inspection service as the exporter's 
inspector quality-controls to his specific supermarket customer's standard (whereas 
a PPECB inspector has to try and inspect to all the UK supermarket standards).208 
208 GEF members have proposed that the array of quality standards prevalent in the UK be reduced to a few standards 










(2) The container equipment inspection services exclusively conducted by the PPECB 
should be deregulated allowing private companies to compete in the same 
market. 209 This should further improve services and reduce costs for the shippers. 
(3) All marketing agents and producer-exporters should become members of the FPEF. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the poor marketing skills of an inexperienced 
group of cavalier producer-exporters and marketing agents have tarnished the 
South African export effort in the deregulated era. Accreditation to the FPEF would 
encourage the entire table grape exporting fraternity to collectively determine a high 
standard of marketing. In addition to this, it is recommended that producers not 
directly involved with the marketing of their own product should be encouraged to 
use only accredited members of the FPEF. In this way, much of the ill-discipline 
prevalent in the industry around legal, financial and quality matters can be 
effectively managed through the FPEF Code of Conduct and its speedy dispute 
resolution procedures. 
(4) In order to preserve and enhance the provision of accurate, real-time information to 
producers and exporters, the PPECB should remain custodian of the industry's 
information database for confidentiality purposes. However, considering that the 
PPECB's core business is fruit inspection services, the PPECB should outsource 
the management of the database to an IT company whose core business deals with 
IT matters of the magnitude and complexity emanating from the industry. Marketing 
decisions are facilitated by the supply of weekly vital statistics from the PPECB, and 
the preservation and improvement of this system is a top priority for the enhanced 
competitiveness of the industry. 
5.3.2 Black Economic Empowerment in the Export Sector 
Whilst transformation or BEE at production level is traditionally beyond the scope of such a 
dissertation dealing with marketing matters, recent developments suggest otherwise. 
Essentially, the marketing arm of an industry cannot operate effectively from a politically 
problematic production platform. Two initiatives reflect this fact. Firstly, the ownership of 
land has been identified as the key to politically satisfy previously disenfranchised 











individuals in South Africa. As a result, the production leg of the table grape value chain 
has been targeted by the SA government in a land reform initiative that transfers ownership 
of land to emerging black farmers. In an article titled 'Emotional Intelligence' published in 
the South African Fruit Journal, Symington (2006) suggested that the spoils of the industry 
needed to be more fairly distributed by white commercial farmers amongst their black 
workforces, as this gesture would determine the political stability of the industry in future. 
Secondly, impoverished labourers on a South African apple and pear farm have, with the 
assistance of NGOs, found their way to the last two Tesco Annual General Meetings in 
London. Their mission was to complain about the poor working and living conditions that 
they have personally experienced on their farm due to the allegedly poor financial returns 
received (by the owners of their farms) from Tesco. 
A subsequent visit by the Chairman of Tesco (and some of his executives) in March 2007 
to the FPEF and two of its members (Capespan and Fruitways) resulted in the 
establishment of a Multi-stakeholders' Forum. This Forum - inclusive of every role-player 
involved at the South African end of the pome supply chain - determined that if the South 
African deciduous industry's fruit export performance to the UK was not to be 
compromised, then the following issues related to production and labour practices need to 
be addressed: (1) tenure security; (2) labour rights violations; (3) race and gender 
discrimination; (4) unethical labour broker practices; and (5) the poor treatment of migrant 
labour (Webster, 2007). As a result of what is transpiring in the apple and pear industry, 
table grape producers can anticipate the auditing of their labour practices in the near future 
by their more socially conscious UK customers. Otherwise, as was unambiguously implied 
by the Tesco executives, they might well be forced to take the business elsewhere in 
future. As for the claims on Tesco's prices being too low for the farm to be profitable, that is 
a matter for the Buy-Supply Forum to take up, as proposed in section 5.1.2. 
It is therefore incumbent on current and future industry leaders - for both producer and 
exporter institutions - not to divorce on-farm matters from marketing matters, as the two are 
becoming inextricably linked, particularly in the UK market. Industry leadership is 
encouraged to address the following transformation activities to preserve and enhance the 
competitive state of the industry's future: 
(1) Assist table grape producers in the northern parts of the country (where most 
land claims originate) to successfully transfer land to claimants. The new 










instituting effective mentoring programmes to bridge the knowledge gap 
between the old and the new owners; 
(2) Develop a rapid response system for on-farm matters that are negatively 
affecting the workforce involved, namely those mentioned by Webster (2007) 
above. Remedial action should be applied immediately on such farms, and 
industry leadership can playa valuable, mediatory role in bringing about the 
required attitude changes; 
(3) Institute training programmes for previously disadvantaged individuals on table 
grape farms to lift standards across the board for table grape exports. There is 
currently no dedicated training school or courses within the table grape export 
industry where stakeholders at all levels can further their understanding of the 
value chain and increase their opportunities for career advancement on a 
recognized industry basis. New training courses could be developed, or 
existing training courses could be used (like the Top of the Class programme) 
to uplift targeted individuals immediately and spawn future entrepreneurs; 
(4) Help identify BEE opportunities throughout the South African end of the supply 
chain; and 
(5) Develop 'co-operative structures' for emerging farmers or 'twinning 
programmes' between emerging farmers and commercial marketing agents. 
5.3.3 Industry Leadership and Structure 
One of the hallmarks of being internationally competitive means being the preferred country 
of origin for UK table grape buyers. This implies that South African table grapes should be 
consistently delivered at the right quality, in the right quantity, at the right time and in the 
right place - for the right price. In trying to achieve this, a key concept for table grape 
exporters is how to stay ahead of the global pack, as getting it wrong is the equivalent of 
entering a 'race to the bottom' - that undesirable path of immiserizing growth in which 
commodity producers are locked into a spiral of super-competitiveness but declining 










The key to unlocking the potential of the table grape export sector - not only to the UK 
market but also to all other markets - is coordinated, industry leadership. This thesis has 
attempted to demonstrate that the line between exporters and producers has become 
increasingly blurred over the last five years, and this is predicted to continue. Therefore any 
industry structure - or leadership type - that keeps these two major stakeholders apart will 
be detrimental to the long-term, commercial health of the industry. Innovation at industry 
leadership level requires company owners and industry association leaders to: 
(1) Continually move the industry mindset from being production-led to being 
market-led; 
(2) Replace the old guard of industry hegemony with a new guard of more 
entrepreneurial leadership; 
(3) Persuade producers to pay income tax in good years based on their profits 
earned (rather than spend all profits earned on farm improvements to avoid 
paying any income tax). This would enable producers to build a working 
capital buffer for the bad times that invariably return in commodity cycles. This 
will also make producers less dependent on marketing agents for export 
funding; 
(4) Eradicate the blame culture that has prevented people from taking personal 
responsibility for their own businesses; 
(5) Re-prioritize the industry's strategic asset list by placing the long-term supply 
of sufficient electricity and good quality water at the top of the list; and 
(6) Re-prioritize statutory levy expenditure on post-harvest research and 
innovation rather than on the long-favoured, pre-harvest research. 
Coordination of the major role-players at the highest decision-making level of the industry is 
paramount for a future industry characterized by unity, growth and stability. Three fault-
lines have developed in table grape industry structures in the latter half of the deregulated 
era. Firstly, the GEF exporters' partnership with the producers in SATI was dissolved after 
the 2004/5 season, thereby rekindling the bicephalic structure that has so characterized 
and hampered progress in the industry. Secondly, at the end of 2006, the grape producers 










traditional industry structures and from synergies created over the years. Thirdly, the 
'progressive producer group', which is a consortium of large-volumed table grape 
producers by region, has emerged sporadically from the fringes of the industry to veto 
certain decisions taken by the incumbent industry leadership. 
It is recommended that the decision-makers of the major stakeholders - i.e. the marketing 
agents, producer-exporters and producers - avail themselves of leadership positions on a 
single board that serves the industry's interests. Such a board that governs the strategic 
and financial affairs of the industry could: 
(1) Sit independently from any of the traditional industry associations (namely Fruit 
South Africa, SATI, DFPT and the FPEF). 
(2) Mandate the traditional institutions to carry out various functions on behalf of the 
table grape export industry, either independently or through joint ventures with one 
another. 
(3) Centre the industry's activities around the constellation of strategic 
(competitiveness) themes offered by Spies (2003), namely: innovation and 
technology development; quality of products and services; consumer and market 
demands; transformation within the SA table grape industry; human capital 
development; the facilitation of strategic alliances; and the coordination of industry 
leadership matters. 
(4) Ensure the sourcing of additional industry funds from the private sector (producers, 
exporters and service providers), the public sector (e.g. the Departments of 
Agriculture, Labour and Trade & Industry) and the international donor community. 
Executive capacity in the traditional industry associations should be incentivized to 
cast the donor fund net far and wide, as Section 21 companies in particular qualify 
for such funding due to their representivity, political neutrality and non-profit status. 
Without authentic leadership, widely representative working capital and a strategic intent, 
industry efforts degenerate into a 'talk show'. And with the number of people currently 
employed by and dependent on the table grape industry - especially for its success in its 
biggest single country market - there remains an enormous social responsibility facing 










competitive positions. And it is the leadership's task in the free-market system operating 










Appendix A: Chile - A Formidable Competitor 
6.1 Introduction 
The Chilean economy embraced free-market principles after the demise of the Pinochet 
regime at the start of the 1980s. The country has moved from a closed economy to a fully 
globalized economy. As a result, a very proactive Chilean government has signed 52 Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) that encompass 3.5 billion consumers for its export products 
(Bown, 2006). Chile's GDP is currently growing at a rate of 5%, and its grape export 
industry volumes at a rate of 7% to 8% per annum. The post-Pinochet Chilean government 
has been characterized by strong and stable institutions, transparency, enhanced civil 
liberties and an independent central bank (Bown, 2006). Chile saw the disruption caused 
by deregulation in South Africa as a major opportunity (Promar, 2001), and its exporters 
have been expanding their sales in what are historically considered South Africa's 
traditional markets, namely the UK and the European mainland. 
The competitive position of the South African table grape export industry against the 
Chilean table grape export industry is illustrated in Diagram 6.1. In this diagram, the 
International Market Share (IMS) is plotted against the Export Orientation Ratio (EOR) for 
the various leading table grape exporting countries (NAMC, 2005). As a rule, the closer the 
country approaches the 'upper right' quadrant of the diagram, the more dynamic the export 
industry. And the bigger the circle representing the country concerned, the greater is its 
international share of the business. In this diagram, Chile would be classified as "best in 
class" with an improved position in the last three years. South Africa, tucked away in the 
bottom left quadrant has some way to go, with little progress having been made over the 
time period considered (i.e. 2000 to 2003). 
The steady increase of Chilean grape imports into the UK in particular in the last five years, 
depicted in Figure 6.2, can be attributed to the global currency situation where a relatively 
strong sterling rate - against the dollar and the euro - has afforded Chilean shippers greater 










Diagram 6.1 IMS II EOR for South African II Chilean Grape Exports (and other major 
suppliers) for 2000 and 2003 
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Chile's table grape industry exported the equiva lent of 180 million 4 ,5kg cartons in 200415 
{Bown R, 2006) - nearly four times the size of the South African table grape industry 
According to Ferrandi & van der Mervie (2005) 69% of the Chilean volume was shipped to 
the American market whose size and geographical proximity makes It a natural fi rst choice 
for Chilean producers, and 19% of its volume was shipped to Europe The pie charts in 
Diagram 6,3 illustrate the market-spread difference between the Chilean and South African 
grape export industries in the 2004/5 season , It can be seen that South Africa has a far 
greater reliance on Its EuropeaiVUK market than Chile On Its American market Chile also 
has Significant second and th ird markets in Europe and the Far East respectively; whereas 
South Africa's sendings outside of Europe appear very splintered amongst a number of 
regions 
Diagram 6. 3 Percentage Market Spread between Chile and South Africa (2004) 
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In terms of comparative trade advantage , Jonathan Gersh. MD of Delecta Fruits, insists 
that South Africans cannot ignore or resen t the natural factor endowments inherited by 










East, the Patagonian ice sheet in the south and the Pacific Ocean in the west. Such natural 
barriers afford Chile highly favourable phytosanitary conditions (Trade Latin America, 
2006). Due to its idyllic geographical position, Chile enjoys a mild Mediterranean climate 
with high intraday temperature fluctuations, excellent soils, an abundance of water (and 
therefore hydroelectric energy) from its snow-capped mountains and suffers from relatively 
few pests and diseases. Consequently, the country can produce an array of fruits that 
possess very high brix (sugar) levels and require very few pesticides (Leighton, 2006c). At 
nearly 4000km long, Chile extends through a host of climatic zones that afford it a variety of 
opportunities to grow differing fruit types throughout the year. Sarel Joubert asserts that 
such versatile geographical and climatological assets provide early, middle and late 
growing regions in Chile that give its shippers a 33-week delivery period of grapes to all 
world markets, whereas South Africa only has a 26-week delivery period. 
6.3 Government Support 
The most prominent government institutions active in Chile's successful grape exporting 
campaign have been the Ministry of Agriculture, the Chilean Foreign Ministry and the 
Chilean Export Bureau, otherwise known as ProChile (Leighton, 2006c). The Chilean public 
sector has undoubtedly been a major contributing factor to the competitiveness of Chile's 
table grape export industry (and fruit industry as a whole). Meaningful initiatives include the 
following: 
Firstly, assisting the industry in proactively accessing new export markets for its 
table grape producers like Mainland China,c'o Korea211 and the Canary Islands for 
their table grape exporters. According to the FPEF's submission to the NAMC on 
the Review of the Marketing Act (FPEF, 2006a), Israel - and very recently China -
are the only two countries to which South Africa has achieved new market access 
for its table grapes in the 10-year deregulation period. Market access to Israel for 
South African table grapes was achieved in 2001, and only for Thompson Seedless 
grapes. Very small volumes have actually been sent to Israel, which, according to 
clO According to Mike Grobbelaar, certain production regions in Chile have free access into Mainland China, which makes 
their product more price-competitive than other countries' products (including South Africa). This access also takes pressure 
off Chilean volumes into other markets. 
211 Leon Van Biljon and Sarel Joubert both purport that Chile has been able to offoad its deep red coloured grapes into the 
Korean market in a period where finding another market for them would be difficult. At the time of writing, SA had no official 










industry statistics, comprises of roughly 25 000 4.5kg cartons per annum (DFPT, 
2006). 
Secondly, securing exemption from import duties, as is the case for the first eight 
million Chilean cartons delivered into the EU market. clc South Africa's exports on 
the other hand currently attract a duty of 4.8% CIF.:'L1 John Mare (former SA 
Ambassador to several countries) notes that South African business is noticeably 
under-represented in the decision-making corridors of Brussels, and that EU trade 
negotiation competencies amongst South Africa's public sector officials are a 
shadow of their former self. As a result, Chile and other South American agri-
competitors are securing more favourable tariff access to the EU - through bilateral 
agreements - at South Africa's expense (The Exporter, Feb 2006). 
Thirdly, the Chilean fruit-export industry has historically raised $9 million per annum 
to fund its promotional campaigns abroad (Manning, 2004). 50% of this funding is 
raised via an industry levy (of 3 to 5 US cents/carton), and the other 50% is gleaned 
from government coffers (NAMC, 2005). Chile has, according to Bown (2006), 
personnel dedicated to the promotion of Chilean fresh produce in seven Chilean 
industry offices around the world (namely in Japan, South Korea, Europe, USA, 
Mexico, Colombia and Chile). These promotions comprise a mix of activities, 
namely international trade fairs, points of sale in identified retail stores and major 
advertising campaigns. 214 According to Gustavo Yentzen (former ASOEX marketing 
manager for the US, Canada and Latin American markets), this advertising includes 
(1) a television campaign in the US and Canada that expanded from 16 cities in 
2001 to 39 cities by 2006; and (2) retail point of sale advertising for cross-
promotions of Chilean fruit, wine and salmon products (Trade Latin America, 2006). 
The promotional programmes are annually reviewed, adjusted and improved 
according to overseas customer advice. The slogan "Chile, All Ways Surprising" is 
used to reflect Chile's diverse geography, its modernity, the efficiency of its 
institutions, and the entrepreneurial spirit of its people (Bloomfield, 2006). This type 
e Ie According to the FPJ (Leighton, 2005), Chile's free trade agreement is sometimes construed as a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand it has given Chilean exporters an advantage over their competitors; but on the other hand, it has increased 
the amount of internal competition between Chilean shippers to the EU, to their own detriment. 
213 This was the duty paid in the 2004/5 season (although this duty started at 15% many years prior to this). The import duty 
is being reduced annually by 10% and will be entirely scrapped by 2009. 
21~ According to Gustavo Yentzen (former ASOEX marketing manager for the US, Canada and Latin American markets), this 
advertising included (i) a television campaign in the US and Canada that expanded from 16 cities in 2001 to 39 cities by 2006; 











of fund-raising, the positioning of staff on all the continents around the world and the 
promotional activities described above are in stark contrast to the absence of any 
such generic promotion strategy in the South African table grape export industry 
during the deregulated period. 
Fourthly, considering the current plight of South Africa's ports, it is worth noting the 
innovative steps that the Chilean port authorities are taking to improve the overall 
competitiveness of their ports. The Chilean port of Valparaiso is a good example 
where project "ZEAL" involves the establishment of a pre-port facility (11 km from 
the actual port site) designed to take logistical and operational pressures off the 
existing port. The value-add in the pre-port facility includes storage facilities; cargo 
services; transport and distribution infrastructure; container depots; fiscal, health 
and sanitary installations for government inspection authorities; parking facilities; 
and improved traffic flow into the port and directly on to the ships (Leighton, 2006c). 
6.4 Leadership of ASOEX (Chilean Exporters' Association) 
The Association of Chilean Exporters has played a central role in developing Chile's 
competitiveness. According to the FPJ's supplement on Chile (Leighton, 2006c), Ronald 
Bown, the President of ASOEX maintains that Chile's prominent competitive position in 
relation to its competitors is a result of 'high levels of entrepreneurial skill; a professional 
workforce; low levels of corruption; a market-driven economy that fosters competition; a 
respect for the law; very strong public institutions; high levels of transparency with 
information; and coordinated promotion programmes worldwide'. Bown further alludes to a 
well-organized industry that has shunned the shackles of bureaucracy, that has prioritized 
research and training, and that has realistically assessed its potential in terms of a 
balanced international presence. The chief objectives of ASOEX have been to: 
• Establish two important and active institutions. Firstly, the Fruit Development 
Foundation (FDF) is a non-profit organization that works closely with a 
number of universities and research institutions. Its primary goal is to bring 
the worlds of science and commerce together for the benefit of the industry 
(Leighton, 2006d). Secondly, OTIC AGROCAP provides training 
opportunities to the Chilean fruit sector, not only in the traditional technical 
and marketing fields, but also in teaching the English language and 










skills. OTIC AGROCAP also works in conjunction with the University of Chile 
to ensure a steady stream of agronomists and logistics engineers into the 
industry (Leighton, 2006d). In South Africa, DFPT Research is responsible 
for the transfer of researched information to the producers. In terms of 
training, the South African fruit export industry - including the grape export 
industry - has no training institution like OTIC AGROCAP in Chile. What 
training is done in the South African table grape industry is outsourced to 
service providers. It is also done on an ad hoc basis - mostly for the benefit 
of historically disadvantaged South Africans - and in an uncoordinated way 
between the various fruit kinds. 
• Provide market intelligence to its members and customers through two 
products: (1) an online market information system offering regularly updated 
strategic market intelligence; and (2) the publication of the highly revered 
Expordata Yearbook (Leighton, 2006c). This book is jointly published by 
ASOEX and Decofruit and contains detailed information on weekly, shipped 
figures of more than 500 Chilean exporters and 1500 importing companies. 
The South African Table Grape Industry's (SATI) attempt to provide crucial, 
real-time shipping information to its producer and exporter fraternities has 
been hamstrung by an under-performing central database. Internal 
competition amongst IT service providers, uncooperative shipping lines, 
poor levels of EDI and insufficient upgrading of the industry's central 
database system during the deregulated period have all contributed to a 
below-average provision of strategic information. This state of affairs has 
undoubtedly hampered the industry's international competitive position. 
• Use its membership of prominent fruit institutions in its major markets (like 
the Produce Marketing Association [PMA] in the USA and Freshfel in 
Europe) not only as an effective mouthpiece for its members, but also as an 
opportunity to 'change perceptions, heighten profile and instill a sense of 
collective pride in its members' (Leighton, 2006d). Chile has industry 
personnel positioned on all of its major customer continents around the 
world that constantly promote the interests of the industry and feed back 
market intelligence to their constituencies. As already mentioned earlier, the 
South African table grape industry does not have marketing personnel 











• Develop its own Good Agricultural Practice protocol - ChileGAP - that has 
been accorded equivalent status to the sectoral standard in the EU, namely 
EurepGAP (Leighton, 2005a). This bold initiative instituted a 'uniform system 
of compliance with the major quality specifications put forward by the 
principal markets for Chilean fruit. It facilitated a single procedure for 
auditing and certification making it easier and more cost-effective for 
growers to market their fruit' (Leighton, 2006c). Various South African 
industry associations have separately debated this concept at Board level, 
but it has been stymied by the anticipated costs involved in rolling out such a 
programme. ASOEX, through its presidency of the Southern Hemispheres 
Association of Fresh fruit Exporters (SHAFFE), has helped promote the 
global harmonization of standards to ensure that Southern Hemisphere 
growers don't bear the costs of having to be certified by up to 15 different 
standards (Leighton, 2006d). 
• Promote, through its alliance with ProChile, Chilean fruit across the globe 
under the slogan "World Class Fruit". South African fruit has enjoyed no 
such branding up until 2006, and precious few, small-scale promotional 
activities. 
6.5 Industry Maturity 
The Chilean grape export industry has had over 20 years of operating in a free-market 
environment. Certain aspects of Chile's industry are therefore considered by many GEF 
members to be 'more mature' than the South African table grape export industry. The 
following issues are put forward by the leading South African export houses that 
corroborate this perception: 
• Sarel Joubert says that Chile has passed through the stage of grower 
bankruptcies and has since evolved into an industry dominated by grower-
shippers and by multinational companies (MNCs) that have integrated 
backwards into buying farms. Five grower-shippers (namely David Del 
Curto, Dole, Del Monte, Unifrutti and Chiquita), four of which are MNCs, now 
control 80% of Chile's grape exports. According to the NAMC (2005), these 
leading MNCs have established marketing relationships with their European 










selling to fixed, minimum guaranteed pricing strategies. Leon Van Biljon 
feels that this grower-shipper Chilean system is more sustainable than the 
marketing agent system in South Africa, in that the grower-shipper owns, 
leases or rents the farms, and is therefore guaranteed his own product 
volumes. Leon Van Biljon further adds that the Chilean farms are like 
factories, and do not carry the same cost structures as the 'lifestyle farming' 
still so characteristic of many South African grape farms. The Chilean 
grower-shippers co-load ships, and qualify for substantial shipping rebates, 
which are larger than the South African's shipping rebates, according to 
Mike Grobbelaar. These grower-shippers can defend themselves against 
lower prices in the markets due to the large product portfolios that they 
carry, and the potential cross-subsidization that they can afford. There also 
appears to be a more integrated approach between Chilean producers and 
exporters than their South African counterparts. With the emergence of the 
smaller-sized Chilean producer-exporters, big and small Chilean exporters 
have somehow managed to channel their internal competitiveness better 
than South Africans in the eyes of some of their common customers 
(Leighton, 2006c). 
• Sarel Joubert claims that Chile uses relatively few importers in the EU 
market giving them a distinct advantage over the scores of importers that 
are used for South African product. 
• A strong feature of the Chilean industry has been the quality of its 
communication and information flow from its shippers to the EU importers 
(Promar, 2001). Chile has developed a culture of information sharing which, 
according to Sarel Joubert, yields more advantages than disadvantages -
especially considering the impact that oversupply and misinformation have 
on prices in the markets. Knowledge in advance, for example, enables 
shippers to re-route fruit to potentially more profitable markets. Hubert 
Leclercq maintains that Chile learnt the hard way that if they didn't achieve 
total transparency on what volumes the UK supermarkets were capable of 
taking from their exporters, the supermarket buyers would use the lack of 
information to leverage their buying power and over-procure from Chilean 
suppliers. 
• Chile has also developed more market-related quality standards than South 










Thompson berry size in the UK market is cosmetically superior to the South 
African's 15mm Thompson berry size. Chile refrains from sending class 2 
fruit into the EU market, and instead funnels it off to the wine industry and 
the local Latin American markets (Promar, 2001). Due to a lack of spending 
power, South Africa's SADC region unfortunately does not afford the same 
opportunity, and instead class 2 fruit still finds its way to the EU market, 
though mostly to the European Mainland. 
• Leon Van Biljon states that Chilean exporters are given the responsibility of 
inspecting their own fruit in a quality management system rather than an end 
point inspection system like that currently implemented by the PPECB. An 
industry requires a lot of self-discipline to ensure that product quality is 
voluntarily achieved in line with market standards. Whilst there can be no 
doubt about the cost-effectiveness of the Chilean quality control system 
compared to the South African one, the likelihood of Chileans taking short-
cuts on quality control measures must be considerable. 
• According to two major importers in the EU (Hage in Holland and 
Fruchthansa in Germany), who have worked with both Chile and South 
Africa as supplying countries, Chilean product is now very competitive with 
South African product because of: (1) the way in which individual Chilean 
exporters conduct their businesses; (2) the fact that they work with an 
extremely wide range of product specifications; (3) their ability to adapt their 
specifications to the needs of the market; and (4) the transparency with 
which they share information, making it a very useful planning tool for 
importers into the EU (Leighton, 2006c). 
6.6 Innovation 
Whilst the Chilean table grape export industry cannot claim to necessarily have a more 
innovative culture than its South African counterpart, certain Chilean initiatives over the 
years suggest that a more progressive, entrepreneurial spirit has prevailed in that country. 
The following Chilean initiatives demonstrate this point: 
• According to Sarel Joubert, Chile developed the perforated bag which put a 
stop to berry burst (formerly a common problem in closed bags) and sulphur 










Africa has now adopted this technique, Chile had the first mover advantage 
for a substantial period of time. 
• The Chileans have recently introduced the polypropylene carton to replace 
the cardboard box, which was being weakened by the fumigation process 
(necessary for eradicating the black widow spider prevalent in Californian 
vineyards in particular). Snaploc Chile is a packaging company that recently 
invested US$50 million in a factory in Chile to manufacture polypropylene 
cartons (to move away entirely from the traditional corrugated cardboard 
carton). It combines the fibre-injection and extrusion moulding technologies 
that produces a tough, water-resistant carton that does away with the need 
for glue and staples (Trade Latin America, 2006). 
• According to Louis Kriel (snr), when the American and the UK consumers 
pioneered the red and white seedless markets back in 1983, the Chileans 
immediately started planting these varieties. As a result, they soon edged 
the South African seeded varieties out of the American market. History is 
repeating itself as the Chileans once again capitalize on the opportunity of 
supplying the UK market with the newly developed black seedless variety, 
Autumn Royal. Introducing a new variety into an already crowded market is 
no easy task, but successfully doing so will fill one of the last missing pieces 
of the seedless jigsaw puzzle in the UK market (Leighton, 2006c). 
• With regard to the development of new varieties, Chile's agricultural 
investigation unit (Inia) has been developing its own homegrown portfolio of 
new grape varieties. Two new varieties - Illusion and Isela - are now ready 
for commercial release.21S Key characteristics have been deliberately 
developed in these cultivars to fulfill technical, commercial and political 
needs (Leighton, 2006c). This again is in clear contrast to South Africa's lack 
of new varietal development. Mike Grobbelaar notes that the last South 
African variety produced was the unsuccessful Regal seedless, and that the 
Israelis, Egyptians and Americans are also showing competitive advantage 
over South Africa in new varietal developments. The demise of the ARC is, 
in Louis Kriel's (snr) opinion, symbolic of the government's lack of 
:' 15 As an example, Illusion has been developed (with the consumer in mind) as a large-berried, seedless grape with a very 
fruity, muscatel flavour. It has a post-harvest survival period of 25 days making it ideal for the distant European market. It is a 
very early variety with very high yields - 4000 cartons per hectare - and is easier to prune and handle than other grape 
varieties. It can be grown in the Valparaiso region close to the major port, which minimizes transport costs. Chile has been 
overly dependent on California for its varieties, and Illusion offers Chile an opportunity to 'trade' its home grown varieties with 










commitment to the industry since 1994.c16 To add insult to injury, Louis Kriel 
(snr) cited the emigration of highly qualified technical staff - trained with 
South African taxpayers' money - to competitors such as Chile, Argentina 
and California. 
• Chile's table grape export growth to the UK is largely due to its strategic 
growth in Crimson seedless. This Chilean 'red revolution' has (1) caused the 
upliftment of the entire category; (2) enabled the Chileans to extend their 
season beyond the limits of their green grapes; (3) allowed retailers to 
maintain their price points; and (4) enabled buyers to remove some of the 
less reliable product from Chile's competing sources (Leighton, 2006c). 
Diagram 6.4 demonstrates the rise of the 'red revolution' (Crimson 
Seedless) in the Chilean portfolio of grape products. Essentially the growth 
of this variety went from 1 % in 2000 to 11 % by 2004 of the total Chilean 
production portfolio. 
• The Chileans invented the forced-air cooling method (to pre-cool grapes on 
entering the pack house), which greatly reduced the time - and therefore 
cost - it took to get grapes on temperature. m The longer grapes stand in the 
pack house for cooling, the more congestion is experienced, especially in 
the peak intake weeks. Product needs to move through the system as fast 
as possible, and if faster cooling can de-congest the pack house sooner, 
bigger facilities do not have to be built (which would be an added cost). 
South Africa has largely adopted this technique now, but its systems 
remained antiquated for many years until it did so. 
• Sarel Joubert claims that Chile has also demonstrated superior techniques 
in the storage of their grapes. They look at controlled atmosphere 
treatments, and at picking the best crop to store while moving the inferior 
product to market as quickly as possible. Like the Chileans, South Africans 
need to adopt the mindset of storing their product in the market (rather than 
in cold stores back in South Africa). It is more flexible though more 
expensive to do so, and the right varieties with the right post harvest 
cl6 It should be noted that while South Africa as a country has not produced new varieties through any of its research 
institutes during the deregulated era, private enterprise has achieved notable exceptions. In this regard, At Hoekstra and 
Quinton van den Bergh, both producers, have developed commercial varieties for their own accounts. 
c 17 A two to three day saving was achieved with this new process, which is the difference between a conSignment of product 
making it to the port to be loaded onto a vessel, versus having to wait for another five or more days for the next vessel to dock 










treatments are needed to achieve this , Storing gives ways and means of 
surviving in a difficutt period especialty when the prices are not satisfactory 
Or when there's too much product in the market 
Diagram 6.4 Growth of the Chilean Crimson Seedless in four years 
(2000 to 2004) 
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6.7 Conclusion 
In the light of what has been wri tten in this appendix, the following key success factors 
have laun<:hed Chile into a dominant supplying position of fresh fru its , and therefore table 
grapes, an 'open door policy on Inward Investment ' strong public and private sector 
linkages, a strong research and development base; an active exporters association 
supported finanCial ly by government continuous generic promotions in key International 
markets, a we ll balanced portfolio of produds- successful market access negotiations 
significant investments In post-harvest technology; and a clear market-led mindsel. Bown 
(2006) In his speech to the South Alrican industry listed the following additional success 
factors' growers and exporters working strongly together in areas 01 mutual interest: high 










stakeholders; and a desire across the industry for excellence in everything that is done. 
Finally, the few success factors not mentioned above but also covered by the President of 
Fedefruta - the Chilean Fruit Growers' Federation - include: political stability in Chile with 
low levels of corruption; a law abiding population; and the constant effort by everyone in the 
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